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WHAT IS RELIGION?

A PROTEST AGAINST

"THE SPIRIT OF THE AGE."

A PLEA FOR

THE REALITY OF THE SPIRITUAL.

BY

REV. R. W. MEMMINGER.

"For the things which are seen are temporal; but the things which are not seen are eternal."

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INTRODUCTION.

"THE little light of awakened human intelligence shines so mere a spark amid the abyss of the Unknown and Unknowable — seems so insufficient to do more than illuminate the imperfections that cannot be remedied, the aspirations that cannot be realized, of man's own nature. But in this sadness, this consciousness of the limitation of man, this sense of an open secret which he cannot penetrate, lies the essence of all religion; and the attempt to embody it in the forms furnished by the intellect is the origin of the higher theologies. . . . If the religion of the present differs from that of the past, it is because the theology of the present has become more scientific than that of the past; because it has not only renounced idols of wood and idols of stone, but begins to see the necessity of breaking in pieces the idols built up of books and traditions and fine-spun ecclesiastical cobwebs; and of cherishing the noblest and most human of man's emotions, by worship 'of the most part of the silent sort,' at the altar of the Unknown and Unknowable." (Huxley's *Lay Sermons.*)

Such is the view taken of religion by one of the leading scientific minds of the day. It is the natural result of an idolatry of physical science. There are but three objects which man can know — God, Nature, and Self. It is possible that the attention should be so exclusively directed to any one of these objects, that the others should be entirely lost sight of. In the present age, the thinking mind of the

public is almost exclusively directed towards one of these objects, namely, nature. The knowledge of self, under all its aspects and in all its relations, is now almost entirely neglected. To devote one's attention to the study of this so-called incomprehensible subject, is thought to be but time thrown away. Ethics, metaphysics, psychology, as sciences, are by the public almost entirely ignored. There are perhaps a few thinking men who still continue to be interested in these subjects; but their interest must be confined to themselves. Supposing they propound their views, it is almost impossible to get the ear and to awaken the interest of the public. Plato, the father of metaphysics, Socrates, of ethics, are forgotten; Des Cartes is hardly known. It seems to be taken for granted now, that it is impossible to arrive at anything like the truth in these departments of knowledge. And yet, after all, they are the most important, and are those which relate to what most vitally concerns mankind.

Consciousness is the basis, the condition of all knowledge. To know nature, we must read off the impressions which it makes upon our consciousness. This the scientists, who so exalt the study of nature, while they essay to throw contempt upon that which relates to self, should remember: we only know anything outside of us, because we are conscious of it within. The appeal, then, to consciousness must in all cases be the final one. What we are conscious of as occurring within, we know as confidently as anything that occurs without. The internal facts revealed by consciousness are just as much matters of certainty as are those external facts about which scientists seem to feel so confident. Now one of these facts which we find within is the consciousness of God, and this the scientist will generally allow. It is admitted in the oracular utterance of our text; it is granted in the admission that there is any such thing

in the world as religion. But while the being of God is admitted, His nature is wholly misunderstood. An exclusive attention to one object has so engrossed and absorbed the mind of the scientist, that he is incapable of seeing anything else. He forgets that there is anything besides Nature, and thinks it the "all in all." And yet, being a religious creature, he cannot help at the same time feeling the necessity for a Deity, in whom he may gratify his religious instincts. To meet this demand, he deifies Nature, and worships it. He stands awe-struck, solemnized, with uncovered head, in the presence of his Nature-god; he is filled with sorrow because his God is to him, and must forever remain, unknown. The impossibility of ever arriving at a thorough knowledge of the vastness of Nature fills his soul with a sad melancholy; and this, we suppose, takes the place of what is known, in a truly religious experience, as sorrow for sin, or penitence.

This worship of Nature is the religion of science. It is Pantheism. The personal God, as distinct from His works, has disappeared, and Nature is God, and God is Nature. God has, under such a scheme, ceased to be; while He is acknowledged in words, he is denied in fact. Pantheism is Atheism; and yet, while it deceives the soul, it satisfies many of its cravings — therefore its power and its fascination. In order, then, to arrive at the truth, we propose entering upon an investigation of the subject: What is Religion? We propose answering this question.

In the first place, then, we ground ourselves upon the basis of Consciousness. In opposition to the prevailing tendency of the times, we propose directing our attention to the internal rather than the external. Consciousness is the mirror into which we propose looking, and we will read off the internal facts of man's nature as we find them there reflected.

Here we stand on the ground of absolute certainty. What I am conscious of, I know to be a fact, inasmuch as I am conscious of it; of this I am certain, more certain than of anything else in the world. I am certain of the existence of what I see without me, because I am conscious of seeing it; and I am just as certain of what I see within me, more certain in fact, because what I see within, I see immediately, without any interposing medium of transmission; whereas, what I see without is made known to me through the transmission of the senses, and the senses may sometimes introduce wrong impressions into the mind. The facts of the internal consciousness are therefore inevitably certain; all that is required is the power to look within and to see one's self. The certainty which arises from such a process is, of course, entirely personal; it cannot be verified, as in the external, by co-operative observation. The certainty of the facts of consciousness is not increased by combined testimony. This only lays the basis for a generalization as to what are the elements of human nature, or the facts of the human consciousness. The observation, then, of the internal facts of consciousness by different individuals, serves as a basis for a psychological science; upon them we can generalize, and so arrive at the elements and laws of human nature. The certainty, however, in each individual case, as to his own personal observation, is in his own consciousness final; it cannot be effected by the result of such generalization.

In entering upon the investigation of the subject of Religion, we must begin, then, with the Consciousness. Any *form* of religion is but a product, the result of certain forces which are to be found within human nature. The only way by which we can arrive at a knowledge of these forces is by appealing to the consciousness. These forces, then, will be found existing as facts or as elements in the human

consciousness. We will begin by making an analysis of those facts or elements contained in what may be called, specifically, "the religious consciousness," considering them in their organic connection with each other. Passing from such an analysis, we will proceed to consider the subject synthetically. Different arrangements or combinations of these elements give rise to different forms of life. One such combination gives rise to what may be termed the Moral life, another to the Religious life; and, again, a third to what we have termed the Divine life. Next we pass on to consider the instrumentality by means of which the facts of the religious consciousness are brought out — the instrumentality, therefore, by means of which human nature is regenerated and educated for a higher sphere of existence. And this will necessitate a notice of the danger we of this present age are in, of losing faith in that Divine instrumentality — the Holy Scriptures. Finally, we will conclude with a protest against the materialism of the age, with a plea for the reality of the facts of religion, and for Christianity as being "the power of God unto salvation to every one that believeth."

WHAT IS RELIGION?

PART I.—AN ANALYSIS.

CHAPTER I.

THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF GOD.

A CAREFUL analysis of the human consciousness gives us the following result: A consciousness of self — of the world — and of God. These three elements, taken together, go to make up the unity of the human consciousness. Each of these conditions has its own peculiar group of sciences, with their own proper methods of investigation. All that pertains to metaphysical science belongs properly to the consciousness of self; its method being, in the first place, observation founded on introspection, and then induction and verification, landing us thus in the ultimate truths of metaphysical and psychological investigation.

To the consciousness of the world pertain all the physical sciences, its method being, as is well understood, induction. In this case, observation is founded, not upon introspection, as in the metaphysical,— but upon the report of the senses. The result of all physical inquiries belongs to, and in proportion to its thoroughness, so far, satisfies the demands of, man's consciousness of the world.

All that belongs to what is termed religion is subject-matter peculiar to the consciousness of God.

A consciousness of the existence; of the reality of things lies at the basis of all knowledge ; without such a conviction it would be impossible to be interested in, or to be stimulated to the acquirement of any knowledge. Let a universal skepticism but prevail, let the mind be in doubt as to the reality of self, or of the world, or of God, and, as a matter of course, it must be paralyzed. Doubt as to absolute reality and truth, is inactivity, mental stagnation, and death. Consciousness carries with it absolute certainty. I am absolutely certain that I am, because I am conscious of it. I know, or am certain, that there is something external to myself — that the whole world of nature is a reality, because I am conscious of it. In both cases, the consciousness is immediate and necessary, differing only in the modes of verification. In the former case, consciousness is verified by introspection, or, as Descartes would say, *cogito ergo sum.* In the latter case, the verification, though not so immediate, is just as satisfactory, being through the senses.

Introspection, by itself, could never bring us to the intellectual fact of self-consciousness, nor could the report of the senses bring with it the consciousness of nature; both of them must be preceded by an intellectual condition.

Psychological observation and physical observation are simply the instrumentalities which, logically speaking, a previously existing mental status uses for its information and satisfaction. The knowledge of the *I* is in the first place limited and confused ; self-consciousness is not satisfied with such ignorance, but seeks a clear, extended, and entire knowledge of itself. Until this self-knowledge becomes complete, self-consciousness will not be satisfied. Not until I know myself as I am known by the Omniscient, will my yearnings be quenched. Socrates was the apostle of

this department of knowledge. "Know thyself," was the dictum of his philosophy, and must remain that of every true philosopher, until self-knowledge corresponds to the demands of self-consciousness. The same conditions are true of the state of a consciousness of the world. From the very first, by a necessity of his nature, man is conscious of the external; but in the primary stages of his development, and in the corresponding rude stages of the historic development of the race, this knowledge is limited and confused. The senses are the means used by the reason for the increase and clearing up of this knowledge. The physical sciences apply themselves to this work, and as they extend their horizon, and take in all that can be known of nature, man's consciousness of the world becomes more clear and distinct, and if it were possible to gain a distinct knowledge of the whole physical creation, then, too, would the cravings of this consciousness become satisfied, and man would rest in the fulness of a complete knowledge of the whole of the physical creation.

And now as to the consciousness of God. This, just as in the cases already considered, is an immediate, necessary condition of the soul.

It is impossible for the human mind, unless maimed in some of its departments, to fail to find these three elements clearly defined. Man must necessarily feel conscious of his own existence, of the existence of the world, and of God. It is true that these elements may exist in different minds in different proportions. In some, self-consciousness may predominate; and here we find the psychological and metaphysical philosopher, — in fine, all the forms of egoism. In others the consciousness of the world may predominate; this gives us the physical philosopher, and all those who live in and for the sensuous. And then, again, in a third class, the consciousness of God may predominate; and this

gives us the theologian, and all those who are properly termed religious.

In order to a full and healthy intellectual development, not only should these three elements exist together, but also in proper proportions. Any exaggeration must necessarily bring with it intellectual unhealthiness.

Now, just as in the other cases the knowledge corresponding to those mental states is, in the first place, limited and confused, so it is in this.

The consciousness of God exists before any form of religion. All these forms are but the products which a necessity of our nature brings forth. They are the forms with which the forces of man's nature, under the pressure of a consciousness, seek to satisfy themselves.

At the basis, and as the basis of every form of religion, lies this principle, namely, the consciousness of God. The question is not whether there is such a being. That we know already. We are conscious of His being, just as we are of the world and of ourselves. No evidence is required to prove the facts of consciousness; they are already proven by the very highest kind of evidence, nay, they are more than proven, they are known. We know that we are, that there is a world, and we just as necessarily know that there is a God,— we are conscious of His being. It is this conviction or consciousness that makes man susceptible of divine knowledge. By it the mind is opened to, and is anxious for further knowledge. Being conscious of a God, we are pressed to know more of Him, and this puts the soul into a state of activity, and, unless impeded, it proceeds to use all the means at its command to increase its knowledge on this subject. Under the influence of a state of consciousness, intuitively the soul knows and feels itself to be in the presence of, and in contact with the Infinite and the Eternal, and it feels after them, if haply it may find them.

Under the pressure of a self-consciousness, and rendered susceptible of self-knowledge thereby, the soul seeks to know itself. Under the pressure of a consciousness of the world, man seeks to know nature ; and under the pressure of a consciousness of God, man seeks to know God. And in proportion to the fulness and truthfulness of his knowledge will be the grade and nature of his religion. The religion which has as its basis ignorance, and error as to the Divine Being, will be superstitious and degrading just in proportion as these ingredients enter its theology. The religion which has as the basis of its theology knowledge and truth will be accordingly elevated, and will, so far, satisfy the cravings of a divine consciousness. When, in answer to the inarticulate cravings of man's divine consciousness, there comes the full knowledge of God, then will these yearnings be satisfied, and, this consciousness being filled, will rest in a sense of beatific satisfaction. Under the influence of the consciousness of God, man feels himself in contact with a dread unknown. The oppressive sense of a dim, unknown, undefined presence presses upon him ; inarticulate longings agitate the soul, and man longs to, and then tries to fathom this dread unknown. We can be conscious of the presence and existence of something that we see not, nor hear, nor can understand ; and yet we feel and know that it is there — a reality. The consciousness of God, in all its stages of development, instinctively impels the mind to a formation of a complete and adequate conception of the object with which it is concerned. Evidently there are degrees in the development of this consciousness. In the individual there is a variation. At one period of life, in the same individual, there is a more vivid consciousness of God than at another, and then the individual is most religious, and most anxious to know Him. Again, one person is more religious than another ; that is to say, he is more sensitively con-

scious of his God. And finally, the race is at one time more religious than at another. At certain periods in the historic development of the race, the atmosphere becomes charged with religious electricity. Such periods are times of great religious agitation: witness the Reformation, the rise and rapid progress of the mendicant orders in the Roman Church, Puritanism and Methodism in England, and various other seasons of religious revival. There may, too, be an intensifying of the religious consciousness, and yet the prevalence of great spiritual ignorance. Interest may be awakened without the means of satisfying it. Where this occurs in the individual, it makes him superstitious, or a bigot. In the race or people, it creates, generally, cruelty and persecution: witness Mohammedanism in the East; in the West, the Crusades and the cruelties of the Inquisition.

The object which corresponds to the consciousness of God, is God. Self and the world corresponding to their respective subjective states, are intelligible. And although the knowledge of these objects is, in the first place, limited and confused, still the mind has from the very first some definite conception of the object with which it is concerned. On the other hand, the conception which the mind forms of the object corresponding to the consciousness of God is not definite; it is, as we have said, dim and undefined. Man feels himself in the presence of the Infinite, in contact with the Eternal; and from the very nature of the case, because the object is infinite and eternal, therefore it is undefined. To conceive of it exceeds the power of the imagination, and man expresses his sense of this in reverence, awe, and in worship. It is this very awfulness of the thing with which man feels himself to be in contact that makes religion. Worship is only possible when its object is conceived of as infinite and eternal. There is an object; it is undefined. Man is conscious of it, and, in the spirit of

awe and reverence, he worships it. There is, then, a reality which man is conscious of as God, and which he seeks to know.

The various forms of religion give us the different conceptions of God which man has aimed at. Such a conception is at the basis of every form of religion, and gives us its theism. These, then, are the elements which go to make up the unity of any form of religion. First, there is a consciousness of God which renders man capable of religion; next, from this capacity, and under its pressure, there arises a conception of the Deity which is the theism of religion, and lies at its basis. This conception, in its turn, under the pressure of a consciousness of the immediate contact of its subject with man, becomes the object of worship, the highest form of which is prayer. And lastly, since in the formation of the theism of a religion it is impossible to leave out the elements of man's moral nature. Since therefore the conception must and will include a moral character, it follows that religion will have in it a moral element. God cannot be conceived of, even under the light of nature, but as approving the right and as disapproving of the wrong. Hence, then, along with the theism of every religion is a code of morality, as expressive of the will of God. Consciousness of the Deity makes the obligation of this law to be felt, and the breaking of it to be dreaded. And at this point it is that the cultus of a religion springs up. The moral law gives rise to it. Man feels and knows that he breaks that law; he fears the Deity, and hence his efforts to propitiate Him. The cultus of a religion is to be found in the rite of sacrifice. Prayer is the inward worship of the soul; sacrifice the outward. Both spring out of a consciousness of God. The one is the expression of weakness and dependence; the other, of guilty fear.

To be conscious of anything proves that it is; we cannot be conscious of that which is not: it is a contradiction of terms. Faith is the evidence of things unseen. To be conscious is to be certain, requires no proof, is complete in itself. And we can be just as conscious of the unseen, and, consequently, as certain of its existence as of the seen. I am conscious of nature through my senses; but I am conscious of God through no medium, but immediately.

The contact of spirit with spirit is nearer and more immediate than that of spirit with matter. No medium is required; contact is immediate; spirit communes with spirit. The All-spirit, the Omnipresent, is therefore in immediate contact with every created spirit, and there is that in us which is conscious of this. The conception which we form of the Deity is a thing entirely distinct from His being. Of His being we are conscious; of our conception of Him we are conscious only that we have it, that it is our idea of Him; and therefore, though certain of it as existing in us, we are not certain of it as belonging to Him. This conception is knowledge; it may be true — that is, an adequate conception of the original — or it may not be. We may misconceive God, and so have a false God. The mind, in the act of intuition, looking out for truth, does not look at ideas, but at things; it looks out of itself. It fixes its glance upon substance; it beholds, and as the result of its effort it gains an idea. An idea, then, is the impression made upon the mind in its cognizance of spiritual substance presented before it — the intellectual conception which it forms of spiritual substance. And just as in nature the scene presenting itself before the vision is dependent upon the eye, so in the world of Spirit the idea, the view which the mind takes of spiritual substance, varies with the condition of the intellectual vision. The more practised

and powerful the mind, the clearer the idea. The weaker the mind, the more confused its intellectual conceptions.

Thus, then, in the first place we have substance, existence, realities, self, the world, and God. Of these objects we are conscious. Next we have our ideas of them, which may be more or less perfect, and more or less false; and these ideas taken together constitute our fund of knowledge. Of this we are conscious only as of its being ours; we know not whether it corresponds with the reality; therefore, in this case, we believe or think only.

Consciousness is the organ for taking cognizance of substance or being; it is this only that it takes hold of and makes known to us. But substance cannot remain long before the mind, if at all, without having qualities attached to it. The very first operation of mind is to conceive of and to know that of which it is conscious. Synchronously, therefore, with the consciousness of being, arises some conception of it; and this conception arises from the attaching of qualities to the substance. A child, for instance, begins with being conscious of God as a substance; his mind is prepared and ready to conceive of Him. Gradually, in the course of education, one after another attribute is attached to this substance, different objects are pointed out and assigned to God as their creator; everything that is not made by man, the child is informed, is created by God. He learns thus to conceive of Him as the Creator. The substance is now beginning to leave the region of the undefined and to take form. Again, moral attributes are assigned, and by the pupil attached to this substance; and so on, until the pupil has learned to attach all that is known of God to Him; and thus his conception is completed. Now, it is a law of the mind that substance should absorb qualities, and that thenceforth there is no distinction in the mind between them. Qualities attach themselves so abso-

lutely to substance that they cease to be viewed as distinct from substance itself. Thus it happens that, although our conception of God is a different thing from His substance, nevertheless, when we have attained to a knowledge of Him, we are conscious of Him according to such conception of Him. We have been taught that God is omnipotent, omnipresent, omniscient, and eternal; we have learned, moreover, that He is holy, just, and good; and we are therefore conscious of Him as such. Henceforth we cannot disconnect these qualities from his substance, and must be conscious of Him under such conditions. The knowledge which we have of a thing thus passes over into the region of our consciousness. Thus, though all men are conscious of the same substance, they are not of the same God; the conceptions which they have formed of that substance separate them from each other. The Hindoo is conscious of God as Brahm or Buddha, the Mohammedan as Allah, the Jew as Jehovah, and the Christian as the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. There are certain qualities and attributes which mankind almost universally agree in assigning to the Divine substance, namely, what we know as the natural attributes — omnipotence, omnipresence, self-existence, omniscience, and eternity. But in relation to the moral character of the Deity there is much diversity of opinion. The Jewish and the Christian are the most familiar to us. The conspicuous attribute assigned to God, under the Old Testament dispensation, is holiness; a new conception to the world, one, therefore, which required a long and elaborate system of education before it could be planted in the human mind. No religion compares with the Jewish in the conception which it offers of the Deity. In none of them does His personality so clearly and so conspicuously stand out. The Christian conception is exactly that of the Jewish, more clearly enunciated, and pre-

senting, moreover, to the human mind the mode of existence in the Divine substance, namely, as Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. We then, as Christians, are conscious of God not merely as Jehovah, but also as the Triune one — the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. This conception has passed over into the region of our consciousness; we cannot think of God without this conception coming with it; the attribute has lost itself in the substance. We look up at the stars, and at once we conceive of our God as omnipotent; and we feel that he is with us as omnipresent. We look out upon the beauty of a summer landscape, and we are conscious of Him as our Father. The Christian consciousness of God contains, then, in it all that is made known of Him in the Old and New Testament. The Christian cannot be conscious of God but as therein represented. Different aspects of the Divine character, and different attributes may, according to circumstances, occupy the mind in its periods of consciousness; but all of them will be found there, and all can be elicited when the proper occasion presents itself. And this Christian consciousness has, even unwittingly, a powerful effect upon human character and conduct; for man cannot but be more or less affected by his knowledge of God. His consciousness of Him is a fact in his constitution. It may be much repressed, nay almost extinguished, but wherever it does occur, it brings with it all that is known of God. His mightiness and His holiness rise before the mind, and in the individual, and in the mass, even such a temporary and fluctuating consciousness produces a mighty effect. It makes this nineteenth century, with all its advance of civilization, what it is. It is this knowledge of God that puts us where we now find ourselves in the historic development of the race. The knowledge of God is a mighty element in the world's advance. Man may not recognize it, still it

is a power. And it is this internal element of human nature that makes it so ; we cannot escape ourselves, and what we know of God through this vital inlet to our very immortal being will affect us. As living under the light of Christianity, we must be conscious of, and consequently affected by our vital contact with the Triune Jehovah.

The consciousness of God is, then, but the basis and root of religion. It renders the soul susceptible of the knowledge of the Divine, and moves it from its very depths to seek after God. It haunts man with a sense of his contact with the unseen, infinite, and eternal ; but by itself it is blind. By it, man, under the strongest kind of certainty of which his nature is susceptible, becomes conscious of the being of something besides himself and nature — of the being of an invisible, infinite, and yet unknown God. Thus he is susceptible of, and, according as the consciousness is more or less developed, is anxious for light. Revelation is the only adequate method by which this want can be supplied ; without it, man must inevitably sink into idolatry.

CHAPTER II.

THEISM.

WHAT is a theism? It is the conception which the mind forms of God — the idea which the mind forms of the God with whom it feels itself to be in immediate contact. God, as a reality, exists outside of the soul. It must form to itself some conception of this Being. To be continually on the strain of seeking to behold the Infinite is, as an exercise, too severe to be long continued. The mind, therefore, forms an idea which is, as it were, the image of the reality, at least in so far as it is able to conceive of it. And this image it can make the object of its contemplation without any peculiar effort, whenever it feels disposed to. God exists, then, in the mind as an idea. The theism of a religion gives us that idea.

As soon as the consciousness of God begins to dawn upon the human mind (which takes place synchronously with the development of the other elements of human consciousness), at once there begins to arise, corresponding to it, an idea of the Deity. Necessarily, the mind begins to construct for itself a conception of God. The sources from which it may draw in proceeding to construct this conception are, in brief, twofold — revelation, and man's own unassisted powers. We will for the present confine ourselves to the consideration of the latter as a source of knowledge.

The human race, as one form of existence, is an organism. Every individual is but a part and member of the whole. No individual stands out before us as entirely isolated; none but the first father of the race has ever occupied such a position. In every individual, therefore, we

have the result of preceding generations, and his own ideas are not, as he might at first think, entirely his own, but are results arising from the communicated thoughts and conceptions of the individuals of ages gone by. Every individual is therefore related to, and dependent upon the past, and necessarily all his conceptions will be affected more or less by such relation.

The conception of God, like all others, is liable to be affected by these circumstances, even supposing there be no revelation; still men in times past must and have formed some conception of the Deity, and this conception naturally is handed down from father to son, from generation to generation, constituting thus what may be termed a traditional theism. Of course, the mind of every individual forming a link in this sequence will necessarily be affected more or less by such traditional knowledge. Such being the state of the case, it becomes almost impossible for the human mind, untrammelled, and unbiassed by tradition, to form an original conception of the Deity. Perhaps, however, some such instances have really occurred among the great minds of the past; men who have been enabled to throw off the whole pressure of the past, and to think and conceive for themselves as if they stood alone in the world. Plato and Socrates, among the Greeks, are instances in point, and among other nations, no doubt, there are cases just as striking. All the founders of new religions must, to some extent, partake of this character — must have stood out alone, must have trampled upon the prejudices and ignorance of the past, and have thought for themselves.

Taking, then, for granted the possibility of an original conception of the Deity, let us consider the sources from which it must draw its material. Evidently they are twofold: self and nature. In the one we will find the spiritual and the moral; in the other, the Infinite. The two,

taken together, will give us a possible human conception of God. To form an adequate conception of the Deity, both of these sources must be drawn upon. The impressions created by the contemplation or study of nature must be carefully supplemented by those obtained from the contemplation of self. Without a careful observance of this rule, man must necessarily form a one-sided notion of the Deity. Suppose, for instance, nature only be contemplated. Under such circumstances there will arise upon the mind impressions adapted to the infinite; the ocean in its vastness, the mountain in its grandeur, the desert in its awfulness, all create impressions. In the view of such sublime objects there sweep through the soul feelings all but inexpressible; awe and reverence, terror and admiration, alternately, and then again all together rush upon the soul, and oftentimes man falls down and in mute admiration worships the creature rather than the Creator. These feelings find their full correspondent only in the infinite; and in the religious soul where the consciousness of God is developed, and where God is kept separate from nature, such feelings naturally pass over to their corresponding object, and man religiously, under the pressure of such impressions, worships the God of nature. All that is grand, and terrible, and beautiful in nature, thus goes first towards producing emotions; secondarily, in reinforcing the impressions of the soul, as existing in its consciousness of God, of his omnipresence and his infinity. The impressions produced in the contemplation of the Beautiful modify to some extent the first, as to this awfulness, and enables to enter into that conception something of goodness. But the former impression is in the preponderance, and man, in the contemplation of nature, naturally rises to the idea of the eternal power and Godhead of the Deity. Thus we see how, in the contemplation of nature, indirectly there

arises within the soul, through the medium of the sensibilities, some idea of His being; an idea, however, which from its very nature must be indefinite. The Infinite can have no form, cannot be conceived of by the finite; there can therefore be no human idea of it; man can therefore be only conscious of it, without conceiving of it. None but God himself, as in the "Logos," can form an idea of himself. The idea of God derived, then, from the contemplation of nature, must necessarily be indefinite. In it man is simply intensely conscious of God's infinity, of "his eternal power and Godhead," as the inspired apostle puts it. How the impressions produced in the contemplation of nature come to pass over from one object, and be transferred to another; how they happen to leave nature, and to attach themselves to God; how the soul comes to transfer those emotions arising in the contemplation of the grand, or terrible, or awful, or beautiful; from the object giving rise to them, to the Deity; why it does so? we can only answer by saying, such is the fact. That such an operation does take place is a psychical fact; it admits of no explanation: it is a law, a fundamental fact. Reason has nothing to do with the operation; it is immediate. If reason comes in and presumes to do its work, the operation is prevented. Reason, it is true, has its place in the argument from design, and justly argues that when contrivance is so intricate, so evidently adapted to ends, there must be a designer, and one of profound wisdom. But this is not the process employed here, reason interrupts. The soul, in contemplation of nature, at once, through its sensibilities, rises into an intensified consciousness of the infinity of the Creator. There is no argument here; it would in fact only serve to break the chain by which the soul makes fast at once to its God. This cold method can never be conclusive as to the reality of God. After the argument is com-

plete, and although there may seem to be no possible flaw in it, still the soul is cold and suspicious. By an irrefragable argument, God is proved to be of profound wisdom; but still the soul is not moved: it is convinced, we must say, for the argument is conclusive and irrefragable; but intellectual conviction does not seem to be enough. The soul must know; and it cannot know of that which is without it but through its consciousness. We say, without it; but perhaps this needs modification. We are conscious of God, no doubt, because he is actually in the soul — not a fact of the soul, but nevertheless in some inexplicable way within it; for one cannot properly be said to be conscious of that which is without. Reason, then, is not the proper organ; there is no organ. The soul is *conscious* of God. He who is without this consciousness cannot know God. Reason may convince, may prove the wisdom, goodness, greatness of God; but still He will be without the soul. Unless, in the first place, the soul be conscious of God, all the efforts of reason, all arguments will be unavailing. Reason can legitimately follow and confirm consciousness, but not precede it. There is a vitality, a realization in the acts of the soul during its state of consciousness to which no other state approximates. During such a state the soul spiritually discerns its object, is in immediate contact with it, and feels such impressions as such object by its nature is calculated to awaken. Under any other state, as for instance during an intellectual process, the soul is engaged in examining, analyzing, comparing, generalizing. It is looking at parts, and not at the whole; it is occupied in the details of a process, has lost sight of the object which in the first place gave rise to this examination and process.

The chasm subsisting between a state of intellectual conviction and that of a consciousness of anything is profound. The two states are entirely distinct. An intellectual con-

viction never has in it that vitality which is attendant upon a fact of the consciousness. Thus, metaphysically, we may clearly prove the existence and attributes of God, and still such a conviction may be wholly uninfluential — a demonstration, an intellectual fact, and yet a dead one. But let the consciousness of God dawn upon the soul, and at once it is alive, moving, feeling after Him — fearing, worshipping, praying to Him.

The contemplation of nature, then, produces impressions. These the religious soul at once carries over to the being or substance of God, as existing in the consciousness of Him, and attaches them to it. These impressions all clustering around the dim, undefined notion of the Infinite, deepen and vivify it as a fact in the consciousness, making it almost personal, the infinite to be the Infinite One. And if the intensifying of a previously existing fact of consciousness can be said to be a defining, we might say that so far nature has aided in the formation of a theism. The God of such a theism would evidently be a reality, a vitality in the soul; but still such a conception must necessarily be wholly inadequate. While the eternal power and Godhead of the Deity would be known, still, without something further, man would remain ignorant of the moral character of God, and under such circumstances would find it impossible to arrive at the knowledge of the way in which he should serve Him; in the depths of his soul he would reverence and worship Him, in his eternal power and Godhead; provided the consciousness of moral guilt be not awakened, such a worshipper, like Cain, might deem it becoming, as expressive of his homage, to present before Him an offering of the first-fruits of the earth.

Another very important element must then enter into man's conception of the Deity before it can by any means be an adequate one, and before it will meet the demands of the human consciousness.

Man is conscious not only of nature, but also of self, and in his conception of the Deity, both of these elements must necessarily exercise an important influence. The principal elements entering into the unity of self, and in fact constituting it, are thought, and moral character; both of these properties the soul instantly and instinctively transfers to the Deity, and at once conceives of Him as possessing them. Just as in the contemplation of nature the soul conceives of the Deity as the Infinite One, so in the contemplation of the intellectual and moral powers of human nature, man is necessitated to conceive of God as intellectual and moral. In both cases, the conception, from its very nature, is indefinite. In the one case, God is viewed as the Infinite; it is the eternal power and Godhead that pass before the mind; and since the mind is finite, it cannot grasp the whole, cannot hold before it steadily the idea of the Infinite; hence the conception is dim and undefined. The mind *feels* and is *conscious* of the Infinite, rather than apprehends it. Thought, too, and moral character, as transferred to the Deity, are of the nature of the Infinite. His thought is felt to be incomprehensible, his moral character perfection. Of both of these man may have some dim idea, of neither a comprehension. The conception of the Deity formed thus from these sources, will necessarily, then, be indefinite. Nature gives only an indefinite impression of His infinity; self, but an indefinite impression of his intellect and moral character. Such would be the nature of a theism honestly drawn by a candid mind from these two sources. Provided the consciousness of God be somewhat developed, which is certainly the case more or less, in every individual of the human race,—since all are more or less open to impressions from nature, since all more or less feel the existence of a law of right and wrong within,—all, provided they would use the light

afforded, might arrive at such a conception of the Deity. The reason why so few do, is because no man stands an isolated being; he is connected with the past; he is therefore a product; his mind is affected by tradition; he is unable to be original, and to think for himself. What, therefore, was his forefather's conception of the Deity is his. Thus prejudice effectually closes the soul to the light that shines upon it from without and from within.

In a theism drawn from these original sources there would then be three elements, physical, intellectual, and moral, all felt to be Infinite, and, therefore, together offering an object fit to be worshipped, depended upon, and obeyed. The majesty of such a Being would naturally call for awe and reverence, and His felt perfection in intellectual and moral character would necessarily draw with it a sense of obligation to fear and to obey. The law of right and wrong manifesting itself in the moral consciousness, serves to designate and express the will of such a being. It points to His law, and as such is descriptive of His moral character. Under such circumstances it is, therefore, easily understood how such a Deity is to be served. He is felt, not merely to be tremendous, but also as one who loves the right and hates the wrong. The creature knows, therefore, how to serve Him: and here another fact is to be taken into consideration. A view of the inner life brings before the consciousness the fact of man's moral culpability. The law of right and wrong is consciously felt to be often disregarded. The soul, therefore, cannot but necessarily feel its guilt, and in the face of this fact it is afraid. It fears to look boldly at its God, but seeks to hide itself, and to forget Him. When it thinks of Him it is afraid, sombre shadows gather around His throne, and fitful lightnings playing around, forebode a coming storm. Under its sense of guilt, the Deity to the soul assumes a threatening aspect;

all that is gloomy and terrible in nature seems symbolic of His wrath. At once he is conceived of, not only as majestic, but as terrible, and the soul stands cowed before Him. All the impressions created by the terrible in nature pass over to the Deity, and so He becomes not only the object of reverence, but of fear.

The conception then formed of the Deity is subject to modifications, and these depend on the subjective state of the individual. To the soul in which the moral consciousness is developed, the Deity assumes a terrible aspect, and the soul is afraid of Him; where, on the other hand, this element of consciousness is but faint, and imperfectly developed, where it is almost suppressed, as is the case after a long course of moral degradation, this terror is but faintly experienced. In such cases, man even ceases to clothe the deity with a moral character. The deity of whom he conceives is all but as degraded as himself; He knows not what the loftier points of moral character are, hence his god is but a brute. But even under such imperfect moral development it is possible for man still to be open to impressions from nature. Though the light that is within him be all but darkness, still the light from without may be perceived; thus the eternal power and Godhead of the Deity may be felt, and yet, at the same time, His moral character may be unknown. Here, then, we have a tremendous, a majestic, an awful Deity, but not the Holy One and the Just. The two things are abstractly separable, though practically and in reality this never occurs. The moral consciousness always, to some extent, will assert itself; Nature must, to some extent, impress the soul through the senses; and so, let but the consciousness of God exist, though never so faintly, and man cannot but conceive of Him in both capacities — both as mighty and good, and just and holy. Here, then, we have a theism such as human nature, were it but true to itself and

untrammelled by traditional prejudice, is capable of constructing. The material is at hand; nothing is required but honest, truthful thoughtfulness. Here we have before us a God inspiring us with awe and reverence, a mighty, omnipotent Creator, one felt to be worthy of our adoration, and not only great, but also holy, just, and good. A God of perfect moral character, hence one whom, by an observation of the dictates of the voice within the soul, we can know how to serve; but one whom the same voice within tells us that we do not serve, but, on the contrary, every day of our lives, disobey, and provoke his wrath and indignation against us;—one, therefore, of whom the soul cannot but feel afraid.

One other modification, it must be observed, such a theism is subject to. Supposing the soul to be fairly opened to impressions from nature, it may happen, and often actually does, that it is more impressed by the signs of goodness in nature than of greatness. To such minds the character of the Deity, as derived from such sources, assumes the aspect of infinite goodness and benevolence, rather than of majesty and awful and unapproachable holiness. Such minds are open to impressions from the beautiful, the peaceful, and all that is soothing, rather than to those which are from the awe-inspiring and terrifying. The soothing sense of goodness and benevolence excited in such minds in the contemplation of nature, at once passes over to the Deity, and attaches itself to Him. By such God is regarded as only of infinite goodness and benevolence; all other moral perfections are ingulfed in these. He is not feared, because He is all love, and no matter what may be the subjective condition of the creature, he concludes that he is not authorized to apprehend anything. In such cases, parallel to views of the Divine character as derived from nature, arises a supplementary view, as derived from self. The

moral consciousness is imperfectly developed, there is no sense of guilt, no consciousness of moral disorder within. The all-benevolence of the Deity overlaps all other impressions; all feelings arising out of the moral consciousness are suppressed. The all-preponderating element in the conception of the Deity is his all-benevolence. Here, then, we have another form, or rather modification, of theism, derived from natural sources; — a theism recognizing both the majesty and the moral character of the Deity, but in which the benevolent element is by far the preponderating one.

All the conceptions of the Deity possible fall naturally under one or the other of the following forms: Monotheism, Polytheism, Pantheism, Atheism.

Monotheism, in its primitive features, we have already considered. Admitting a development of the consciousness of God, the conception which the soul forms of Him naturally takes this form. Essentially it is a spiritual conception. The Deity is viewed in his infinity and perfection; and since it is the finite that is the beholder, necessarily such a conception must be dim and confused. It is hardly a conception at all; it wants definiteness, and falls back upon the region of the consciousness, reaffirming and intensifying an antecedent intuition. The intellect has done its part; it has examined and contemplated the evidences offered, has felt its inadequacy in the premises, and has been impressed rather than convinced.

In the monotheistic conception, God is conceived of as the Infinite and the perfect One, and especially as the *One*. This it is which separates this from the succeeding view of Polytheism. Then, again, He is conceived of as the Creator as distinct from the creation — as a personal God. The soul is conscious of Him as distinct from self and from the world, and this draws the line between it and Pantheism.

Apart from all intellectual effort, provided only the consciousness of God be not smothered, this monotheistic conception of the Deity will assert itself. Springing out of elements necessary in human nature, and demanded by the facts of the soul and of the world, Monotheism naturally dawns upon the soul. It is only through some abnormal process that it can be prevented. Now, Monotheism is indefinite. The soul, therefore, becomes dissatisfied with it; though finite, it would comprehend the infinite. It seeks, therefore, to define; necessarily it must fail. The finite can never define the infinite; its conception must fall far short of the reality; either it will sink to the finite, thus falling back on what is known, or in its effort to grasp the whole will stagger, become confused, and lose sight of its object. Thus, as the result of man's speculations on this subject, we have on the one hand, Polytheism, on the other Pantheism; both the results of human reason in its effort to conceive of and to define the Infinite.

Polytheism begins, then, in intellectuality. The soul seeks to become more fully acquainted with the objects of its worship. To do this it uses the medium of the seen. Leaving the intuitions, to conceive of the unseen, necessarily we must fall back upon the seen. The conception will, therefore, necessarily leave the region of the infinite and fall back upon the finite. The soul can be *conscious* of the infinite, but when it goes to conceive of it, it must reduce it to the finite. The highest conception of the Deity, under such limitation, must still be a finite one, and so below the truth, and therefore inadequate. If this conception be taken as a full view, then it is false. This is just what happens: the finite is taken as the image of the infinite, the infinite disappears, and the inadequate finite supplies its place, and so at once man has a false conception of God. A false idea now occupies the place of true reality; man worships his ideal God, and becomes sincerely an idolater.

The intellect is the betrayer, pride of intellect the tempter, and man is lost through speculation.

The highest form in which the finite presents itself before the mind, is, in man. Man, then, in his personality, will be the substance around which all the qualities considered divine will ultimately crystallize. Man at first, for the sake of his personality, being thus deified, soon the divine and human become confused. Qualities which are essentially human, evil propensities, passions, and lusts, pass over from man to God, and are considered as divine attributes. The powers of nature, too, the genial and the dread, the desired and the feared, these too are considered divine attributes, and are personified by being assigned to some human God. Heroes and heroines, transfigured through the haziness of time and tradition, undergo apotheosis, and give finally a heavenly pantheon of earthly divinities. In the first place, God is the *One;* the infinite is still in unity; such is the testimony of consciousness. But under Polytheism the complexity of this unity undergoes analysis; its elements are separated, each one becoming the peculiar characteristic of some special divinity. The grand unity of the infinite, as thus conceived, undergoes disintegration, its elements passing over into the vast multiplicity of heathen Polytheism.

Such a process, from the very nature of the case, is unending. Inasmuch as the Infinite can never be exhausted, it follows that the polytheistic list of divinities can never be completed. Of this incompleteness of the divine idea, the heathen mind could not but be conscious. So long as the Pantheon could admit of the introduction of some other deity, it must have been seen that all of God was not known. A fact peculiarly expressive of this unsatisfied condition of the heathen mind with respect to its conception of God was noted by the Apostle Paul, during his sojourn in Athens. In his speech on Mars Hill he remarks that he has observed an altar with this inscription: "To the unknown

God." Athens was famous for the number of its divinities, and yet with so many, still the religious mind recognized the fact that the idea of God was not yet exhausted; they felt that, with all their gods, still the whole God was not yet completed.

Evidently all the heathen deities must be taken together in order to give us the polytheistic notion of God. Grouping all these deities together, we would have a unity, and in this unity would be found all the attributes considered divine. This unity would be the true polytheistic god, and should any of the ancients have employed such a process, he must at once have fallen back on the original monotheistic idea. Polytheism no doubt begins in personifying what it regards as divine attributes, attaching them at first to human beings, and so making God, man or men; thus there arises multiplicity in the conception of God. It is the multitude of persons included that creates the difficulty, the absurdity of the conception. Drop the person, and you have an attribute. Take all together, and you have the polytheistic idea of God. This, of course, is not done actually. The primary idea in the mind of the heathen worshipper is the person of his God; but this is a result — Polytheism in its finality, not in its beginning. It begins in personifying what it conceives to be divine; and it regards as divine what it fears as well as what it loves. Having arrived, then, at the concrete, it worships the person, thenceforth regarding the primary conception as but an attribute. And so in the finality we have the polytheistic Pantheon of gods. The meaning of Polytheism can be ascertained only by denuding these attributes of their personality, and thus bringing them out again in their state of primal abstraction.

Polytheism, having forsaken the original intuition of the soul — being dissatisfied with the only natural way of beholding God in self and in nature — having forsaken these

living fountains of light, betakes itself, as we have seen, for aid to reason. Reason is insufficient in the premises. The primary intuition of the Divine unity becomes lost, passing over into the multiplicity of a polytheistic pantheon, and so producing false gods and idolatry. If Polytheism were logically complete, men must worship the evil as well as the good. In fact, being actuated by their fears more than by their loves, men would worship the evil more than the good. In worshipping the evil, their object would be to appease; and since the good must be regarded as benevolent, it would be neglected: hence a devil worship. That which is terrible and malignant being dreaded, is first personified, then deified, then worshipped, that it may be propitiated. Polytheism naturally ends in devil-worship. One more step remains before the process is complete. The gods are localized; multiplicity in the godhead is the antecedent, localization is the consequent. The universal One, of course, could not be localized. He is the All in All, the One who is everywhere. But Polytheism consisting in multiplicity, is evidently consistent with localization; moreover, it admits of a representation of the Deity, and so is doubly consistent with localization. First, the Deity is symbolically localized; then the symbolic presence ceases, and a real one takes its place; the stock ceases to be a symbol, it becomes an image, then an idol, and so a god. There is a tendency in human nature to localize the Deity; Polytheism fosters this tendency, and allows it to be logically realized.

This tendency still continues to assert itself, even in Christendom. The Deity is first localized in places, then represented and localized in things. First, there is a church, and here the Deity is more generally localized; then a communion table, here the localization is more specific; then there is a celebration of the Eucharist, including

two ideas, time and place. On this occasion, in the elements of bread and wine upon a communion table, which at once becomes an altar, God as a sacrifice is symbolically represented; then the symbol fades away, leaving a reality in its place; so that in the Eucharist upon the altar, in the form of bread and wine, God is really present. According to the Roman Catholic scheme, the bread and wine cease to exist, and God the incarnate Son in flesh and blood is present in the Eucharist. Here, then, we have conjured up before us visibly, a new God — the Christian God — the 'Host.' Thus the Christian world returns to Heathenism, and begins to build again the Pantheon of Polytheism.

The third form of Theism which offers itself is Pantheism. Here, as in the preceding case, the intellect is at fault. The consciousness of God, true to its instinct, goes out in search of its object. It feels after God, if peradventure it may find Him and know Him. The intellect essays to supply this want; it attempts to form an adequate conception of the Deity. The subject is too great for it, the conception too prodigious. It seeks to grasp the reality, it misses its hold, the reality eludes it, and it grasps a phantom. The consciousness of God bespeaks, besides self and the world, a third reality. Pantheism contradicts this; before it, God as a third reality disappears. There are but two realities, self and the world, and they are God. The intellect unable to conceive of the Infinite, supplies its place by the finite, and even this is inadequately conceived. The universe is God, God is the All, and the All is God. Polytheism in its effort to conceive of the Deity, fell; still it retained the idea of personality. Pantheism loses even this. God being everything, of course ceases to be personal. He is the universe, the impersonal One; man is God in his highest manifestation — God becoming conscious of himself.

And this brings us at last to the negation of all forms of Theism, namely, Atheism. Pantheism, in reducing the elements of human consciousness to two, allows Atheism at once to come into being. Deny that there is a third reality, distinct from self and nature, and you have Atheism. Pantheism in words admits the reality of a third substance, but in conceiving of it resolves that substance into a combination of the other two. Its Theism is therefore an Atheism; there is, according to it, no third substance — God. It admits that there is a third element in the human consciousness, but in reality denies that there is any substance corresponding to such a consciousness. Thus, practically, Atheism goes one step farther. First, like Pantheism, it denies any third substance besides self and the universe, and then it denies any third element in the human consciousness. It denies, therefore, that man is conscious of God. Such is the inevitable consequence of a pantheistic Theism. That Atheism is possible in human nature is a question; philosophically it is possible. That the consciousness of God should be wholly extinguished, and so the soul left with but the two elements of self and world-consciousness, is certainly possible, but not probable. The man or the people in such condition would find it impossible to be religious. They would be conscious of nothing but of themselves and of nature, and would be wholly unsusceptible to any idea of God. It would be impossible to bring such creatures to the sense of being under any obligation to such a Being. They would feel themselves isolated — absolutely independent and irresponsible for their conduct. The religious element would not exist among such a people. Perhaps there are such; if so, they are the wrecks of human nature, being, as to one third, without the essential elements of the human constitution. The consciousness of God, though often so much repressed as almost to be for-

gotten, will nevertheless at times assert itself, and so prove its existence. But Polytheism and Pantheism are facts; both are theistic forms of intellectual error. In the one, the true original monotheistic idea is dissipated, degraded, and lost; in the other, the same idea is lost, and in its place arises a composite one, made up from self and the world. Monotheism, Polytheism, Pantheism, and the negative, Atheism, such, in brief, are the forms which, in the endeavor to conceive of God, the idea may assume.

CHAPTER III.

THE FEAR OF GOD.

THE analysis of human consciousness gives us, as we have seen, three elements. Turning our observation upon one of these, the consciousness of self, and proceeding to analyze it, we find as one of its elements, the religious consciousness. On proceeding to analyze this, we find at once, as its base, the primary condition of the consciousness of God. Having considered this element in its nature and method, we proceed to examine the next element contained in the religious consciousness. In order to understand this subject, it becomes necessary here to enter into the examination of another element contained in the consciousness of self, namely, the moral. It has been usual in psychological inquiry to classify the religious and the moral consciousness together: they are essentially distinct. Of course, they come together in the unity of the personal self; still they are separable; and again, they are correlative, relating to matters that render it possible for them to come

together *per sese*. The moral consciousness, we have seen, finds a point of contact with the religious at the point where moral obligation is felt. Here, as an impulse, the moral and the religious act together. The obligation to virtue arising from a sense of the Divine, is a thing entirely distinct from that arising involuntarily out of man's moral consciousness; in fact, they are separable. It is possible for the religious consciousness to be so suppressed by a course of moral degradation, that man should almost — perhaps entirely, if Atheism be possible — lose his consciousness of God. But even then the moral consciousness will assert itself; the law of right and wrong will make itself known within, and conscience will make itself felt as a moral force, approving the right, condemning the wrong. Again, in an age of scepticism, in which the consciousness of God, as in the other case, ceases to operate, still the moral sense does and will usually assert itself. In a sceptical age, the consciousness of God ceases to be felt, because it is bewildered. The conception which the mind presents to it, is unsatisfactory, it is pantheistic; or perhaps there is no formal conception, but all is doubt and darkness. Under such circumstances the divine obligation to virtue ceases to be felt, and yet, during such times, virtuous men are by no means uncommon. Their virtue is morality, and not godliness; and this, in fact, even under the light of Christianity, is often the condition of things. Men absorbed in the business or pleasures of life, or perhaps in literary or scientific pursuits, by an exclusive attention to the facts of self or nature, manage to suppress the consciousness of God, and cease finally to be religious; and though they may practise virtue, they do it, not in the fear of God, but simply conscientiously, or in the fear of man. God to such characters has, as an operative force, ceased to exist; they are no longer conscious of Him; they have suppressed the

consciousness of Him, and with it all religion. Morality, then, and godliness, though correlative, are entirely distinct.

To suppose the entire suppression of the consciousness of God, is however, it must be admitted, an extreme case. It is not true of the generality of instances; and although virtue may not be practised, still it is generally felt to be additionally obligatory because of God.

But although godliness may not exist, and vice may be practised, still the fear of God, as a fact in the soul, may make itself felt. Here, then, we find ourselves in the presence of the element after which we are inquiring. The facts of the moral consciousness, we say, will not give us fear. Let us analyze them.

It is evident to every one who will observe the movements that take place within the soul, that there is a certain spiritual force operating within, compelling to one course of action, deterring from another. Place a man in certain circumstances, and let it become necessary for him to act in what is known as the moral sphere, and at once he must become conscious that he is drawn or impelled by some force within to act in one way, and not to act in another. Under the same or precisely similar circumstances, the impulse will always tend to produce the same course of action; and not only does this pertain to one individual, but to the whole race. All men are conscious, more or less, of such a force; so much so, that, given the circumstances, it can be foretold how the individual will feel impelled to act. So universal and so constant is this force, that it can truly be attributed to human nature as a fact belonging to it. The circumstances under which this force makes itself felt, are in concrete individual cases. We must proceed, then, to classify. It is found that under one set of circumstances, the force is always in the same direction; hence we at once generalize, and so arrive at a law — a moral law.

For instance, man finds within him something deterring him from the murder of his fellow-man. Invariably, when the circumstances exist, this force makes itself felt, both in the individual and in the race; hence we say, it is a law. 'Thou shalt do no murder:' this law gives us, in brief, the rule of the acting of this spiritual force within us. All these generalizations taken together, go to make up the moral code; and according as the moral force within us is more or less active, will this moral code be more or less extensive. The law is a generalization springing out of an observation of the acts of a force within. The case is exactly parallel with that of observation and generalization as applied to the physical sciences. In the one case, we observe and classify the facts of nature; in the other, the facts of self-consciousness. In the one, reason uses the eye of the body; in the other, she uses the eye of the mind. In the one case, we have as a result, physical, in the other, moral, laws. 'Thou shalt do no murder,' 'Thou shalt not steal,' 'Thou shalt not commit adultery,' and innumerable other moral laws can be arrived at in this way—simply, by an observation of the facts of the moral consciousness, and by generalizing upon them. In physics, that which causes all bodies to tend to a certain centre, we call the force of gravity. In psychology, or morals, that which draws to one course of action, and deters from its opposite, we term the force of moral obligation. Again, this force of gravity is not uniform, but varies according to certain well-known laws; for instance, inversely as the square of the distance, and in proportion to the density of the mass. So, likewise, with the force of moral obligation; though constant, it is not uniform, but varies according to certain laws. It is stronger in cases included under the head of crimes, than in those coming under that of discourtesies; there is a heavier pressure against murder, than against rudeness.

In fact, there seems to be a great variation in the intensity of the moral force under different circumstances. 'Thou shalt not murder' is stronger than 'Thou shalt not steal;' and this last is stronger than 'Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor;' and again, this last is stronger than 'Thou shalt not covet;' and lastly, all of these are stronger than 'Be courteous and hospitable and generous,' &c. Evidently, then, this force of moral obligation varies according to some settled law. Now, it is evident that the stronger the force, the greater will be the shock occasioned by a sudden resistance to it. The moral force is not a statical, but a dynamical force. Given the circumstances adapted to develop it, and already it is in motion. It at once tends to produce its effect. Let the mind but propose an immoral act, and at once the moral force is in operation, tending to restrain. Resistance offered to this movement produces what may be termed a psychical friction, which makes itself felt in the soul as a feverish restlessness, a painful uneasiness. The moral force resists the pressure offered by the will, and produces these painful psychical symptoms; and this, when the moral consciousness is developed, is usually the condition of the soul. Dissatisfied with itself, it tosses about in a state of feverish restlessness. No act properly criminal has been performed; the mighty force tending to prevent such acts has not been violently resisted; no psychical shock has been received; nevertheless, the soul feels itself to be in a state of general moral friction. The lesser moral forces are being continually resisted, the laws of the force of moral obligation are being continually broken, and as the result, we have this state of psychical restlessness, culminating in regret; and this restlessness in its turn passes over into irritability and impatience, which again in their turn bring a resistance to the moral force, aggravate the dissatisfaction, and so on —

a circle of forces being set in motion, each increasing the force of the other, the uneasiness only becomes more and more aggravated, and so the soul becomes more and more unhappy. Let but the moral consciousness be properly developed, and inevitably, even in cases where no criminal act has been performed, all these facts will follow.

But now suppose some deeply criminal act to have been committed; supposing the moral consciousness to be properly developed, here we must inevitably find profound unhappiness. In such a case, not only have we a most intense friction, but something more. A sudden and effectual resistance has been offered to the very strongest psychical force, that force was in motion, and as a result, we have a violent moral shock. At first the soul recoils, then it stands for a moment appalled, benumbed by the shock, then at once, in one gigantic wave, its guilt is hurled upon it, and it staggers under its misery. Here, then, we find remorse; the soul staggering under the shock received in resistance to its most powerful inner force. Here we have not only restlessness and dissatisfaction, but also absolute wretchedness. Resistance to the lesser degree of the force of moral obligation generates psychical friction, and when the resistance is effectual, regret. Successful resistance offered to the greater degrees of this force, generates remorse. Still we have not arrived at anything like fear. It is not in remorse; it is not, in fine, an element of the moral consciousness.

Fear is evidently a perturbation of the soul, a painful condition; but it is so, because in it, the soul looks to the future. The eye of the soul is fixed upon an object; it is disturbed, thrills with tremors, is terrified, is in an agony perhaps; but why? Because it apprehends some harm from the object on which it gazes. Looking to the future, it apprehends pain, and therefore is uneasy. Remorse, on the other hand, looks to the past; it looks backward, the

ghastly phantom of the deed of darkness rises before it, it glares upon it, and the soul in its agony sweats great drops of blood; it writhes and groans in its struggles to escape, but still the ghastly spectre of its guilt will glare upon it; it cannot escape. To forget is the only antidote for this agony. As long as the deed continues to stand before the soul, and to stare at it, so long will this agony continue; and unless memory will submit to forgetfulness, there is no escape. It is not, then, the future that remorse regards, but the past — the irreparable past. Fear, then, is in no sense an element of remorse.

But before we proceed to classify, let us define. The element with which we are dealing is fear; we will define it. We must, then, in the first place, suppose the separate branches of the human consciousness to be at least somewhat developed, for otherwise the various elements entering into these unities will not make themselves felt and known. In order to describe a fact of consciousness, of course we must in the first place be conscious of it. Nor can we understand and recognize such a fact when described, unless upon looking into ourselves we there perceive it.

Supposing, then, the three grand elements of human consciousness ordinarily developed. On directing the mind's eye upon the facts which pass before it, we observe the following. In addition to, and distinct from all these facts which we have noted as pertaining to the moral consciousness, we observe what may be termed an apprehensiveness in the soul. The circumstances under which this condition makes itself most sensibly felt, are those in which the soul is forced to fix its eye upon the subject of death. Let this subject but present itself before the mind, and force itself upon the attention, and at once there ensues an uneasiness; icy tremors thrill throughout the frame; death, the grim Gorgon, fixes its stony gaze

upon the soul, and at once it is petrified. The whole system sympathizes; in many cases the whole man is paralyzed. Of course, this is an extreme case; nevertheless, in all cases the symptoms are distressing. And though the soul may not always be panic-stricken in the presence of death, still, provided its moral consciousness be only ordinarily developed, under such conditions, it will ever be disturbed. Nor does it require the actual presence of death to produce these effects. Without it, still the soul is disturbed; the future makes it afraid; dim forebodings of evil flit across its vision; it cannot look forward with any assurance; there is a mystery about the future, and in that mystery there is something that frightens, and causes the soul to shut its eyes in dread. Thus all life-long the soul is haunted by a phantom, a horror, dim and undefined, and when faced, discovered to be a grim reality; so in life the soul is disturbed and uneasy in view of the future, and when death brings it face to face with the object of its fear, it is paralyzed. We have seen that no such fact as this is to be found in the circle of psychical facts contained in the moral consciousness. It must therefore be found under the head of some other branch of human consciousness.

Fear, as a psychical phenomenon, a fact in the human consciousness, has two roots; it is a result springing from the co-operation of two distinct causes. And these two causes are to be found in the separate elemental psychical conditions of the moral and religious consciousness. On the one hand there is the consciousness of having frequently and wilfully offered violence to the force of moral obligation; there will often flash upon the mind the recollection of inexcusable deeds; there looms up before the mind's reflective perception a gloomy mass of moral blackness; when crime has been perpetrated, it too comes flashing back in its lurid light; the mass grows darker, and ominous thunders

come muttering through the soul; and when it looks back upon the gloom, and then turning its gaze, looks forward towards the future, towards death and the hereafter, then, provided on the other hand it be conscious of God, it is afraid. The other root, then, to this psychical product is the consciousness of God. The facts of the moral consciousness give us remorse, and nothing more; and that regards the past, and not the future. Properly, remorse is the punishment annexed to moral unfaithfulness. The man who resists his conscious force of moral obligation brings this punishment upon himself. If the circumstances be such that the force resisted is slight, then the punishment entailed goes no further than what is known as regret; but if it be crime that is perpetrated, then comes remorse in its fullest sense. The force resisted is great; the entailed consequence is proportional. Sensuality entails upon the body, as its consequence and punishment, bodily pain. Immorality entails upon the soul, as its consequence, spiritual pain; and this consequence or punishment, varies, from the slightest, to the most intense spiritual agony. But all this is distinct from fear. In the one case, we have a consequence already suffered; in the other, a consequence apprehended. Add to the recollection of past misdeeds the consciousness of God, and at once you give rise to the psychical fact of fear. Man transfers over to the Deity, in conceiving of Him, the moral idea which he derives from his moral self-consciousness. Conscious of Him as one who impels towards the same course of conduct as the force of moral obligation does, as of one who is in sympathy with the dictates of his moral nature, and who therefore loves the good and hates the evil, man feels that God and his moral nature are in unison, and that therefore when he resists the one, he has done the same to the other. Taking this state of things into consideration—namely, man's con-

sciousness of God, his conception of Him, that this God has a moral character, who hates evil, and cannot look upon iniquity: add to this man's consciousness of his own immoral condition, that he has often resisted, and done violence to the moral force of his nature; that his conduct has been wilful and inexcusable; that already, when memories of past misdeeds, perhaps of crimes, come over him, he feels their consequences in the agonies of remorse which fasten upon his soul; — take all these facts of the moral and religious consciousness together, and at once we have before us the roots and causes of that apprehension which man feels when he looks forward to death and the future. Now it is evident, that, the more vivid the consciousness of God, and the more sensitive the force of moral obligation, the more acute will be the psychical sensation of fear; the more religious and more morally sensitive a man is, the more apprehensive he will be as to the future.

Let there be an adequate conception of God as Holy, a vivid consciousness of Him, and a clear knowledge of the moral law, and then, evidently, unless the practice corresponds with the knowledge, there must and will be deep apprehension as to the future. Fear will be acute; death will be dreadful; the soul will be unhappy. Fear, then, has two roots: the one we find to be the consciousness of God; the other, the moral consciousness. Three elements go to constitute it: first, a consciousness of God, more or less vivid; second, a knowledge of God's character, and of the Divine law; and third, a consciousness of having wilfully and inexcusably resisted the moral force within, and of having thus wilfully disobeyed God. Here, then, we find the point where culpability or guilt is to be found; and it is this consciousness of guilt in the presence of the Deity that creates fear, and so renders the soul afraid of God, of the future, and of death.

CHAPTER IV.

SACRIFICE.

AN analysis of the moral consciousness gives us the psychical fact of guilt. In guilt the soul becomes conscious of its ill desert; that is, that it ought to suffer; is conscious of deserving punishment. This state of mind, taken in conjunction with the consciousness of God as the Holy One and the Just, produces fear; and so we have in the next place before us a psychical fact, the fear of God. The soul in which the fact of guilt is developed cannot, as we have seen, but recognize God as holy and just, and therefore must inevitably fear Him. Thus we have reached a point where another fact in the religious consciousness makes itself known. Guilty fear of God in its turn produces anxiety, and desire to propitiate, and this desire terminates in sacrifice. Sacrifice is the act performed by the soul in its effort to propitiate a Deity of whom, from a consciousness of guilt, it is afraid. The leading thought contained in the idea of sacrifice is satisfaction — satisfaction made to the demands of justice. By a natural process it has transmitted this attribute over to the Deity, and cannot but look upon him as the vindicator of justice, and therefore the avenger of injustice. As such, then, the soul recognizes Him, and is afraid of Him. Again, not only is the Deity the vindicator of justice, but as a personal being He is the Just and Holy One. He hates the evil; injustice offends Him and provokes His wrath. The guilty soul feels that God is offended and angry with it, is conscious that justly it deserves His wrath and indignation; hence the necessity for propitiation, the leading point of

which is an effort to appease, to allay a just indignation, to quench wrath. Sacrifice is this effort. In it the guilty soul, in the hope of appeasing the wrath of God, renders to Him such satisfaction as is deemed most proper, just, and acceptable. The effort is to turn away wrath; the method employed is by rendering a supposed satisfaction to justice. Sacrifice is, then, the effort to appease wrath by the satisfaction of justice; thus, two ideas are embodied, that of satisfaction to justice, and that of turning away wrath; the first is subordinate and subsidiary to the second. It is impossible for the guilty soul to feel comfortable in the presence of the Deity without a sacrifice; the forces within will not admit of it. Let the soul become conscious of its moral guilt, — let it but recognize the justice and holiness of a conscious Deity, — let these two parallel facts be but developed in the human consciousness, — and it will be found impossible to bring the two, God and the soul, into contact with each other without this coupling link of sacrifice.

Sacrifice is, then, an act, — a result whose roots run deep down into the heart. As an act, it is performed by way of satisfaction to the demands of justice. In the Moral sense the soul becomes conscious of its culpability. It feels guilty, feels that it owes some satisfaction to justice for what it has done. Sacrifice is that satisfaction, a proof and a witness of the soul's recognition of its guilt. But such an act is performed with an object. It is not merely a condemnatory act meant only to express the consciousness and recognition of guilt; there is an end in view, and the act is but the means to that end. To propitiate, to turn away the wrath of a just and holy God, is the end in view; this is the motive, the inducement that gives rise to the act.

First, then, as to the act; what is it? The very essence of the act is suffering, and necessarily so. Guilt, as we

have seen, is a fact of the Moral consciousness. In it the soul recognizes and feels its culpability. This in itself is a state of pain. Here ends the matter, so far as concerns this branch of the consciousness. But the same person who suffers as culpable is at the same time conscious of a God. Conceiving of Him, he naturally attributes to Him justice; then looking upon Him as the vindicator of right and the avenger of wrong, the soul becomes disturbed; there arises upon it the dim foreboding of a future reckoning with the just and holy God. Guilt is suffering, a present one; but there is another future one to which it points; like the alarm-bell ringing out its loud alarum through the wild night, it warns the slumbering soul of an approaching fiery doom.

Guilt, then, though a present fact, points to a future. It is, then, a present painful reminder of a painful future; in fine, of a future punishment. Again, the soul conscious of guilt not only apprehends punishment, but besides this it fears God, is troubled at the thought of Him, feels that He is angry with it, and justly so. Here, then, comes in an anxiety and desire to propitiate Him, and this desire gives rise to sacrifice. It is not the desire to prevent future punishment that creates sacrifice; it is rather the desire to propitiate, to turn away God's anger; the soul seeks by a sacrifice to pacify God, and so to reconcile Him to it — that so He may be induced to act towards it, not as an enemy, but as a friend. In it the *person* of God is viewed rather than His attributes; it is a personal act, directed towards a personal Being. The method of the act, on the other hand, has reference principally to the Divine attributes, its prime object in this respect being to satisfy the claims of Divine justice. Examined from a psychological standpoint, the necessity for some expiatory or sacrificial act is found to exist in the soul. This necessity very naturally manifests itself, and so gives us the external overt act

of sacrifice. Psychological investigation therefore brings to light a psychical fact. Observation brings to light the historical fact of sacrifice. So general, so universal is the practice of this rite among mankind, that it is evident it must spring from a necessity in human nature. The historical, then, confirms the psychological.

The manner in which this rite is practised next comes under observation. In this respect there is variety. If man was unconscious of his guilt, would the rite of sacrifice exist? If unconscious of guilt, necessarily he will feel himself to be innocent; as such, he will not be afraid of God; would he, under such circumstances, offer sacrifice? Evidently not. Yet even under such conditions some religious rite would exist; man would still feel that he ought in some way to express his reverence and his sense of allegiance to God; some act of homage he would feel to be proper. As expressive of this, we might anticipate that he would offer to God something that was at the same time symbolic and valuable. Thus, in depriving himself of that which is valued, and giving it back to God, he would express his love, and at the same time perform an act of homage. The first-fruits of the earth would be, as an offering, adapted to such a purpose. Such would be the natural course of a creature not conscious of any guilt in its worship of God; such, the Scriptures inform us, was Cain's mode of worship. Had he only been an innocent creature, it would have been proper enough. Here, then, we have, not a sacrifice, but an offering. An innocent creature would have no need, a guilty creature, unconscious of his guilt, would feel no need, of a sacrifice. The whole thing springs out of guilt; it is the expression and the proof of man's consciousness of his guilt. An innocent creature, or a creature unconscious of his guilt, would never be found offering what is, strictly, sacrifice. Guilt, inasmuch

as it concedes the desert of punishment, demands suffering. In the state of conscious culpability it is allowed that there is a demand for retribution — that such a demand is just — that it ought to be satisfied — that it is a debt that ought to be paid — that it must be paid ere justice can be satisfied, and so the soul released. The guilty soul admits, then, that without shedding of blood there is no remission of sin. It is absolutely necessary, then, by the admission of the soul itself, that in order to the expiation of guilt, suffering by way of punishment be undergone. To the soul that sins, this evidently would seem to be the proper answer to such a question. Is such, then, the demand of the psychical consciousness? Does there arise in the guilty soul a conscious necessity of self-sacrifice in order to the expiation of guilt? Does the soul feel, that, before it can feel at peace, as having expiated its guilt, it must voluntarily submit itself to suffering? And if so, who in such a case is to administer the punishment? Evidently the guilty one himself, or some one of his fellow-men. Here, then, we have the origin of all forms of penance, and the grounds of all the forms of civil punishment as inflicted by society. In the one case the guilty one admits his desert of punishment, is anxious to expiate his guilt. He therefore undertakes to punish himself, he starves or scourges or mutilates himself, inflicts upon himself some form of punishment, all in order to expiate his guilt. Here, then, we are at the root of all those self-imposed forms of suffering termed penances. The great difficulty in all such cases is about the rule of apportionment. The scale of the "lex talionis" would seem to be the best that could be adopted: an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth, is the nearest approximation that can be made to the rule of absolute justice: it is, in fact, absolute justice. But, then, this rule could not be carried into practice but in a very limited number of

cases. How much, and what kind of suffering must a guilty man inflict upon himself before he can expiate his guilt? and how long must he suffer before the expiation is sufficient? To these questions the unfortunate penitent has never found a satisfactory answer. Luther found none; there is *none* according to Heathenism, none according to Rome. There *is* one according to the Gospel of Christ. The reason why none has been found, is, because, looking to the facts of psychical consciousness, there is but one — one which the soul would fain, and does generally, overlook. The suffering or punishment which guilt demands in order to the satisfaction of justice is, as to its duration, eternal; as to its intensity, that distributive in conjunction with retributive justice must apportion in accordance with the gravity of the offence. Self-inflicted tortures can never bring peace to the conscience, because there is a testimony within that the punishment of sin is eternal. Until the end of that period is reached, which of course is never, guilt will bespeak an unsatisfied justice, a debt uncancelled, a punishment still due; and so self-torture would have to continue forever and ever, and still the debt would be unpaid, the guilt unexpiated. As to the form of self-torture adopted by the penitent, that must necessarily be wholly arbitrary; there is nothing within that would demand one form rather than another. The demand of guilt is for suffering, simply suffering; the manner or form of the suffering is not indicated. No doubt there is a fitness in such an adaptation, a fitness which is administered in the "lex talionis," and which distributive justice will finally make evident. But as yet, in the fact of guilt this apportionment is not indicated; the demand is in the gross, not yet eliminated, and that demand is, by way of punishment, for suffering eternal suffering.

In the case of the penitent, he is at the same time the

sacrifice and the priest. (A priest is, strictly speaking, one who offers sacrifice.) The two things may be separated; the penitent may employ some one as his priest, some one who shall scourge and torture him. Still the penitent is a sacrifice by which justice is to be satisfied, and so God propitiated. Society separates these two things. It in itself assumes the priesthood, takes the knife and sacrifices, a victim upon the altar of justice, the social criminal. Society in its organization assumes on this earth the place of God. Transgression of its laws, though not, strictly speaking, sin — for it is possible that society may pass immoral laws, — is rather crime. Society, occupying the seat of justice, assumes its sword, appoints its officials; as social priest it uses the knife, and sacrifices the criminal as a victim upon its altars. Society in its judicial administration of justice is but a shadow of the process under the moral law of the universe. And here one point is worthy of notice. The social offender in expiation of his guilt is not expected to sacrifice himself; society has its official priesthood to whom it has delegated the power to offer sacrifice. The transgressor is the victim. Society having judged and condemned,— having done what God does and manifests in the moral consciousness, — executes. By distributive justice the penalty is apportioned to the offence. The organ of society, acting in its capacity of priesthood, inflicts the penalty. The victim is sacrificed, and so atones, socially speaking, for his offence. His social guilt is thus expiated; and unless the penalty is capital, he is restored free again to the community. Thus crime or social guilt can be expiated, for it is just what society by its laws makes it. But moral guilt is indelible; its penalty is eternal, and can never be satisfied by the offender. Thus when a civil law is also moral, though the offender be in this respect cleared, and restored a free man to society, still the brand, the moral

stain will remain unexpiated, indelible, save by eternal punishment; and therefore never,—always, saving the one and only way.

This separation of priest and sacrifice, of him who offers from him who is offered, points to the fact that he who inflicts a penalty is to be separated from him upon whom it is inflicted. In moral cases, apart from the laws of society, there is no one to inflict the penalty. Man must not punish himself; God alone can legitimately do it: and to this truth the facts of moral consciousness bear witness. Thus guilt, while it admits its obligation to justice for punishment, at the same time testifies that God is the only proper one to inflict that punishment. This prerogative the penitent takes out of the hands of God; hence all the confusion and darkness of the mind in this connection, and hence the unsatisfactoriness of all such self-inflicted tortures. And not only does the individual assume the retributive, but also the distributive justice of the Almighty—prematurely, inadequately, unwisely,—he torments himself, and all to no avail; guilt still continues to cry out for vengeance; it will not be atoned. In guilt, then, as a psychical fact, the soul recognizes its obligation to undergo punishment, but at the same time it recognizes the fact that God alone is the one to inflict it. Here, then, comes in the doctrine of vicarious atonement. Psychology cannot account for its existence. Psychology shows us a want, but not its supply. It gives us a penalty recognized as deserved; it gives us God as the only proper one to inflict it; it gives us a dim foreboding, a nervous expectation that He will inflict it; it gives us an intellectual necessity that He must inflict it; it gives us therefore a fearful looking-for of vengeance and fiery indignation looming up in the distance; and here psychology stops. What will God do under the circumstances? that is the question. By the light of nature, vengeance only can be anticipated. But still there is a possibility. God cannot

change, justice is inexorable ; but still there may be hope, for God is infinite, who can know Him? This possibility under Revelation has been realized. God has not changed, his justice is as inexorable as ever, nevertheless a way of escape has been opened. That way is through the vicarious sacrifice of the Son of God for mankind. How God would act under the circumstances would of course be a matter of revelation and of history. It is impossible that the idea of vicarious sacrifice should have naturally arisen in the human mind ; it must, in its very first stages of development, have been the subject of Revelation.

Psychical observation leaves the soul in a state of want. It finds it anxious to propitiate the Deity, but wholly at a loss how this is to be effected. The voice of justice in the soul, speaking in the consciousness of guilt, admits that it has been grossly outraged, and that a satisfaction is necessary before it can be hushed. It is an admission recorded in the very consciousness of the soul, that until the claims of justice are fairly met and satisfied,—and that satisfactorily to the soul's sense of justice,—until then there cannot be any peace within. Guilt is but the voice of justice in the soul, a living, standing, vital protest of justice, never to be quenched until its claims be satisfactorily settled. It is the recoil of justice upon itself, accusing and condemning. To readjust the equilibrium, a counter shock must be experienced ; satisfaction to justice furnishes the counter shock. Given this, and the moral equilibrium is restored, justice acquits, guilt is satisfied, expiated, ceases to be a fact in the consciousness.

Supposing, then, man to be laboring under a sense of guilt, it is evident that the equilibrium of his moral consciousness cannot be restored until his sense of justice be fully satisfied. And this cannot be, by man's own admission, but by the payment of an eternal duration of suffer-

ing, and therefore, confessedly, never. This is what it would require, by man's own admission, to satisfy his own innate sense of justice. Confessedly, according to the facts of his own consciousness, he can never, being once guilty, cease to feel guilty; his sense of justice can never be satisfied, hence he must continue to protest against himself, and experience the sense of guilt. Man therefore, confessedly, can never propitiate and be reconciled to himself. Nothing that he can do can ever expiate his guilt. To reconcile a man to himself is, from the nature of the case, an impossibility. He can never satisfactorily to himself expiate his guilt; and conscious of this in his own case, he infers the same thing of the Almighty. Justice is but justice, to whomsoever it may belong. Essentially, it is absolute: it is incarnate in man; it is divine in God. It is but the same quality in both beings. Let this quality but be aroused, and it will act in man just as it does in God; what it condemns, God does; what it approves, and when it acquits, God does likewise: man was created in the image of God. Justice is the same both in God and man. When man, then, in his state of guilt, judges his case as irremediable, it is but natural he should conclude it appears in the same light to God. If I condemn myself, it is but natural to conclude — seeing, too, that God is of absolute justice — that He also condemns me; and since, confessedly, I must continue to condemn myself to all eternity, seeing that I can never expiate my guilt, God too must do likewise. Seeing, therefore, I can never propitiate myself, of course, I can never propitiate God. He must, then, remain unreconciled to me, and His wrath must abide upon me forever. Here the soul pauses; it can go no further. Being guilty, it can only look to itself as the proper one to offer satisfaction to justice; and provided the end was to reconcile one's self, this would in fact be the proper object to look to. But

inasmuch as the object is to reconcile God to the soul, it is possible that the satisfaction may come from some other source. If I am to expiate my own guilt, to my own satisfaction, certainly I myself must be the sufferer. I must undergo punishment, and not some one else; it is the soul that sinneth that must die. Never can I feel that I have atoned for my guilt, until I myself have borne such an amount of suffering as I feel to be my due. I, by self-inflicted suffering, can never satisfy my sense of justice, and so expiate my guilt. Nor does it any more appear how God by the infliction of suffering can satisfy His sense of justice. In the first case, the suffering is self-inflicted; in the second, it is inflicted by God. It was in the one case insufficient to satisfy the human sense of justice; in the second, it must prove equally so with the Divine. It is not possible, either with God or man, that human suffering can ever satisfy the demands of justice, and so expiate guilt. This the soul feels, and when it thinks, sees. And here it must pause; the case seems hopeless; nothing but a Revelation can clear the matter up, and give any hope. The doctrine of an eternal punishment is natural — a necessity, springing out of the facts of consciousness. Given but the consciousness of guilt, and you have also eternal punishment. It requires no revelation to make this known; it stands already revealed in the facts of the moral consciousness. The doctrine of a vicarious sacrifice is a revelation, and necessarily so; man could never have imagined it.

Self-sacrifice, in the sense of self-inflicted suffering, is natural to mankind, but at the same time it is unreasonable. Springing out of a sense of guilt, it is the effort of the guilty one, by satisfying his sense of justice, to expiate his guilt; it is the effort of the guilt-distressed soul to obtain rest. It may operate even apart from the belief in a God. Man has within him a sense of justice. The resistance to,

and his trampling upon this sense of right, arouses this principle. At once it asserts itself, condemning, and calling for vengeance. Here, then, arises the fact of guilt; and man, apart from all thought of God, in order to become reconciled to himself, will often be induced to attempt expiation. He will inflict torture upon himself, seeking to satisfy the demands of justice within, and so to still its cry. The effort is selfish, but it is real. Such an act cannot properly be termed sacrifice, for sacrifice seeks to satisfy God's justice, and to propitiate Him; here, on the contrary, man seeks to satisfy his justice, and to propitiate himself. All such self-willed efforts must prove fruitless; guilt can never thus be expiated; man's own sense of justice will never recognize itself as satisfied; guilt, as a fact of consciousness, will ever remain. Man can never, therefore, become reconciled even to himself, still less to God, by such self-imposed suffering. It is to be observed that there is a natural satisfaction experienced by a guilty person in suffering; he feels that he is making some amends for his offence. Of course, he must have hope; he must, therefore, think that the time will come when he shall have expiated his guilt. But the same feeling which demands suffering now, will demand it forever. Let a man but continue to eye his crimes or his offences, and he will find that his guilt will continue to stare him in the face; no matter how much he torture himself, still every time his offence presents itself before him, he will blame himself, will see how inexcusable was his crime, will feel that he deserves punishment. And all this, because his sense of justice is not yet satisfied, his guilt is unexpiated. Such must continue to be the state of affairs to all eternity. Man cannot expiate guilt to his own satisfaction; of course, therefore, not to God's.

Self-torture, apart from any consideration of God, is, we

have said, not sacrifice. Self-torture with reference to God, and to propitiate Him: nor is this properly sacrifice. True, it is self-sacrifice, it is a religious act; but still it has not in it that element which lies at the very bottom of the idea of sacrifice. Both acts have reference to the Deity. The object of both is, by satisfying His justice, to turn away His wrath, and propitiate Him; but the method employed in the two cases is different. In the one case there is self-sacrifice; in the other, the sacrifice is vicarious. The very essence of sacrifice is in its being vicarious; and by vicarious we mean this, namely: that for the guilty party a substitute is provided, and upon that substitute, instead of the principal, that punishment which the principal deserved is inflicted. The substitute suffers, then, instead of the principal.

It is impossible that such a process as this should ever have entered into the human mind. It is natural enough for a man to feel that he ought to suffer for his own sins. But that some other should take his place, that a brute should be substituted for him, and by its sufferings should expiate his guilt, such a thought could never have occurred in the brain of natural man. The natural view on this subject has always found exponents. There never was a time that man was not found trying to expiate his guilt by means of self-sacrifice. The great mass, in whom the consciousness of guilt is imperfectly, sometimes not at all developed, have always been indifferent; they sacrifice nothing, they make no effort to expiate guilt, because they feel none. But at the same time there has always been found a large class acting otherwise. Such a class, conscious of guilt, and religious, are anxious to expiate the former, and to propitiate the Deity. This is the religious portion of mankind, in whom the consciousness of God and of guilt is developed. And while we predicate such a development of a

portion, we do not deny it in the whole; only in some it is more developed than in others, and of course becomes more conspicuous and more active. All men by nature have the elements of religious and moral character; only in many cases, among large portions of mankind, such elements are suppressed, undeveloped, nay, sometimes almost extinguished. When, then, alongside of the consciousness of God, the consciousness of moral guilt is developed, there we will find men trying to propitiate the Deity; and the way which they naturally will adopt will be that of self-torture. Hermits, Ascetics, Anchorites, Stylites, Hindoo mystics, Mohammedan dervishes, Roman Catholic penitents, Protestant ritualists and legalists, all are engaged in the same business. All trying to propitiate the Deity by some species of self-torture, all acting very unreasonably, yet naturally; obeying the impulses of their nature, seeking rest, and yet, because it is an impossibility, finding none; many in this hopeless pursuit going so far as to kill themselves, as many a skeleton on many a wild waste, in many a damp cave and solitary convent or monastic cell, might witness; as the car of Juggernaut, upon whose wheels there is human blood, might testify. Yes, there are many martyrs in this cause; there were many living exponents, now dead ones, but whose blood still bears witness that fondly they imagined, that, by the shedding of their own blood, there might be obtained remission of sin.

Now, alongside of this practice of self-sacrifice, we find that of vicarious sacrifice. The first, we say, was man's device; the second is God's. Man practised it, but it must have been a revelation. The demand which self-sacrifice ought to supply is natural. It is the effort of the consciously guilty soul, by expiating its guilt, to propitiate the Deity. The way in which it was attempted to supply this demand was irrational, hence it proved fruitless. The

moral consciousness recognizes the fact that guilt can be expiated only by suffering. What kind of suffering, how long, and by whom inflicted, man, in his anxiety to effect this purpose, presumes to judge. In doing so he goes astray. The only pain he can inflict is bodily; how severe it must be, he must decide for himself, and it must be inflicted by himself; for society takes cognizance only of offences against its laws. As to the intensity of pain to be self-inflicted, it must be impossible to ascertain such a point satisfactorily. Then, as to how long, if reason and the facts of consciousness were consulted, it would very soon be seen that it must be forever. Hence it was, and still is felt, that all such methods of expiating guilt are unsatisfactory. Man is right in concluding that he, the sinner, is the proper one to suffer; but he is wrong in supposing that there can ever be an end of suffering — wrong in supposing he can make an end of guilt — wrong in taking justice into his own hands, and in supposing he is the proper person to inflict upon himself the penalty of sin. If these points had been recognized, man would have seen the folly of all self-willed efforts for the expiation of guilt. He would have been found feeling a necessity, but seeing no way of supplying it, would have been found recognizing his deserts, and at the same time his inability to meet them. And it is to this state of mind that the institution of sacrifice must have appealed. So soon as the soul feels the possibility of meeting the demands of guilt; so long as it imagines that it has a way of doing this, just so long will it be found self-dependent, busily engaged in the business of satisfaction. Let all such possibility be exploded; let it be seen to be impossible for the soul, of itself, by any means to expiate guilt, and what follows? Either despair, or, in its agony, a cry unto God for help; either despair, or a turning away from one's self, and a turning unto God. To such a state

of mind, sacrifice, a revelation from God, appeals. Man, in his conscious inability, appeals to God. God answers by instituting sacrifice.

Sacrifice, in its primary form of institution, was a significant hint; in the way of a hint, it suggested that God had on hand some purpose of expiating guilt. It suggested to man, in his condition of hopeless inability to meet the demands of justice, that God himself would take the matter up; that what man could not do, He himself would do for man. And not only was it a hint as to such a purpose, but it was, moreover, significant of the manner in which the purpose was to be accomplished. Here, for the first time, we find suggested the vicarious idea — the possibility of a substitute suffering in place of the offender. Sacrifice was, then, in brief, a significant hint of God's purpose of expiating guilt by a vicarious sacrifice; or, since it is of the very nature of sacrifice to be vicarious, we might say at once, by a sacrifice. Of course, it is not possible that the blood of bulls and goats could expiate guilt, nor was it ever so intended. Sacrifice never meant this. It was simply a rite instituted by Revelation, a representative, symbolic rite; a hint significant of a Divine purpose, vividly exhibiting in the manner of its execution the way in which the Divine purpose was to be fulfilled. Given to man, it must have operated in the way of a promise; holding out a hope, and at the same time indicating the manner in which that hope was to be realized. Until the fulfilment of the Divine promise, man must wait in expectation; and though his sense of guilt would remain consciously unexpiated, yet he must patiently await the development of the Divine purpose, watching carefully its progress, faithfully trusting in God, that He would, in His good time, fulfil His promise of expiating guilt. The thing proposed by God, and significantly hinted to man in the institution of the rite of sacrifice, is not pri-

marily to satisfy man's sense of justice, but His own. The demands of man's justice and of God's justice for the satisfaction of guilt are identically the same, namely, eternal punishment. In the institution of sacrifice, God signifies His purpose of satisfying these demands in another way, and that way, as suggested by the rite of sacrifice, is to be a vicarious one; that is, there is to be a substitute for man, and that substitute is to bear the punishment that man deserves. All this is plainly contained and exhibited in this rite. An animal is taken, the sins of the offender are confessed, his hand is laid upon the head of the victim; symbolically, it is guilty, and as such, it is slain; it is punished; it dies as a sacrifice for sin; the guilt of the offender is expiated; God is propitiated; God is reconciled; there is an atonement. Here, then, we have in detail, symbolically represented, what was to be accomplished when the transaction here referred to should actually take place. What that transaction was to be, could not of course, in the first place, be known. Its main points were, however, sketched off in the rite of sacrifice, and the substance must correspond with the shadow. The great point indicated was, that there was to be a sacrifice—a vicarious one. Some living being was to be substituted for man; bearing man's guilt, it was to bear the penalty laid upon it by God himself, namely, death. Such a sacrifice was to prove satisfactory to the demands of Divine justice, was to propitiate God, and reconcile Him to mankind. Such is the prophecy contained in the rite of sacrifice. Such, in its main points, was the plan by which God proposed to make satisfaction to His justice for man's guilt. The rite in itself did not effect anything as to the expiation of guilt, either with man or with God; it simply exhibited the fact that God proposed to satisfy guilt, and symbolized the manner of that satisfaction.

The rite of sacrifice was, then, a standing symbolic memorial of a Divine purpose — a purpose of interfering in man's behalf, in order to the expiation of guilt. The details of the rite symbolically represented the manner in which this purpose was to be effected. Observe, then, this point carefully, namely, that in itself the rite effected nothing, was not intended to effect anything; its object was to point to that which was to effect something — to a real transaction, in which there was to be a real vicarious sacrifice, a substitute which should really bear the guilt of mankind, and really suffer the penalty of sin in its place: a transaction in which a real satisfaction to the Divine justice was to be made, man's guilt really expiated, God really propitiated and reconciled. The rite of sacrifice effected none of these things; it only indicated and symbolically represented them. To lose sight of this point is to misconceive the whole meaning of the rite of sacrifice. To suppose that, in that rite, the immolation of brute beasts really satisfied the Divine justice and propitiated God, is a mistake; one, however, which we find man, in his historical religious development, very soon making: a mistake which is by no means infrequent even at the present day. Half, or, rather, two thirds of Christendom now make it. We find the same thing in the Roman Catholic Mass. We find, too, the same thing among Protestants, in certain ritualistic views of the Holy Communion. There is a tendency in human nature to adopt the doctrine of the *opus operatum*.

The sacrifice of Jesus Christ upon the cross expiated, we are told, the guilt of the world. In the ceremony of the Holy Communion we have before us a standing symbolic memorial of this event. The details of the ceremony represent the particulars of that transaction. But yielding to this tendency, this rite ceases to be symbolic and repre-

sentative, ceases to be a memorial; it becomes the event itself: the bread and wine become the real body and blood of Christ; the ceremony becomes a real sacrifice; an altar is erected, and Christ is really offered up upon it, visibly, in the eyes of the faithful. And this sacrifice is supposed to be really efficient, and to expiate the guilt of all who participate in it. The same mistake is made here as was in former days among the ancients; in both, there is a rite, a ceremony divinely instituted. In the one case it was a sacrifice; in the other, it is the memorial of a sacrifice. Sacrifice, though real, was only a memorial. Backwards, it was indicative of a Divine purpose; forwards, it indicated the way in which that purpose was to be effected. It was a memorial, then, since it served to remind man of what God proposed to do. It was a symbolic memorial, inasmuch as it indicated how that purpose was to be fulfilled. It gave guilty man hope; it encouraged him, and taught him to love God as a God of mercy; but so far as it concerned expiation of guilt, it effected nothing: man's relation to God remained unaltered; the purpose of God was all that was; a purpose revealed in the institution of sacrifice, and to which man in hope clung.

The Holy Communion is, too, a rite, a divinely instituted one, and, like sacrifice, it is a memorial; it reminds man, not of a purpose, but of its fulfilment — of an actual sacrifice offered for man, to expiate his guilt. As symbolic, in its details, it represents the particulars of that transaction, of how the expiation was effected. As a symbolic memorial, then, it serves graphically to remind man of what Christ has done for him — that his guilt has been expiated, and God propitiated and reconciled to him. To guilty man it brings joy; it reconciles him to God. The ceremony in itself, so far as concerns expiation of guilt, effects nothing; but, as a symbolic memorial, it brings peace and

joy and love towards the God of our salvation. Let the rite of sacrifice cease to be recognized as a Divine reminder that the expiation of guilt is to be the work of God, and at once man will adopt it as his own. Supposing it is still regarded as a Divine institution, nevertheless man adopts it as one of his own works; he will use it as a sort of charm, supposing that thereby he can propitiate the Deity. He will use this memorial rite with the same spirit and with the same intent that he had in all his self-inflicted tortures, namely, with a view to the propitiation of the Deity thereby.

It is natural, as we have seen, for man by his own works to seek to propitiate God. This tendency is deeply imbedded in human nature. Sacrifice points to the fact that God himself is to effect this propitiation. But man soon loses this idea, and adopts it as a means whereby he is to effect that object. He uses it, then, as a charm, to propitiate God. Thus, sacrifice becoming a work of man, man feels that it ought to cost him something. Primarily, there is nothing of self-sacrifice in it. In its simplicity, it is to the unenlightened unsatisfactory. Man will introduce some self-sacrifice into it, so he increases the number of the victims, makes the offering, instead of a single victim, a hecatomb. And even this, though so expensive an offering, proving still unsatisfactory, he offers man, his fellow-man, as the most noble victim he can obtain — his own child, the thing most dear to him. Here, then, we strike the root of human sacrifice: it springs, originally, out of a misunderstanding of a meaning of the Divine rite of sacrifice. It is a lapse from the Divine to the human; man, refusing to let God expiate his guilt, seeks to expiate it himself. Sacrifice has pointed out a vicarious method of expiation; man adopts it as his method, then falling back upon his tendency to self-torture, he combines the two, and, as a final and logical result, we have the rite of human sacrifice.

The history of religion shows us that the rite of sacrifice did not long retain its original significance. First, it lost its prophetic character, ceased to remind men of God's purpose of expiation; then it seems to have lost in the minds of men its connection with God; they forgot it was a Divine institution. True, they found it among them, but they knew not how it came there; it was simply a fact, a religious ceremony handed down by tradition. Its religious character still remained; in fact, it had in process of time become the whole of worship. It had expanded and become the entire cultus of religion; losing its primary significance as a prophetic memorial, it had become a mere "opus operatum," whereby something, namely, the propitiation of the Deity, was supposed to be immediately effected — a mere superstitious practice. Out of it issued the swarm of the heathen priesthood; it gave them position and a livelihood; it was to their interest, therefore, to give a fictitious importance to it. Sacrifice being supposed to propitiate the Deity, naturally it was thought that, the more costly the sacrifice, the more pleasing it would be to Him, the more apt to propitiate. Hence, as we have seen, the hecatombs of the ancients and the sacrifice of human beings. But still, after that the rite had been performed, although faith might conclude that God was propitiated, still a sign would be more satisfactory; hence the examination of the entrails of the victims, and the whole system of augurs and auguries. All this was for the purpose of telling whether the Deity was yet satisfied and propitiated. Thus we see how this Divine rite of sacrifice, losing its prophetic significance, then its original connection with God, as a rite of His institution, becomes at last prostituted to superstitious purposes. One original Divine idea it alone retained, and that was the vicarious nature of sacrifice; and even this was in danger. The hecatomb showed it to be

adulterated. Human sacrifice shows it almost lost, for in it man returns again to his own natural inclination towards expiating guilt by self-torture. In offering a human being, supposing any feeling of humanity, there must be suffering; in offering one's own child, the pain of the offerer must be intense. Herein it was felt lay the expiatory efficacy of the sacrifice. In such a sacrifice two elements are present, substitution and self-torture. The substitution was traditional; the self-torture or self-sacrifice was regarded and consciously felt to be the expiatory element. Here, then, we have two elements: the one the vicarious, practised as a tradition, in itself unmeaning; the other, self-torture or self-sacrifice, practised naturally, and felt to be in its nature expiatory. In self-immolation we find the vicarious element to have altogether disappeared, the natural element alone remaining. Human sacrifice must necessarily brutalize; but this is the end, not the beginning of the rite. Its origin is such as we have described it. Every practice has its philosophy, just as every effect has its cause. The sacrifice of human beings by man does not spring out of his brutality; that is rather an effect than a cause. It has two roots: the Divine rite of vicarious sacrifice, and the consciousness of guilt. How it grows and develops into this final frightful product, we have already stated.

The point which stands out so prominently in the institution of the rite of sacrifice as to throw all others in the background, is, that it is God who will provide the victim, God who will inflict the penalty and expiate the guilt; that it is God himself, within the Godhead, who will expiate the guilt of sin, propitiate Himself, and reconcile mankind to Himself. The whole thing is to be effected in the very circle of the Godhead itself; man has nothing to do with it. This is the meaning of the rite of sacrifice, in its institution and in its ceremonial details. After all, it was but

a prophetic rite, symbolic, and at the same time prophetic. It found its fulfilment and realization in the sacrifice of Jesus Christ the Son of God upon the cross of Calvary.

We are well aware that there is a form of theology widely prevalent which ignores the fact of sacrifice as an essential element in religion. According to this system, in order to bring the soul into a conscious state of reconciliation with the Deity, it is only necessary to represent Him as a God of infinite benevolence and love. Such a school entirely ignores one of the most important elements in the moral consciousness, namely, the consciousness of guilt. Provided this element be not developed, it is easy enough to see how the soul can continue to feel comfortable in its consciousness of God. If there be no consciousness of guilt, there will of course be no sense of justice, condemning and demanding satisfaction. Under such circumstances, the soul naturally would feel a self-complacency; and perhaps, under such conditions, the representation of the Deity only as all-benevolent might prove satisfactory, and would enable the soul to eye Him without fear, and feel comfortable in the thought of Him. But on the other hand, allow but a development of the consciousness of guilt, be it never so faint, and all will be changed. If our own heart condemn us, God is greater than our hearts, and knoweth all things. The soul, feeling the force of this argument, becomes uneasy; it regards the Deity as looking upon it with an ominous eye, and feeling guilty, it is afraid of Him. To a soul in such a condition, no representation of the Deity, however flattering, will prove satisfactory. Convince the intellect that God is all-benevolent, all love; let the soul feel that it is irrational to be afraid of Him — that it is its duty to love Him — still the breach will remain unrepaired, and the soul, if it but candidly examine itself, will find that it is still alienated from God. You may per-

haps convince a hungry man that he ought not to be hungry, you may get him even to ignore his hunger, still hunger gnaws at his vitals, and will not be satisfied until food is supplied. You may persuade a timid man that it is irrational to be afraid, you may so work upon him as to make him imagine and declare that he is not afraid, — he may actually believe that he is a brave man, — yet all the while he is a coward, liable to be frightened at any moment. The thing which estranges man from God is his guilt, his consciousness of guilt. No matter what character you may attribute to the Deity, no matter how kind and merciful you make Him out to be, yea, though the soul be persuaded this all is so, that it is wicked to distrust this, still it feels withal uncomfortable in the consciousness of Him. Intellectual impressions are not sufficient. The cause of estrangement, of disquietude with respect to God, lies not in the head, but in the heart. True, the heart must be reached through the head; but the difficulty with which the head is to deal must first be rightly ascertained. A man conscious of guilt will not be satisfied by proofs of God's love and all-benevolence. You have not touched the right point to remove the estrangement; you must remove its cause, must meet the demands of man's guilt, show it expiated, satisfy the demands of his sense of justice; not until then will he feel comfortable in the thought of God; then, and not until then, will he be able to take comfort in the thought that God is love. The revelation of the Divine atonement will alone effect the reconciliation of man to God. A guilty conscience makes cowards of us all. The man guilty of crime, or of dishonorable conduct, dares not look his fellow-man fairly in the face. The man who has betrayed his friend withers with anguish under his eye. The man who has sinned against God, and who is conscious of it, feels similarly; he dares not meet the eye of God; he

writhes in anguish when he thinks of Him; therefore he avoids the thought of Him, and seeks to repress that element of his consciousness. Speak to such an one of the love of God; tell him that God is all-benevolent and all-merciful, and you give him no consolation; you only torture him the more. There is but one remedy: point such an one to the Cross; open to him the doctrine of an expiation of man's guilt by the sacrifice of Jesus Christ the Son of God; show him, in Christ, his sins punished — nailed to the Cross, as they deserve to be. This will bring peace; it will soothe and relieve man's sense of guilt; it will show him God's love, in expiating his guilt for him. Thus, showing man his guilt expiated, the barrier is removed, man becomes reconciled to God, is comfortable in His presence, and learns to love Him.

It is the sight of Christ's sacrifice, whereby God is reconciling the world unto Himself, that reconciles man to God. And this is the only way of ever leading a creature conscious of his guilt to love God. That class of Christians who exclude the atonement, if they sincerely love God, necessarily they must be unconscious of any guilt: but this is scarcely possible; they cannot, therefore, truly love God; it is under such circumstances a psychical impossibility. No doubt they believe they do, and they dwell constantly upon the love and mercy of God; but this very exclusiveness shows the weakness of the position. They dare not face the justice of God, entirely ignore it, because they cannot meet its demands, because there are some ugly questions connected with that justice; besides, this might awaken anxious inquiries within. The consciousness of guilt, evidently, is not entirely suppressed. This very over-anxiety to see only one side of the Divine character proves as much; the soul is not, then, reconciled to God. In the consciousness of Him it is uncomfortable, uneasy, afraid.

Like the braggadocio, the man talks much and blatantly; but within there is trembling, underneath there is weakness in the knees. The man who is reconciled to God through the sacrifice of Christ, eyes the justice of God with perfect composure. Justice is his friend. He looks at it, then, into himself; he sees his guilt, but he sees on Calvary a cross, sees upon it a sacrifice for sin, and there he sees his guilt expiated. Justice no more condemns him; it is satisfied.

Christ being God-man, in Him God became conscious of guilt. As a man, He could feel what guilt deserved. Through sympathy and love, Christ could experience guilt, not as His own, but as his fellow-man's: as a Holy man, He could feel this acutely. There is no doubt we feel the guilt of those whom we love when they sin, if we be but partially holy and they not, more than they feel it themselves; we feel for them, and verily wring our hands in anguish. Love and sympathy enable one man to bear the burdens of another; it joins together, and makes us feel each other's pains. God, in Christ, became conscious of human guilt. In Him, then, in His consciousness of guilt, the Divine sense of justice demanded, consciously, satisfaction. As human, in this consciousness of guilt, the human sense of justice also called for satisfaction. God and Man, both in Christ, in His consciousness of guilt, felt the need of satisfaction to justice. The Divine sense of justice, then, in Christ, made itself consciously felt, under the condition of guilt. God did really become consciously guilty, not of His own, but of His fellow-man's sin. God experienced the feeling of guilt; His sense of justice, in Christ, consciously condemned, not Himself, but sin, as felt by Him, in His consciousness of guilt. To satisfy the demands of His Divine sense of justice, He underwent suffering and death, the penalty of sin. He did not, however, torture

and kill Himself: God the Father inflicted the penalty. His sense of justice called upon Him to condemn and punish the guilty one; thus only would His sense of justice be satisfied. But how long? for ever?

In Christ, the Divine sense of justice was satisfied by His own suffering and death. If in Christ, where the Divine sense of justice consciously existed under the conditions of guilt, if He felt guilt no longer, necessarily the sense of justice in God the Father must be satisfied, and He propitiated; because He and the Father are one. In Christ, the human sense of justice has, too, been satisfied, for both human and Divine demand identically the same satisfaction. In Him, therefore, the two, the Divine and the human, met, and in His consciousness became one. Thus, in Christ, God actually became conscious of guilt, actually suffered for it, and consciously expiated it. Thus, in the very circle of the Godhead itself, has human guilt been experienced and expiated. Christ being God, His sense of justice was God's sense of justice. When, therefore, upon the cross, He uttered those memorable words, "It is finished," then was God's sense of justice satisfied, and human guilt expiated. Moreover, being man, His sense of justice was man's sense of justice. When, therefore, He declared, "It is finished," He announced the satisfaction of the human sense of justice. When, therefore, we contemplate the sacrifice of this our great fellow-man, seeing He combines in one God and man, His suffering for us and in our stead satisfies the demands of our guilt, in its relation both to God and ourselves, allowing us to feel that it has been satisfactorily expiated. Thus, being justified by faith, consciously clear of guilt, we feel "at peace with God, through our Lord Jesus Christ, by whom also we have access into this grace wherein we stand, and rejoice in hope of the glory of God."

The meaning of the incarnation is this: in Christ, the God-man, God himself enters into the consciousness of human guilt. As the holy God, He suffers what He feels to be the desert of guilt, and so, satisfactorily to Himself, expiates it. In Himself, God could never enter into the experience of guilt, but as man, in Christ, God has, in the person of his Son, experienced guilt. Here, then, we have the fulfilment of the prophecy contained in the rite of sacrifice, here the true meaning of its symbolism; here is a victim, a substitute; not a brute beast, but the Son of God incarnate. Entering into a full experience of man's guilt, and as divinely holy, He feels it most acutely. Consciously He experiences guilt, not His own, but by means of sympathy, His fellow-man's. Consciously, as God and man, He suffers what He feels that guilt deserves, satisfies His own divine and human sense of justice, and makes satisfaction for the guilt of the whole world. It is God who feels thus; therefore it is an eternal fact, an everlasting truth. Here, then, is the true, the final sacrifice, an atonement for the sins of the whole world, an historical fact, the sinner's hope.

CHAPTER V.

PRAYER.

MAN, conscious of his immediate contact with an Infinite Being, prays. The elements entering into the unity of this Being are Omnipotence, Omnipresence, Omniscience, and Goodness. There is something in the soul the natural tendency of which is to vent itself in prayer. There is a force in the soul which impels man to uncover

his head, or to fall upon his knees, or to prostrate himself upon the ground, just according to his habit of reverence, and to cry aloud under the blue heavens to an unseen Being for help. The greater the exigency, the louder and more earnest the cry. No matter how entirely circumstances seem to shut the creature in, nay, the more inevitable the danger, the greater the felt necessity for prayer. Man's necessity is by the soul felt to be God's opportunity. If man could rescue himself, if the way of escape was open, then, most assuredly, there would be no prayer. But it is this very apparent impossibility of escape which brings man to his knees. The way of escape is, to human eyes, absolutely barricaded; therefore it is that man is on his knees, crying for help. This proves that man is conscious of God as omnipotent, omnipresent, and omniscient; and though he may be in the dark as to His moral character, that still he puts some trust in His benevolence. He would not pray unless he had some hope of answer, and he could not hope unless he had faith in the benevolence of God. In prayer, then, there is, on the one hand, a consciousness of God, in his infinity and goodness, and, on the other hand, a consciousness of self, in all its weakness and dependence. Trying circumstances bring on the crisis; and though man may, in prosperity, boast of his self-sufficiency, yet will adversity reverse the judgment, bring man to his knees, and make him, in his felt insufficiency, cry aloud for help.

Prayer springs from the heart, and not from the head. The intellect and the heart are oftentimes found in antagonism. In an age of ignorance as to the laws of nature, provided the consciousness of God be vivid, these two influences do not interfere with each other. The gods of the superstitious heathen are to them capable of answering their prayers. In their ignorance, being unacquainted with the uniformity and invariableness of the laws of nature, they

were not inconvenienced, were not hedged in by that intellectual difficulty which presents itself in a more enlightened age to more enlightened minds. In such an age, prayer could be more hearty; and provided the suppliant could be assured of the benevolence of his God, necessarily he would be more hopeful, and could expect his prayer, however difficult the request, to be answered favorably.

The difficulty which besets the subject of prayer now, is this. Seeing we have discovered how the great First Cause works,— seeing, we now know that He acts only in accordance with certain uniform, invariable rules which we have discovered, and which we term the laws of nature,— under such circumstances, it is folly to expect God to interfere, and arbitrarily to suspend or revoke these laws, and that simply upon the request of some poor individual man. There certainly are difficulties, but they can be easily resolved, if we keep in mind the distinction between the head and the heart. Prayer is from the heart; the difficulties are all intellectual — from the head; and, after all, it is only a question of pride. The intellect knows something, but imagines that it knows all. It cannot carry even what it has; it staggers under it, and is confused. It would form a scheme of government, but cannot; becomes confused, and then this reacts upon the forces of the heart. A man may become so confused as to be unable to pray; such a thing is possible; but although this may be the case while all is well, let but adversity come, let the soul be placed in trying circumstances, and the power of the heart will reassert itself, the consciousness of God will revive, man will feel his own insufficiency, and the instinct of prayer, of man to call upon God for assistance, will make itself heard and felt.

Placing ourselves at such a standpoint as will enable us

to see the difficulties to be encountered, what do we see? But before we proceed, let us understand the nature of the standpoint at which we are posted. In order, then, that difficulties should present themselves to the mind in the act of prayer, the intellect must be at least partially informed. Ignorance will offer no obstacles to the Omnipotent. The man who chains Him down must have some knowledge. The knowledge which gives rise to these difficulties is that of self and nature. The standpoint at which we are now posted is, then, one in which the intellect has been somewhat informed; where therefore a fund of knowledge, as regards both mind and matter, has been acquired,—where the intellect has been both educated and enlightened,—under such circumstances, the soul is more conscious of self and of nature than of God. Its attention being more constantly directed to these objects, the facts of self, and of nature are more constantly before it, and therefore, in any act, the soul is more apt to turn in one direction than another. For instance: a man is placed in trying circumstances; he has been accustomed to reflect upon the laws of mind and matter, is unaccustomed to meditate upon the omnipotence of God. The soul, true to its instincts, is moved towards prayer; but the mind, true to its education, turns in its accustomed direction, and stands staring at the laws of nature. The attention is directed from God and His omnipotence, and is fixed upon these laws and their invariableness. The soul urges to call for help; the mind suggests difficulties. The man becomes confused, feels it is hopeless to pray, and turns away sullenly to meet his doom.

Since the time when the inductive method was applied, the intellectual horizon of man as to the laws of matter has been greatly extended. Applying this method, either to nature or to the inner consciousness, we begin by observ-

ing facts; next proceeding to apply the rules of exclusion and inclusion, we classify; then mounting up into the region of hypothesis, we generalize; then, thirdly and lastly, we verify. This being done, we have before us a law. What then is a law? It is but this: that, certain circumstances being supposed to exist, certain other circumstances may uniformly, invariably, nay, we may safely say inevitably be expected to follow. The antecedents being known, the consequents can invariably be predicated. What constitutes the connection between the two, we know not. That the one causes the other, may be true or it may not be. Nothing more do we know on the subject, but that the latter is an invariable consequent of the former, its antecedent. But this gives us much. We know what to expect: we know that the stone thrown up will come down; that fire will burn; that mind will think. Applying this method to both mind and matter, we discover the facts of both to be but chains of antecedents and consequents, of causes and effects, as it is generally said. Of course the greater our knowledge of these laws, the more thorough our knowledge of mind and nature. Now, to well-instructed minds these laws are but expressions for the method of the Deity. God, then, we learn by experience, and reason acts in mind and matter according to a certain uniform, invariable method. The laws of nature give us the rule of the Divine Omnipotence in its activity. Given then a law, and we know how God will under certain circumstances act.

Now prayer is in a certain sense unreasonable. It is logical, inasmuch as it springs out of consciousness of omnipotence; but it is unreasonable, inasmuch as it goes to contravene the result of experience. The soul in its exigency recognizes the unlimited omnipotence, and trusts in the goodness of its God; it overlooks the lesson of expe-

rience and the difficulties presented by the intellect, and in its logical unreasonableness calls aloud for aid.

As long as the soul eyes the Divine nature, it hopes. To God all things are possible; experience may offer difficulties, reason may confuse, but in times of exigency the soul turns its eye upon God: difficulties vanish, behold he prays. As soon as the exigency is past, the scene changes, the intellect returns again to its favorite topics; the laws of nature loom up again; the sense of God's omnipotence and goodness becomes less vivid; an endless chain of causes and effects attaches itself to the soul. The mind becomes confused; it cannot see how prayer is to be answered, and so the voice of the soul becomes hushed, and the man settles himself down to the hopeless gloom of fatalism; until the exigency arises again, and the logical unreasonableness of the soul makes itself felt once more.

Prayer is logical, because it springs out of the recognition of the omnipotence and the goodness of God. It appears to be unreasonable; but it is only an appearance. Supposing ourselves fully assured of the existence of a law, so that we could declare a consequence to be inevitable, still, even under such circumstances, to expect and to pray for a different consequence is not unreasonable. From a human standpoint it is; but not in reality. All things are possible with God; because He is the Infinite One. The chasm between the finite and the Infinite is profound. The finite must not limit the Infinite. Though we have arrived at a point where we can predicate of a thing that it is impossible, this we must remember is but the dictum of the finite. The Infinite is now to be brought into play, and who can predicate of Him, *No.* The soul appreciates this distinction. It feels, is conscious of the Infinite. It is broader than the intellect; goes deeper down, can feel what the intellect cannot conceive of. Man feels, and is conscious of the Infinite One; but to conceive of Him, to

form an adequate conception of Him, is impossible. Now just as the soul is conscious of what the intellect is incapable adequately of conceiving, so on the other hand, it prays for that which the intellect finds it impossible to explain, how it is to be supplied. The difficulties are all of the intellect, intellectual. The prayerful motions are all of the heart, uncalculating, instinctive.

Supposing this universe to be finite, it is possible, man might comprehend it. He might contain in his mind the knowledge of the whole chain of antecedents and consequents, which holds good in the universe. Should such be actually the case, man could, humanly speaking, foretell exactly what under all circumstances would take place; he would know all the laws of mind and matter; and were the Deity but finite, could forecast his every procedure. But the Deity must be finite. Supposing the conception of the finite to be complete, yet how would this warrant any forecast as to the action of the Infinite? It is this passage from the finite to the Infinite that the soul makes; but which the intellect cannot; at which it inevitably pauses. The soul makes the leap; prayer is a voice from the other side. Prayer is not then unreasonable. It is unreasonable for the finite to limit the Infinite. Prayer in the exigency of the finite demands of the Infinite. It is clearly, therefore, conformable with the purest reason.

The conditions then necessary in order to this product of prayer, are, first, that there be, at least, some consciousness of God left in the soul, that this element of the consciousness be not entirely suppressed by an exclusive development of the intellectual; and next, that man be placed in trying circumstances—in an exigency in which it is manifest that all human aid is unavailing; then inevitably the soul will turn to its God and cry to Him for help. Let such conditions but continue, and the soul will remain

in the attitude of prayer; when these are the permanent conditions, prayer will become a habit. The soul which constantly feels itself to be in an exigency prays always. It is a consciousness of his own need and helplessness, and of God's fullness, sufficiency, and goodness, that brings man to his knees. The reason why man prays so little is because in the main he is so self-sufficient. Under ordinary circumstances he feels that in himself he is self-sufficient. It is only when shut in by difficulties seemingly insurmountable that he is brought to see and to confess his mistake, and to betake himself to the Deity for help. Let a man be brought to feel that he is weak and insufficient of himself, and, provided he has not lost his consciousness of his God, he will be a praying man. The subordinate reason why men pray so little, is, because, while on the one hand they exercise and enlighten the intellect, on the other they fail to exercise the heart. They seldom meditate upon God; their minds are dark on this subject; they have formed to themselves no conception of the Deity, or, what is worse, an inadequate or false one. Their minds are more occupied with second causes than with the Great First; the infinite complexity of second causes only confuses, and so the head becomes dizzy, and the voice of the soul goes out in a sigh and nothing more.

The intellectual difficulty in prayer assumes two forms: first, *how* God is to answer prayer; secondly, *will* He answer it. The first form aims at God's omnipotence, the second at His goodness or benevolence. In the first, the finite would comprehend and limit the Infinite, and is unreasonable; a morbid state of mind arising out of a one-sided development. The second form of the difficulty is, however, reasonable. The natural attributes of the Deity, His omnipotence, omnipresence, omniscience, and eternity, are necessary facts of the consciousness, contained in the unity of the being or substance of God, and can be evolved out

of it; all of these are essential elements of the grand substance of the Infinite. But the benevolence of the Deity is in the same consciousness a more variable element. It is a fluctuating element; there is more of the nature of an opinion about it, than of a conscious fact. And yet, in the one form or the other, this fact must enter into the unity of the religious consciousness, otherwise there would be no prayer. Man must in some way or other be persuaded of the benevolence of the Deity, otherwise he would not pray. Such persuasion may arise from evidence, or it may be an ingrained fact of consciousness, still, since we see its effects, we must infer it as a cause. Should man be persuaded of the absolute benevolence of the Deity irrespective of his own subjective condition, there would be no hesitancy in his approaches to Him. He would on all occasions in which he required help boldly call for it, and would confidently await an answer. But if his sense of the Divine benevolence be confused, if he be uncertain on this point, of course there will be hesitancy and want of confidence in addressing the Deity. Let man but be assured of this, and he will become as a child, and whenever he becomes involved in difficulties will betake himself for help to his Father in Heaven. Let but the obstacle of self-sufficiency be broken down by adversity; let but the consciousness of God in His omnipotence and benevolence become a standing fact in man's inner experience, then will man become a hopeful, confident child, dependent and waiting on, and praying to the Great Father of the universe. But the difficulties in the way of this free access are grave. There is first a fluctuating state of uncertainty as to the Divine benevolence, and then, in addition to this, there are doubts arising from movements within. The great obstacle to familiar converse with God is fear of Him. This is a fact in the Religious consciousness. To be afraid is to

avoid, to distrust, to cease to pray. This fear has roots, one of which, running down deep into man's soul, sends out its rootlets among all those disturbing facts which are connected with moral guilt. It is the feeling of guilt which makes man afraid to meet his God; this it is which makes him shun God's presence, and makes him too uneasy to hold any familiar converse with Him. In times of agony the cry may be forced out; but at other times, man, feeling his guiltiness, is sullen and stands off at an impracticable distance from his Maker. Now it is inevitable, that, so long as this state of things continues, man will remain a prayerless creature. Supposing even that he is persuaded of the infinite benevolence of the Creator, supposing this to have become a fact in his religious consciousness, still the soul will, even under such conditions, feel an estrangement; still it will feel that something is wrong, that there is still a barrier between it and its God; still it will feel timid in His presence, will feel a hesitancy in approaching Him, and will consequently be found seldom in prayer. The all-benevolence of the Deity is not enough, still there is something in the soul that will erect a barrier, will create a coldness between the two, will interrupt prayer. And this barrier lies in man's moral consciousness. It arises out of a sense of guilt. The hesitancy then in guilty man's approach is reasonable, and there is but one possible way of removing it: man must be persuaded finally, not only of the general goodness and benevolence of God, but also of His goodwill towards himself, guilty as he feels himself to be. In order to feel comfortable in the presence of his God, he must then feel that he has rendered satisfaction for his guilt. If this demand of his moral nature be not met, it will be impossible for him to feel comfortable before God. When this is effected, man and God will be reconciled, will be at peace with each other; being reconciled by faith, there will be peace, and access, and joy in

the conscious sense of a re-established union. Thus will man be again established in his proper relation to his Maker, and thenceforth he will be a praying creature, making known his every want to an indulgent Father.

Prayer then, in all its forms, from the very first movement of the soul in casting about for help, to its last full trustful confident demand upon its Heavenly Father for all that it feels in need of, is, psychically speaking, a logical action. There is a logic of the soul as complete as that of the intellect. In the intellectual sphere, logic means this. Given certain propositions, termed premises, and the intellect will be forced to accept another proposition termed the conclusion. Now in the soul where the vital, active, powers reside, there is a state of things exactly corresponding to this. Given a certain psychical state or condition, and the man will act in a certain manner. In the one case the conclusion gives us intellectual sequence, that is to say, given the premises, and we can predict how the man will think or conclude; in the other, given the premises, which are psychical conditions, and we will know how the man will act. Provided the intellectual premises be clear, the conclusion is inevitable.

Given then a psychical consciousness of God in His omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence, and eternity and goodness, on the one hand, and on the other a conscious sense of weakness, and yet a felt necessity for help; given a consciousness that mortal aid is unavailing; given these psychical premises, and the conclusion is inevitable, — man will pray. The more vivid the elements entering into this condition, the greater the certainty. And if man be persuaded, not only of the general goodness, but of the goodwill of the Deity towards himself, not only will he pray in an exigency, but will always pray, will pray without ceasing, communing lovingly and confidently with his Father in Heaven. Without premises there is no conclusion;

without its own proper, peculiar psychical conditions, prayer is impossible. It is a logical sequence, and must have its premises. The reason why it is so little understood is, because its psychical premises are so generally absent. To be understood, these must be examined. If they are absent from the consciousness, this becomes an impossibility. Let these conditions be present, and then prayer, the conclusion, will follow. The man who says that intellectual difficulties so perplex him that he is unable to pray, is in exactly the condition of him who is so confused by physiological difficulties as to be unable to eat, or of him who is so perplexed with psychological difficulties as to be unable to reason. If he were hungry he would eat; if the premises are present and understood, he will conclude; if the psychical state is present, he will pray. As long as the antecedent conditions are absent, the proper consequents will not follow.

Reasoning is a process, an intellectual one; prayer too is a process, a psychical one. To be understood it must be analyzed, and to be analyzed it must first be experienced. And no one can understand this analysis, unless he has experienced the process himself. We observe then that prayer is a fact of the religious consciousness, is a result; analyzed, it is a process in which the antecedents being present, the consequent inevitably follows. The intellectual difficulty as to how God is to answer prayer is not one of these antecedents. Prayer exists, though we may be ignorant of its laws. Supposing the scheme of this universe and of this world to be such that the finite mind could grasp it; supposing it was grasped and comprehended in all its details, so that man could forecast all the operations of the Deity, and be thus acquainted with all His laws; then would man understand how prayer could be answered. Until then it must remain a problem; and though it must ever remain so, still man will continue to pray.

PART II.

A SYNTHESIS.

CHAPTER I.

THE MORAL LIFE.

THE most general formula for the condition of human nature as we find it, is, Egotism. There is nothing that has a stronger hold on human nature than its desire for independence. Nothing galls a man more than the necessity of submitting himself to the will of another. From the very earliest years this tendency makes itself manifest, and the very first lesson to be taught the infant is submission. By the laws of our being the will of the parent is the rule of the child's obedience; but even here there is resistance, and force and the law of fear must frequently be brought into requisition. But when manhood is reached, then this ceases, and thenceforth the man's own will determines his conduct. Human nature as a general rule is certainly conscious of God. It must then be cognizant of its relations to Him; and man, if properly constituted, could not but feel an obligation to submit to and obey his Creator. The will of the Creator ought certainly to be the rule of the creature's conduct. He, as the great Father of the human race, ought certainly to be reverenced. His will ought to be obeyed, and His honor or glory ought to be the chief end which the creature should consider; but this is not the case. God, though known, is not respected, and the creature in mapping out his life does not take the glory of the Creator into consideration. There is nothing that man seeks more strenuously to assert than his independence. To be under the dominion of another, even though it be his Creator, is galling to him. The consciousness of such a relation, reinforced in Christendom, by early instruction,

seems only to irritate man, and at once there begins the struggle to stifle all such feelings of restraint. All of us are conscious of a desire to do as we please, and when, in such a course, we are met by a Divine command, we become irritated and fiercely champ the bit that would restrain us. Man glories in this feeling of independence, and when once the compunctions of conscience have been stifled, then human nature feels itself free and swells with exultation. At no time is this feeling stronger than when one is actually engaged in consciously breaking one of the Divine commands. Why do men so delight in breaking the Sabbath? because of the fourth commandment. The man who has not grown old in sin exults in such transgressions. They bring before his consciousness his independence — serve to remind him that he is his own master; and though at first there may be under such circumstances a little fear mixed with the exultation, yet now, through impunity, that is gone, and man in the consciousness of his wilful breaking of a Divine commandment, glories. His Egotism is indulged; he is happy. There can be but two wills in the Universe, that of the Creator and that of the creature. Order would require that the one, that of the creature, should submit itself to the Creator's; but here the case is different. The creature will assert its independence. It pleases itself; wilfully transgresses the will of the Creator, and exults in the consciousness of its transgression. It is this state of things that brings about in human nature what may be termed a chronic state of guilt. Man is conscious that he pays no respect to the will of the Creator, that he will do just as he pleases; he knows that he intends to continue to assert his independence, and this causes him to feel that God is his enemy, and makes him, when he considers, afraid of Him. The only way in which he retains tranquillity of mind under such circumstances, is

by not thinking of God. Therefore he banishes the thought from his mind, absorbs himself in the pleasures or business of life, and does just as he pleases. If he did think of God, unless he repented and determined to obey Him, he could not help hating Him. This condition of affairs brings about an alienation; the two parties become estranged from each other. Sullenly the man eyes the God whose power he dreads; defiantly he spurns his commands. Self-willed, he follows his own inclination; and conscious of his guilt, he hates the God whom he cannot but fear when he thinks of him.

Irrespective of all varieties of characters, penetrating it to its very core, human nature is essentially self-willed. Egotism, the doing as one pleases; the feeling of being independent, of being self-sufficient; — such is the spirit with which human nature is saturated. Necessarily such a spirit brings man in antagonism with God. Two wills cannot exist together; one must give way to the other. Man will not submit his, so he must resist his Maker; and yet feeling unequal to such a contest, knowing that in the end he must get the worst of it; this, when he reflects upon it, makes him hate his God, as a tyrant and despot. So long as this spirit of independence continues, until man is humbled, this state of things must continue. Pride must be humbled, resistance must cease; man must give in and submit, otherwise he will more and more bitterly hate God to all eternity.

The fundamental category, then, expressive of the condition of human nature, is, Egotism. Egotism means self-deification, that man is a God unto himself. This condition considered in its relation to God is alienation, which in its finality becomes enmity. This fundamental condition admits of variety; alienated from God, self-willed and self-sufficient, human nature is subject to great diversity.

Being cut off from God, dependent upon itself for life and strength, necessarily it is upon a downward course. It cannot rise above itself; it draws no supplies from the Infinite and Perfect; the only life that it has is its own. Standing in a state of isolation, the finite cannot but exhaust itself, and fall back into nothing, which in the case of the moral, is disorder and spiritual death. Egotism in all its forms contains the same thing, namely, a self-sufficiency. Feeling this, the creature becomes puffed up, and so we have pride; and being proud, it becomes self-willed, restive under all restraint, hating every controlling influence. Admitting the parallel fact of the consciousness, we have in the first place, the religious element of alienation from God, which is the natural product of the independent, self-willed spirit; and then, as a last result, we have the hatred of God: a conscious resistance to His will, and an exultation in the impunity with which the rebellion is carried on. Egotism, without a consciousness of God, that is apart from any religious element, provided the moral life be present, assumes the form of self-complacency. Atheism, the speculative state admitting of an unconsciousness of God, produces naturally the same result. Under such conditions Egotism will flourish, and the character will present as its most prominent features, pride, self-sufficiency, and self-complacency.

Egotism as a spiritual state, admits of two divisions. In it, as isolated from God, there is a life, and this life may manifest itself in two ways. Provided it be efficient, it will bring about a course of moral conduct, will produce an actual, moral life; or, on the other hand, if it be not efficient, it will be overridden by the passionate principles of human nature. Coming into collision with lower forms of life, in the end it becomes entirely suppressed and extinguished. So long however as the moral life continues to exist, it must manifest itself; unimpeded, it de-

velops and becomes manifest in actual, moral life; resisted, it reacts upon itself, producing in the first place self-dissatisfaction, and in its finality remorse.

Life in human nature presents itself to us under various forms. First, there is the animal life, then the intellectual, then the moral, then the religious life, and finally the Divine life. All of these forms can frequently be found existing in individual personalities; often, too, they are found separated, some of them manifesting themselves, others evidently wanting. The animal, intellectual, moral, and religious, are generally found associated. The Divine life is not a form of the natural life; it is supernatural, imported into human nature, received by means of faith. The animal, intellectual, moral, and religious, are all natural. Human nature, in its natural state of Egotism and alienation from God, manifests all these forms of life. In proportion, and intensity, and number, they are found varying in different individuals; but human nature in its originality is capable of exhibiting all these forms. Sometimes the animal, intellectual, and moral are found associated together; here we have human nature, but in a state of irreligion, it may be of Atheism. Under such conditions, if the animal life preponderates, and so assert itself as to repress the other two, here we will have before us the case of the sensualist. The animal life manifests itself in the passionate impulses of human nature; and when the objects to which they relate are those of the senses — here man is on a par with the brute creation. He has appetites bodily like the brute, and the undue gratification of such impulses leads to sensuality. When the animal life preponderates, it represses the higher forms of activity, and leads human nature back to the condition of the brute creation. The intellectual is a higher form of life; it exists first, as in the child, in the state of spontaneity; after-

wards, as in the man, as a conscious life. Conscious, intellectual life begins with the power of voluntary reflection. Let this form of activity preponderate, and it will repress the animal life and will produce the Philosopher, a man above the influence of his bodily passions; but if there be nothing more, perhaps a bad man. Now let there be added to this form of life the moral, let the animal life be held by the intellectual and the moral in proper subjection. Let the intellectual be guided by the moral, — supposing both the animal and the intellectual to exist, — yet add but the moral, and it will aim at holding the others under due restraint; here then we will have the moral man, a man of like passions with ourselves, a man who thinks and reasons; but moreover a man who has a conscience, a man who is conscious of a sense of right and wrong within him, of a feeling which, on the proposal of an action or course of conduct, can approve one course or condemn another. Let this form of life preponderate, and this result will manifest itself; the man will follow the dictates of his conscience, he will regulate his conduct in accordance with the moral judgments he forms; and here we have before us human nature; animal, intellectual, with all its original elements, and yet, at the same time, moral. Up to this point not even a thought of God may have suggested itself to the mind. The moral man may easily be an irreligious man, perhaps an Atheist. The religious life is still a higher, and another distinct form of human life. The moral life, in its normal development, manifests itself in a moral course of conduct. The main points in the case are these: the soul in its cognizance of human conduct passes certain judgments, it pronounces certain actions and courses of conduct, right, others wrong; in the personal consciousness it obligates a man to do this, it forbids him doing that; it approves or condemns the conduct of others, and

passes the same judgment upon itself. There is, then, in the human consciousness, a living rule of conduct, seeking expression. When the moral life is present, that rule will be obeyed. It will become a recognized guide, it will find expression in an actual moral life. Here we have the moral life acting under its normal conditions. But if the moral judgments be disregarded, and the conduct be in contravention to them, here the moral life, if it exist, will manifest itself in another form. In seeking to assert itself, it has been met and repressed, still it is not extinguished. Life is activity, essentially so, and until it ceases to exist, it will assert itself, will attempt a manifestation. Though repressed then, it still exists, and expresses itself under the category of remorse. Moral death is stagnation, there is nothing of regret or remorse in it. The moral judgments are disregarded without any compunction; one of the elements of human nature is for the time absent. The moral life will make itself felt; if successful, it becomes a fact; if unsuccessful, it reacts, creating great spiritual discomfort. In the first case we have self-complacency, in the second, self-dissatisfaction, because the first is a normal condition, the second is unnatural and abnormal. Life is, essentially, activity and development; unimpeded, it passes on to growth and development and final realization of its tendency. Impeded, growth and development cease, and an abnormal and painful activity takes the place of the original healthy activity; moral life impeded, gives us an unnatural development, tending downwards to the morbid condition of an eternal remorse.

The moral life is an activity, a tendency to bring up the conduct to conformity with the dictates of the moral judgment. Such conformity being attained, the moral life becomes realized, a tendency obtains its realization, and becomes a moral fact. Such a realization is perfectly con-

sistent, philosophically speaking, with an entire absence of any element of the religious life. Morality is then consistent with irreligion, and even Atheism. It may, or it may not exist under the Egotistic consciousness.

The decisions of the moral faculty are in the way of judgments. A classification of such judgments, succeeded by a generalization thereupon, would give us a code of moral laws. This code is known as the moral law, and as such becomes a standard of morality. It is evident that such a standard is subject to considerable variation. First, then, there is the standard of morality, arising out of the judgments of the moral faculty when left to itself. Unenlightened from any other source, the moral faculty, still using the light which in itself it possesses, will finally arrive at some standard of morals; inevitably, certain actions will be pronounced wrong, and others pronounced right. Out of such a series of judgments will arise a generalization, and form such a moral code. There may be great imperfection, the code may be very limited, some of the judgments may even be reversed, and wrong; the moral faculty may be so torpid as scarcely to work; seldom judging, sometimes judging through darkness, wrongly, still, with all this, under all circumstances, human nature, provided it be not deprived of one of its fundamental elements, will be found uttering moral judgments; having a moral law, having, therefore, some standard of morality. Such are the standards of morality prevalent among all those portions of the human race which are without any express revelation from on high.

In its primary exercise the moral faculty performs two distinct functions. The conditions which call for its exercise are simply the cognizance of a moral action, it matters not whether the action be past or future, whether performed or to be performed by one's self, or by another. In the presence of an action involving

right or wrong, the moral faculty at once comes into action. The functions which it exercises are two. It views the case in all its moral bearings, examines into motives and circumstances, everything relating to the moral conditions of the act; and having done this, it immediately passes judgment, pronounces the contemplated action right or wrong. If the action past is wrong, it condemns it; if future, it disapproves and forbids it. That which is right carries with it a conscious obligation of performance; that which is wrong, consciously, ought not to be done. When the action judged is one's own, there follows self-approval or self-condemnation, and this is on the one hand a pleasure, on the other a pain. The attachments of the moral judgments to the personality, forms a third subordinate function, pertaining to the moral faculty. The first is its inquisitorial, the second its judicial, the third is its guilt-attaching power. The moral faculty attaches guilt to the sinning soul, it becomes immediately consciously guilty, self-condemnation is a necessity. The soul feels that it is in possession of all the facts of the case, is conscious that its inquisitorial office has been thoroughly executed, knows, therefore, that it is in possession of the truth. It knows exactly the circumstances and motives under which the act was committed, and as such it feels competent to judge. Its judgment is just; the soul is conscious of the finality of its decision. It condemns or approves not the action, but self; here, then, we have the vital moral fact of guilt. It is the soul condemning itself: the soul conscious of its guilt, the soul knowing that its condemnation is just. The same process is apt to occur in the contemplation of the actions of others; but here the case is different. The soul cannot know that it is in possession of all the facts of the case; it may perhaps condemn unjustly, it may attribute false motives, it may not know

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all the limiting circumstances in the case, as ignorance, &c., therefore there may be some mistake, and the judgment passed upon another may be unjust. Under such circumstances, to be certainly just, the action only can be passed upon. It may be such that the moral faculty cannot but pronounce it wrong. In pronouncing upon the actor, it may misjudge him. Still such is generally the case: the mind passes from the action to the actor, connects the act with him, and passes judgment upon him. Only the omniscient One can judge another with unerring justice. The feeling which follows the sentence passed upon another depends upon the nature of the act. If the action be good, the actor will be approved, and perhaps admired and liked; if bad, he will be disapproved of and disliked and avoided. It is impossible for a man to like one whom his moral judgment pronounces upon unfavorably; physical ugliness is revolting, and the same is true of moral. The point at which caution is to be used, is, in the judgments we *pronounce;* we must be cautious here because it is impossible for us to know all the facts of the case. Self-condemnation, if the offence be gross, begets self-loathing. Condemnation of another under similar circumstances begets the same thing. In the case of ourselves, the inquisitorial function is thoroughly executed; in the case of others it cannot be. The judicial is in both cases the same: what we condemn in ourselves, we must condemn in others, and *vice versa*, if we be candid, and pass judgment on ourselves. In the one case we necessarily pass on to attach the sentence upon ourselves; in the other, though ordinarily it is impracticable to delay this process, still reason tells us it is safer, if we would be just, to stop at the action and condemn that only.

The two functions, then, excluding this last subordinate one, which the moral faculty exercises in its primary pro-

ceedings, are its inquisitorial and its judicial. The inquisitorial requires nothing but candidness, that the man come to the examination of his conduct, either past, present, or future, with a candid mind and a desire to know the truth. He must then enter into a full and minute examination of all the details of the case; he must act for himself the part of counsel in the conduct of a case; he must thus fairly bring out the points at issue; and having done this, the inquisitorial function ceases, the judicial must now begin.

To pass a just judgment, the Judge must not only know the point at issue, something more is required; — provided there be no formal law on the subject, nothing to which the Judge is to refer the case as coming under it, under such circumstances, nothing remains but that the Judge be an intelligent, just man; — he must be able to understand the case, and then his sense of justice must make him to act justly in the premises. Where there is a law, the Judge is but an interpreter: first, he classifies the case, brings it under the law applying to it, and having done this, becomes simply the mouth-piece of the law; he declares in general what the law enacts; this case he pronounces to fall under this specific act or clause of it, and, therefore, thus saith the law in this case. Whenever the judgment is left to the Judge's discretion, as, for instance, the amount of the penalty, here the Judge not only is the Judge, but also the legislator and law in himself. And here the necessity of his personal justice again comes in. The moral faculty may have occasion to exercise itself, without any formal law. It may have no defined law at all, or again, may have none applying to the case; in such case it becomes a law unto itself, and is dependent upon its own enlightenment. This may be, as often happens, darkness. Hence, the moral faculty as a judge is in need of enlightenment. Either give it another law to go by, or make it a law unto itself.

The moral faculty is peculiarly a personal one, the moral judgments of one man are not those of another. The same process has to be repeated in each individual case, in each individual bosom. On the other hand, man does not exist in isolation; as a man he is a member of society, and as such is affected by the past and by the present. The moral faculty has ever been in exercise; moral judgments have, therefore, ever existed. These judgments have been classified, and generalized upon, and hence there has always existed in every community a moral law, and a standard of morality. Just as in the civil sphere from individual judgments and customs there gradually arose that civil code denominated the English common law. So in morals, human moral judgments gradually became customs, and finally assumed the form of a traditional body of moral laws. No man, during any age, can, in forming his moral judgments, remain uninfluenced by such a standard. Unconsciously to himself he is under a law. The moral faculty stands in the same relation to this law, as the civil judge does to the civil law of the land. Thus the traditional moral law becomes a body of instructions for the moral faculty. A case arises; as soon as it is understood, it is referred to the law applying to this class of cases. The law pronounces its sentence, and the moral faculty instructed by the law does but in fact become its mouthpiece. Instructed by the law, the moral faculty becomes a living law, and pronounces living decrees. The law, whether written or traditional, speaks only by letter. The moral faculty incorporates the law in itself. The law becomes a living spirit, and as such pronounces living spiritual judgments. Although then, theoretically, it is possible for the moral faculty of itself, in a state of isolation, to pronounce moral judgments, yet practically such a condition never exists. Man is a member of society, de-

pendent upon the past, influenced by the present. Practically then, in the form of customs or traditions, a moral code must always exist. The moral faculty is influenced by such a code, it is instructed thereby and forms its judgments under its influence.

The standard of morality which exists in any community forms the rule of public opinion. Where the moral faculty receives instructions from no other source than tradition, whatever is the public opinion of the age, will be its morality. What public opinion indorses, that the private conscience will approve; what it brands, that the private conscience will condemn. Public opinion is as it were the conscience of society at large; each member of the community, in his private conscience, is but an exponent of the same; thus the private being an exponent of the public, the two are necessarily in unison. What then public opinion condemns, must meet with the same judgment in the private forum of conscience. Thus it happens that public opinion has the power of the keys: what it binds is bound in the conscience; and what it looses is loosed. If there be no other source of instruction, it is evident that morality must be on a level with public opinion. The standard of morality and of public opinion will then, under these circumstances, be the same.

The moral faculty, as we have seen, though influenced by the traditional moral law, is not absolutely dependent upon it. It may put it aside and judge for itself without any reference to written or customary law. It may depend entirely upon its own instinct, seeking to separate itself altogether from opinions of the day; it may isolate itself, call up its own inspiration, and pronounce judgment of itself. Acting under such conditions, it may happen that the individual may rise above the morality of public opinion, may condemn that which public opinion approves, and approve that which it condemns. Such cases no doubt do actually

occur, and we cannot, as religious beings, doubt it, when the effort for truth is made in the spirit of faith and prayer. There have been instances of men who have encountered the force of public opinion, preachers of righteousness who have condemned and branded practices which the public opinion of the day indorsed; — men, therefore, who were persecuted for righteousness' sake, and who, therefore, have their reward. The man who, disgusted with the public virtue of the day, falls back upon himself, and, under a Divine inspiration, arrives at a clearer knowledge of the truth, — the man who, under such convictions, assails the received doctrines, — such a man is the Reformer; and such men have lived. These are, however, the exceptions; as a general rule, the conscience of the individual is in harmony with the public standard of morality. Such a standard finds its expression in the voice of public opinion. What public opinion indorses, that the individual conscience approves; and what it condemns, that the private conscience disapproves and forbids. If then the individual, under such circumstances, lives up to this public standard, his conscience will acquit him of all moral delinquency, he will experience the satisfaction of an approving conscience, and society must regard him as a moral and righteous member of it. Thus to himself and to others he appears as a righteous and perhaps a good man. He has within him a conscience void of offence, both toward God and man.

The tendency of the moral life is, as we have seen, to bring about a conformity between the judgments of the moral faculty, the moral law, and the conduct. Let, then, this form of life exist, and in such force as to restrain the lower forms and to realize itself; under such conditions, with a standard of morality established by man, without Divine illumination, it is possible that the conduct may conform to it, and thus we would have before us realized

as a fact in human nature, the moral life. Here we have before us the moral life and the moral man, the latter the manifestation of the former. Observe carefully the case under consideration. It is the condition of all those portions of the human race which are without the illumination of a Divine revelation. There is a standard of morality, but it is essentially human, the result of a human moral science; the natural moral judgments classified, and generalized upon; a moral law floating about in the moral consciousness of the age, finding its formal enactment in the public opinion of the age. Such a standard must, from the nature of the case, vary. Its natural tendency is downward. As the ages roll on, it becomes more and more lax, the code becomes more limited, and the standard being the guide of the private conscience, necessarily human conduct becomes more depraved. It is possible that now and then, through the effort of some Reformer, this standard may receive a lift. But the tendency in human nature is to lower the moral standard of duty. Thus it is theoretically possible that the standard of morality should be so low, that the moral life would have no room for its exercise, and so could not exist. The lower the standard, the moral life existing, the greater its possibility of realization. It is easier to conform to a lax law than to a strict one; hence, heathen morality was far easier than Christian. The moral life existing, it was easy, under heathenism, for the soul to arrive at the self-satisfied condition of a conscious state of morality. A man very naturally measures himself by his standards; these, being self-made, are not high; they are such as the moral life can easily attain to, realize, and then enjoy itself in the sensation of a soothing self-complacency. Under such circumstances not only is there self-commendation, but also the commendation of one's fellow-men; and this adds to the satisfaction of the moral life. A low standard

of morality is then compatible with a conformity to it. When the moral life exists as a power in the soul, and effectually develops itself, this conformity is actually attained, then follows self-complacency, self-sufficiency, pride, contempt of others, all the psychical elements contained in the state of Egotism. Such a conformity to law is perfectly consistent with irreligion, Atheism, or, in case of the presence of the consciousness of God, is consistent with the hatred of Him.

When there is no moral life in the soul, still the moral faculty will continue to pronounce its judgments. Instructed by the prevalent standard of morality, it will judge, acquit, or condemn the soul; but here the process will end; there being no moral life, there will be no effort after conformity with the standard of morality, there will be no movement of the soul to establish a harmony between the conduct and the moral judgment. It is a life which creates this movement, a life seeking its manifestation. The activity of this life will not cease until it meet with its realization in the actual personal moral life. The reason why the standard of morality is always gradually lowered, is, on the one hand, in order that the lower forms of life, all restraint being removed, may have unlimited development, and on the other hand, in order that the moral life may find its realization more practicable. The higher the standard, the greater the throes of the moral life in its process of realization; the repression of life is painful, the repression of the moral life produces painful symptoms, much mental distress; to avoid this, the moral standard is lowered.

The next standard of morality to be considered is that of revelation. Observe then, in the first place, the ways in which such a standard can be presented. First, there is the positive way by means of a prohibitive law, such as the ten commandments under the Mosaic dispensation. Such

a plan admits, in the first place, the presence of sin in human nature, and by a series of special commandments, it aims at repressing the expressions of that principle. The self-willed, self-seeking, egotistic principle is admitted as existing in man; the commandments would check its manifesting itself in actions. The moral law, as a commandment, does not pretend to uproot the sinful principle; it simply forbids its actions. The sinful principle is one will, the commandment is the expression of another; the latter forbids the activity of the former; it is an outward force meeting an inward force aiming at repressing it. The command meets man from without; the inner force of sin impels him to evil deeds; he is met by the moral barrier of the Divine will, as expressed in the commandments. A will is set over against a will, the Divine against the human. The standard then, set up by a system of prohibitive positive commandments, is a negative one. It admits the existence of a wilful principle within; but forbids it ever coming into action. It forbids it even to go so far as to covet, that is, to entertain an inordinate desire. The moral faculty within the soul cannot but recognize the excellence of such a standard. By its very nature it is susceptible to the beauty of moral excellence. When moral virtue is exhibited, whether by law or by example, the moral faculty cannot but recognize it as the true, the beautiful, and the good; cannot but feel its power, and feel its force as an obligation, to do and be likewise. The intellect, unless overthrown, must and will recognize and perceive the truth when clearly presented to it; the moral faculty, unless entirely subverted, cannot but perceive the beauty and feel the obligation of moral virtue when presented before it. Whether such a model will prove effectual in moulding the character is another question, depending entirely upon the presence of another element, namely,

of the moral life in the soul. Whether the commandments of God, or rather, whether the standard presented by them shall become the rule of man's conduct, depends entirely upon the power of the moral life within him. It is quite possible, that while a man may approve and admire a standard, yet he may prove recreant to his moral convictions, and be immoral in his conduct.

To prevent misunderstanding, observe that, in discussing the morality of the ten commandments, we are not viewing them in their religious connection, that is, as coming from God. The religious obligation to morality has not yet come into view; we are considering them merely in their moral relation, as embodying a code or standard of morality — such a morality as might be practised without any regard to God: whether such a thing is practicable is another question; we have not yet arrived at that. It is possible, we say, to erect a standard of morality by means of prohibitive enactments; we cite the ten commandments as an instance. True, the religious is here found in intimate conjunction with the moral; but for the present we ignore this connection, we ignore the duties which arise out of nearer obligations to God, — these pertain not to morality, but to religion; nor does the moral faculty take cognizance of them. A man may be moral without being religious; he may, having a low standard of morality, easily conform to it; he may practise such a morality for various reasons; he may do so from selfish motives, or he may do so simply because he regards it as right, because he values the answer of a good conscience; this gives us the truly moral man — the man in whom the moral life exists and is realized. The higher the standard, the more impracticable is this result; when it reaches the prohibition even of desire, here its realization becomes, humanly speaking, impossible. Under such circumstances the moral

life cannot be realized. Morality consists in conformity of life with a standard recognized or recognizable by the moral faculty as being right. "Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor; thou shalt not steal; thou shalt do no murder; thou shalt not commit adultery; thou shalt not covet;" these are all recognized by the moral faculty as being right. But, "thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart; thou shalt not make any graven image, nor bow down to them; thou shalt keep holy the Sabbath day," these commandments the moral faculty does not respond to. To disobey them is to be irreligious, not immoral. The faculty which feels the obligation of such commandments is not the moral, but a religious one; not the conscience, but another faculty of the soul. Not to love God is not to be immoral: it is unnatural, and it is irreligious; immorality and irreligion are different forms of Sin. Morality practised in the fear of or from love to God is godliness; practised simply because it is right, it is morality, but at the same time the man is an ungodly man. The religious element must come in before morality can pass into piety and godliness. There are other ways in which a moral standard may be presented, ways which have been actually adopted by revelation. The standard is begun, as we have seen, by prohibition; the object of the commandment is to repress sin, to prevent its breaking out into word or action, and, further, even in thought. This is the negative side; the positive side of the standard requires not any action, but an affirmation. It requires dispositions: instead of saying, "do not steal," it says, "be honest;" in place of "thou shalt do no murder," it says, "love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them that despitefully use you and persecute you;" and so on. It forbids lust. Be chaste, be temperate, be ye kind, tender-hearted, forgiving one

another. In fine, it says, be perfect. It is a body of counsels of perfection requiring dispositions, all of which it sketches, sometimes in the abstract, at other times in the concrete, giving instances of the disposition required, by parable and by metaphor. Here, then, is the positive side of the standard. The command to love, implies of course the prohibition to hate, and so on with all the positive virtues. Here, then, we have both sides of the law; on the one hand, all sinful thoughts, words, and actions are forbidden; on the other hand, all that is pure and good and perfect in human character is required. All evil dispositions being at the same time both implicitly and explicitly condemned, here then we have before us a standard of moral perfection. And high as it is, the moral faculty is capable of responding to it and appreciating it. Brought into contact with it, the moral faculty cannot but pronounce it as embodying all that is true, beautiful, and good in moral character.

The last way in which revelation presents a moral standard is in the way of a moral life. It brings before us in the four Gospels, the life of the man Christ Jesus. It gives us in actual life an instance of one who lived up to this standard. Placed under circumstances adapted to call out all that is true, beautiful, and good in the moral character, the great moral teacher lived what he taught. He exhibited in his life the counsels of perfection. The circumstances under which he was placed were so overruled as to bring out and exhibit the various beauties of character. Not only does his life conform to the law prohibiting sinful manifestations, but here we have all that is perfect, all that is positive; we have points of character, moral dispositions exhibited. In Him we have the actual realization of the moral life, the standard being one of perfection. Of course there is more in that life than moral per-

fection. Human perfection has in it more than this; and Jesus Christ was the perfect man, perfect in all the relations which human nature occupies. Revelation gives us then in Jesus Christ a living instance of moral perfection, a model therefore, and a perfect standard of morality. In Him the moral life existed in its full power; it wrought itself out, and was realized. He required no standard. He was a Reformer, His own conscience was His guide; he left the traditional standard, He assailed it, as the Sermon on the Mount witnesses. He fell back upon his own inward light, and in the spirit of prayer and faith lived by His own light. His moral judgments were never at fault; His generalizations were laws, the real laws of morality, a new and yet the old moral code. All the reformers, preachers of righteousness, that went before, were but the shadows of Him who was to come, the man Christ Jesus.

Thus we have, under these forms, a standard of morality presented to us in Revelation, — a standard which the moral faculty must and will, if fairly dealt with, recognize, appreciate, and pronounce as the true one. Now supposing the moral life to exist in the soul, what will we find? Evidently an effort after conformity. The moral life seeks to realize itself by bringing about a conformity of the conduct with its moral standard. The man, then, in whom the moral life exists will be struggling after conformity with this standard. What will be the result? A failure; and why? Because of the existence of another form of life, — the life of sin within the soul. Man in striving after the sublime ideal presented in Revelation finds himself at fault. The very effort develops that of which he had hitherto been unconscious. He finds himself under a bondage from which he cannot emancipate himself; the moral life quickened within strives to come to birth. It yearns to conform to that standard which it feels is the

true one; but it is met by another life, a life strictly in antagonism with its tendency, and this at once produces discord. The sinful principle is a life whose development is directly in antagonism with the standard of morality. Exactly what that law forbids, that sin urges unto. It has two roots running down into both the animal and intellectual life. The effort at conformity develops, then, discord, and man soon finds that to realize the moral life by such a standard is an impossibility. What then follows? The egotism of the soul is seriously disturbed; the soul is stripped at once of its self-complacency and self-sufficiency. The man finds that he cannot be moral, even though he desire to be so. This is humiliating and distressing, and, rather than submit to it and recognize his helplessness, he settles the question by lowering the standard. He brings it down to what he can perform, and so strikes a compromise. He satisfies the cravings of his moral life, inasmuch as he is able to conform to such a standard. Thus he retains his self-complacency, and is still able to glory in his self-sufficiency. At the same time he allows the sinful principle to hold dominion and to gratify all its impulses, provided only they contravene not his moral standard.

Such exactly is the treatment which the moral standard of Revelation has met with at the hands of men, and this, even while it continued to be acknowledged as Divine. Yet men, finding it impossible to realize the moral life under such a standard, instead of acknowledging this and being humbled by it, they proceeded gradually to lower and adapt it to their capacities. Thus, when the law said, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor," they added, "and hate thine enemy." The Jew felt at liberty to hate all save the members of his own community.

The law of divorce underwent a similar degradation. Thus under a gradual downward pressure, the original

standard became lowered, and in the teaching of the scribes and Pharisees, in the time of Christ, it had become a mere cloak of hypocrisy, allowing all that was foul and malignant to vent itself. Christ the Reformer at once assails this, — he came not to destroy, but to fulfil, — and the first thing he did was to re-erect the ancient standard. All false glosses he tore up by the roots, and he erected the Divine standard in its unmistakable sublimity. Christ's standard is the standard of Christianity; but how is it now? The same process has been going on, as did go on under Judaism. The Christian Church, it might naturally be supposed, would be the exponent of this standard. And is this so? However it may have been, it is evident that this is not now the case. This standard is not even professed, and, of course, still less can we expect to find it exhibited. The Sermon on the Mount is not now the morality of the Christian Church. The Scribes and Pharisees of the Church have managed to lower it, to bring it down to the capacity of an evil human nature. Acknowledging the impracticability of conforming to it, as it stands, they lower it, and so render it practicable. As it stands, it must ever humble man, disturb his self-complacency, break up his self-sufficiency, thus inducing one of the prime conditions of Christian repentance.

The realization of the moral life under such a standard must at once be acknowledged to be impossible; yet the moral faculty cannot but recognize it as the true one; hence arises great disturbance of soul, great dissatisfaction with one's self. To alleviate this and restore the psychical equilibrium, the standard is lowered; and by this means the moral life is realized, self-complacency restored, self-sufficiency reinstated in the soul, and man feels no need of a Saviour. Such is the course of proceeding even in the Christian Church, where the moral standard is recognized

as coming immediately from God. Men tamper with it and modify it, even under such circumstances, and they manage to shut their eyes to the truth. The conscience is led not by the Word, but by the glosses of the Scribes and Pharisees. These glosses have been generally received, until at last they have supplanted the original. There is, then, a received standard in the Church, but it is not that of revelation. It is a traditional moral standard, floating about in the general Christian consciousness. This standard is not uniform; it varies with every community; varies even with different congregations of Christians. Having departed from the original, each party modifies its already diluted one to suit itself. The object in each is to allow of the realization of the moral life with as little inconvenience as possible, — to enjoy the self-satisfaction of being moral, while at the same time all the inclinations which the lofty standard would condemn, are amply gratified.

Sundered from its conscious connection with revelation, we find this same adulterated Christian standard afloat. Through revelation it has become implanted in the human consciousness. The conscience of society, as we find it with us, is sensitive. Its judgments, as compared with those of other portions of the race where this education has not been received, are righteous. The traditional moral standard which we find among us, and by which our moral faculty is educated, is much higher than that which existed in heathendom. Outside of the Church there is a moral standard; it issues primarily from revelation, passes then through the consciousness of the Church, where it becomes partially adulterated; from thence it passes into the consciousness of society at large, where it becomes still more so. It has now entirely lost its association with its Giver. Society finds itself under a law; it adopts it without caring

from whence it came. The individual grows up under it; his moral faculty is guided and educated by it. His conscience is then, after all, a diluted form of the Christian conscience; his standard an adulterated form of the Christian standard. The society may be Christian in its morals, and yet at the same time unchristian, even atheistic in its belief. The standard of morality under which a man lives is not without but within him. The moral faculty appropriates and makes it a man's own. He feels this to be right, and that to be wrong. His conscience has been educated up to it. Just as the intellect appropriates knowledge that it understands, so that it becomes its own, so the moral faculty appropriates the moral law, and thenceforth it becomes an inner law. The moral faculty becomes a law unto itself.

In the Christian consciousness the moral law is recognized not only as the rule of right, but also as the law of God. The standard of revelation is recognized as being given by God for the guidance of man. Under such conditions, morality is practised, at least in the fear, perhaps in the love, of God. But here we have the manifestation of another form of life, namely, the religious. In the consciousness of the moralist, of society at large as moral, the consciousness of God is not developed. If it exist at all, it is in a state of dormancy, repressed by the exaggerated developments of the other elements of consciousness. Self and the world exclusively occupy the soul's attention; man is entirely absorbed in the contemplation of these objects. The consciousness of God being suppressed, the religious element exercises no influence upon the character and conduct. Morality under such conditions has of course no relation to God; its practice must spring from other motives. The true moral life, apart from the religious elements, consists in this, that in it the moral judgments,

the current standard of morality, become the rule of a man's conduct simply because he feels that it is right. The man is moral, so far as his light goes, rather than immoral, because his conscience approves of the one course and condemns the other. Such a man is under the control of his moral faculty. The moral life exists in him, and is realized. That it is realized, is owing entirely to this, that the rule of duty is lowered. The standard by which society regulates its conduct is, as we have seen, far below the Christian standard. It is a diluted, adulterated rule, illegitimately adapted to the sinful creature. The object in view being to admit of the realization of the moral life, and at the same time to allow of full latitude in the gratification of other lower and evil forms of life — in fine, a compromise between good and evil. Christian society has then three moral standards: first, that of revelation; next, that of the Church; and lastly, that of society apart from the Church, what may be termed the world. Under the first two the moral law is felt to be obligatory because it is of God; here morality becomes a religious obedience or godliness. Under the last, the moral law is recognized as obligatory because of the judgment of a voice within, because it is felt to be the law of right. Conformity to such a standard, under such conditions, is morality. Society presents a standard; it offers it as its law, enacts it, and it becomes the law of public opinion. This then is the standard of the world. The man in whom the moral life makes itself felt conforms to this standard because he judges it to be right and good. In its observance he enjoys the pleasure of self-approbation, flatters his sense of self-sufficiency, at the same time he secures the esteem of his fellow-men; here then we have before us an instance of an ungodly, irreligious, and yet a moral man, a man conscientiously regulating his conduct

in accordance with a certain standard of morality, not that of revelation, not that even of the Church, but that of the world.

Moral laws, as we have seen, theoretically considered, arise out of the classification and generalization of individual moral judgments; embodied in a code, they stand out before the consciousness as a standard of morality. By the law of assimilation this standard passes from the outward to the inward, the known becomes felt. The outward standard becomes an inward conscience, approving and disapproving, binding and loosing. But this process of the outward letter becoming inward spirit is gradual. Moral law in its primary conception is but the formula for the action of spirit in the sphere of right and wrong. Observe the process of moral education: first, there is an external law revealed and written, or traditional and existing as current public opinion. These standards are to be considered, in the first place, as external; the object of moral education is to make them internal. The Church, in theory, aims at making the revealed law internal; the world aims at the same thing with its standard. The object in both is to make letter spirit, to make outward law inward life. Where this point is reached, the outward, as form, can disappear; man is no longer under law; he is a law unto himself; his moral education is completed. The man who has completed his education under the revealed standard, will, in all cases, naturally decide just as the revealed law would; he who is educated under the world's standard will judge, naturally, just as it does. The judgment of the individual and the voice of public opinion will always sound in harmony. This process of the passage of the outward into the inward is necessarily gradual; for a long time the conscience must stand with respect to the outward law in the relation of pupil to teacher; and the higher the stand-

ard the longer this relation must continue. In the case of the revealed law, the standard being perfection, this relation never ceases, nor can from the nature of the case until human nature becomes perfect; as long as man lives, he will be obliged to consult the revealed standard as a guide for his conduct. Man properly, then, must ever remain a pupil under the divine law. As a pupil of the world's morality, he can however soon change his relation and become a teacher. The standard of the world can easily be assimilated and made his own; from this standpoint a finished moral education is possible, and when that is accomplished, provided the moral life exist, it may be realized. If it does not exist, or if repressed, of course the conduct will be immoral; but it will be so consciously. The man who under such circumstances is vicious, is so in the face of his moral convictions.

The object of moral education is, then, to transplant a given outward standard into the inner moral consciousness—to convert law, precept, and example into inward disposition and life. Thus a proper basis is laid for the realization of the moral life. The Church, if true to itself, has one ideal, the world another. Under each of them the moral life in its realization consists in a conformity with its respective standard. In the Church the religious element is necessarily introduced, and morality becomes godliness. The morality of the world is apart from religion — it is the product of a lower form of life. The first manifestation of life is in desire; the moral life, where it is found, exists first in the form of virtuous desires; yielded to, desires become habits. So the desire of virtue becomes a virtuous habit, and conformity to a moral standard becomes the habit of the soul; the moral life is realized, the conscience is quiet, the soul rests. Self-complacency rests in the consciousness of its own self-sufficiency. Such a con-

dition is compatible with a state of absolute irreligion, with enmity to God on the one hand, or Atheism on the other. Under the world's standard the realization of the moral life is practicable; under the real Christian ideal it is impossible. The first is a delusion, the second is the truth. The realization of the Christian ideal is an impossibility, because the moral life has its root in man. It is a natural form of human life, an element entirely human. It issues out of man's sense of self-sufficiency, and what is essentially imperfect can never possibly of itself be perfect. The acceptance of a false standard may foster such a delusion. Christianity begins by dispelling it; first, it shatters man's pride, then reconstructs the perfect man through faith in the Son of God.

CHAPTER II.

THE RELIGIOUS LIFE.

THE religious life arises out of the conjunction of two psychical facts, — the consciousness of God, and of moral guilt; looking from one to the other, the soul becomes disturbed; on the one hand, there is the Holy God, on the other a sinful self, fear arises. The religious life is the effort to keep down this fear, to keep up a spiritual equilibrium. The soul does not to itself recognize the fact of its guilt, it can scarcely be said to have become a fact in the consciousness; undefined, unrecognized, it is an impulse; a ground-swell, indicating the existence of a distant storm; kept within these bounds, this ill-defined sense of guilt, in conjunction with the consciousness of a Holy

God, gives rise to a feeling of uneasiness, or fear of God, and of the future, which fear, in its turn, gives rise to the religious life. The object of the religious life is to quench this fear, to keep down all uneasiness, and this it does by *works;* it is a life of self, not of faith. Not kept within these limits, this undefined sense of guilt will continue to grow more definite, until finally, bursting all barriers, it will present itself before the consciousness as an insatiable, agonizing reality. The religious life then, while it has, as a constant element, the consciousness of God, has as its other element a varying quantity, — beginning in an undefined feeling, ending in an actual recognized fact of consciousness.

The first element observable in the religious life is the consciousness of God. The moral life, as we have seen, is consistent with a state of irreligion ; it was deficient therefore as to this element ; it required nothing further than a standard of morality and a potential moral faculty. But here the consciousness of God is the leading psychical element, and corresponding to the moral faculty under the moral life, is the fear of God as a motive power. To stifle this fear, religious life comes into action, at once it assumes a religious profession, and inquires scrupulously as to the will of God. This will being known, the religious life asserts itself in an anxious effort to conform to it. As to the standard adopted, seeing that the effort is to obtain immediate peace, it is not probable that it will be the perfect one of Revelation ; no sooner is that standard fairly erected before the soul, than it must feel its impracticability. Such a standard, so far from bringing peace, must only intensify the uneasiness. The standard then which will be adopted in order to obtain the desired object will not be a true, but a false one ; the soul will act here just as it did in the case of the moral life : it will dilute, adul-

terate and lower the true standard; it strikes a compromise, so that it can at the same time serve God and mammon. The religious life will appear to be realized, inasmuch as God's will, according to such a standard, is observed. The carnal life is at the same time gratified, inasmuch as its desires are indulged. There is a vast difference between being religious and being regenerate; man in his natural condition is religious; to be regenerate is to be in a supernatural condition. In the religious man, the religious life is realized, in the regenerate, the Divine.

Consciousness of God, the prime psychical element in the religious life, necessitates a Theism. In order of logic, the one precedes the other; but in order of nature they are contemporaneous. The nature of the Theistic idea necessarily exercises a decided influence in the direction of the religious life. What a man worships, that will he strive to imitate. The law of assimilation will be brought into operation, and man will always be found approximating to the character of the God or gods that he worships. Deprived of the attributes of holiness and justice, the Deity would not be an object of dread, the motive of fear would therefore cease to operate; under such circumstances, the law of assimilation would have to take its place. This, however, practically never does occur, for heathenism has ever been unable to divest its deity of the attribute of the terrible. Christianity attributes to its God the attributes of holiness and justice; therefore, under this system, the Deity must, in connection with sinful man, be always in the first place the object of dread.

There are several attitudes which the soul may take with respect to God; in all of them it is, of course, necessary, in the first place, that the consciousness of God exist. Unconscious of God, the soul takes no cognizance of Him. It is as though He was not: the soul is in a state of Atheism.

But supposing this consciousness to exist in the soul, it may in the first place be regardless of God, He may fail to be an influence in the direction of man's conduct. In the second place, God may be the object of fear, or, in the third place, the object of love. As an object of fear, God, provided the moral law be considered as emanating from Him, must become an influence within the soul.

It is evident that the soul, in the consciousness of a God whom it fears, must feel itself impelled to obedience; it will fear to disobey, and therefore it will obey. Affirmatively, the motive is against disobedience, and so negatively for obedience. In the irreligious state, man fails to connect the moral law with God as its Giver. Regarding it as human, he feels no higher obligation to obedience than that arising out of the conscience. The moral life, as we have seen, in its obedience to law, takes no cognizance of any other than this human obligation. The religious life does not ignore this association; it, too, recognizes the moral judgments as the rule of right; but it also connects this rule with God as the Giver of it. It views God as approving of conformity with this law, and disapproving of non-conformity—therefore, as pleased with morality, displeased and angry with immorality. There are, then, two motives at work in the religious life: the motive which conscience brings into action, and that which a fear of offending a Holy God brings in. The standard which may be assumed as the rule of obedience, may either be the one written in the heart, or that outward one of Revelation. The first is necessarily that of tradition, and, practically speaking, it must ever be the prevalent moral standard, which finds its expression in the voice of public opinion. The only other is that of Revelation; this, as we have seen, may be so diluted and adulterated as to find the level of a heathen standard. As it is, from the material

thus afforded, the world has formed one standard, the Church another — both of them far below the original. Whatever standard may, however, be assumed as the true one, under the religious consciousness, it becomes adopted as the rule of life, and thenceforth an effort is made to conform to it; the prime motive to obedience being the fear of God. Now if this standard be that of Revelation, what result are we to expect? evidently a failure. The obedience of the fallen creature can never conform to the absolute rule of right, found in Revelation: what then will follow? disappointment. Man will find that he cannot do what he would. The effect of such a failure will evidently be increased apprehension and intensified fear. Honestly comparing its conduct with the standard of the perfect law, the soul cannot but become cognizant of the discrepancy existing between the two. In the beginning it feared to offend God, and therefore its effort of obedience; the effort proves a failure; the fear of the soul can therefore only be increased and intensified. Such a state would border on that of guilt, and would, if honestly dealt with, lead the soul to an inquiry whether there is not some other way, than its own perfect obedience, whereby it might stand righteous before God; but dishonestly dealt with, it brings about ruin. Greatly disturbed by the state of things which this effort after obedience has disclosed, the soul naturally turns from one side to the other, seeking relief. It seeks to hide from itself its own shortcomings; it dwells on its acts of obedience and on its righteousness, overlooks its unrighteousness. But the way which is found most effectual is that of lowering the standard of duty; the standard being lowered so as to allow of easy compliance, conformity becomes practicable, conscience becomes quieted, and the soul in the consciousness of conformity to such a standard ceases to be disturbed by the fear of God.

Another way in which this same result is effected is by mutilating the character of God; following its own inclination, the soul forms a one-sided idea of the Deity, all the benign aspects of the Divine character are paraded before the mind's eye, all that is stern and exacting is kept out of view. The soul manages to deceive itself, and the idea which is adopted is untrue; this idea, however, is but in the intellect; the soul cannot be persuaded; its felt protest cannot be silenced; on the one hand, the man would persuade himself there is no reason to fear — God is all merciful, all good, all love; on the other hand, as a psychical fact, there does exist fear, disquietude, and uneasiness. The religious and the moral consciousness agree in this, that in both the moral life exists and is realized; but they also differ, the religious has in it as an influential fact the consciousness of God. Under it morality is practised, not only because it is right, but further, because it is the will of God. It is this connection that elevates the latter above the former, and makes morality godliness. It takes right and wrong out of the region of ethics and makes them religious; thus the fear of God is evidently the beginning of wisdom.

Conformity to moral law may be practised from various motives. When practised under the force of moral conviction, because it is right, then properly it is morality. The truly moral man is the man who abides by his convictions, who acts from principle, who would disdain doing a wrong action, who would despise himself in being unprincipled. It is his own sense of right and wrong that actuates him in his conduct — his sense of honor, as it is called; when there is nothing to fall back upon but one's own moral sensitiveness in matters of right and wrong, then that which governs a man in his conduct is what is known as his sense of honor. The man who shocks his sense of honor loses

his self-respect, he must despise himself. Self-respect taken in conjunction with moral sensitiveness are the roots from which the moral life springs. There is too a spurious form of the moral life, where the first of these factors only is present; where the moral faculty is not developed, the true moral life will be an impossibility. Sense of honor can only produce a spurious morality, a discrepancy will be found to exist between the inner and the outer life. It will be the common case of the whited sepulchre, outside white and fair, inside full of dead men's bones. It is the conscience alone which regulates the inner life; honestly dealt with, it will keep the inside, according to its light, clean and clear. It keeps watch and ward over the inner workings of the heart. It sees and knows everything, it alone is the power that can keep the inner man clean. Sense of honor will only keep the outside in order; its true meaning is Pride, and its only aim is to keep fair with the world; what it fears is exposure; foulness will be ever cherished within, abomination will be practised in secret; yet withal, provided there be no disclosure, men will retain their self-respect, and be sensitive about wounding their honor. Sense of honor then, means, fear of being known to be what one in reality is. It is consistent with the vilest hypocrisy, and generally accompanies it. This avoidance of open vice from self-respect is not morality; the moral life is not a sham, it is a reality. In the abstract it exists; that it is to be found in the concrete is another question. The concrete seldom gives us things distinctly separated; abstraction can take out the separate elements, examine them, and show that they are really distinct. But in the unity of the personal life all the elements of character, all the motives to action are so inextricably mixed, that it is impossible to say whether they ever do exist and operate separately. They are separable, but perhaps never

absolutely separated; thus it is found that pride and principle generally operate together. As motive powers they are separate, but in the moral life, they will be found to operate together. In the moral life, principle will, however, be the predominating power, and is what characterizes this form of life. The morality of pride without principle is only specious, it has no real morality in it, it is the life of hypocrisy.

There are other motives which give rise to specious forms of morality; but after all, they are only appearances, and will be found hollow and but forms of hypocrisy. Then there is the morality of prudence and of utilitarianism. Under such a scheme, the reality of right and wrong; that an action or course of conduct is right or wrong irrespective of its consequences; that right and wrong are eternal virtues; all this is ignored, or even denied. Right is declared to be that which is expedient, wrong that which is inexpedient. Prudence, then, and sagacity are the faculties for discovering the moral law; the conscience as the ultimate self-revelation of the moral law is denied. Honesty, for instance, is right, why? because it is the best policy; and so with all other moral questions; right is right, because it is expedient; wrong is wrong, because it is inexpedient; a blunder is the most grievous of moral transgressions, in fact it is regarded in the light of a crime; this certainly is not the moral life, it is the prudent life, the selfish life. The motives, then, so far considered, leading to a certain conformity to moral law, amount to these: principle, sense of honor, prudence. The first, abstractly considered, is the motive in the real moral life; the second, in the spurious moral life; the third, is no morality at all, it is acting in a certain way because it is expedient. There is, in fact, no place for morals under such a scheme. In the actual life all these motives

will be found operating, more or less, together; it is the prevalence of any one of these that designates the form of life. Actually, as in the concrete, all these motives operate more or less in the development of the moral life, and the same is true of the religious life. Abstractly, or rather theoretically, this form of life has but two roots: one fastens itself upon the fact of God in the consciousness; the other, as in the moral life, fastens itself among the facts of conscience. The truly religious man acts from principle, in the fear of God; morality becomes godliness. Man ceases to be ungodly and becomes godly and religious. The religious life, then, like the moral, is essentially human; both are activities arising out of the conjunction of certain elements which pertain to the essence of human nature; both, then, are consistent with egotism and man's state of actual separation from God. Man being still in a state of egotism, the religious life will be attempted in his own strength; having set up before him the standard of God's will, he will at once set to work in a self-reliant, self-sufficient spirit to conform to it. If the standard be such that he can conform to it, and he succeed, he will be complacent, boastful, and arrogant. This would give us the self-righteous man; the man who feels that he has obeyed the law, that his conscience is void of offence towards God and man; the Pharisee, evidently not the Publican. Such must be the character of the religious moralist, a self-righteous, egotistic formalist. This, we say, is the religious life in its own proper form of manifestation, here it exists in an ethico-religious form. A high moral standard is adopted, and conscientiously and religiously that standard in its letter is observed; to this moral standard is added a ritual of ceremonial observances which are punctiliously kept; such was the religion of the Scribes and Pharisees in the time of Christ. Such was the religion

of that young ruler, who could boldly say, "All these have I kept from my youth up, even until now." Such, too, was the religion of St. Paul while a Pharisee, who could say, "As touching the righteousness of the law, I was blameless." Here we have the highest expression of the religious life, a punctilious, conscientious performance of all one's duties, so far as they are recognized, both moral and ceremonial; and yet with all this the Divine life is not within the soul. The soul is still in a state of egotism, self-willed, self-sufficient, separated from God, relying upon itself for salvation. All this earnest effort is still compatible with a hard, unloving spirit. And the man who fasts twice a week, who gives tithes of all that he possesses, this same man, even while he prays, will be found in his egotism recounting his own righteousness, and despising the poor sinner who prays beside him. The same man who glories in his good deeds, and sounds a trumpet before him to proclaim them abroad, will be found neglecting justice, mercy, and truth; when it can be done privately, will be found plundering widows' houses, and for a pretence making long prayers; and yet this is the highest form of Religious life, where morality and ceremonial observance are coupled with it.

The Religious life may exist in a state of immorality; it may be found where there is no moral light and power in the soul. The association of the moral law with God as its giver is the work of Revelation. It is possible that no such connection may be established in men's minds. Supposing there be some knowledge of the law of right and wrong, and that knowledge to be entirely traditional or obtained only by the workings of the inner life, what is there that would enable man to refer and to connect this law with God? no doubt he will be forced more or less to see that there is such a connection; but there is nothing in the

premises to convince him ; and so it happened in the ancient world that the two things were often found divorced: men felt the obligation to virtue, but felt no divine obligation. In fact, their gods seem to have been allowed a different and a lower standard than themselves, seem to have had no morality ; and under such circumstances it would be impossible to connect the moral law with God. Morality therefore was entirely separated from Religion. The gods were worshipped, not in spirit and in truth, but in a certain round of ceremonial observances, at the bottom of which lay the ancient revealed rite of sacrifice. A man might be as immoral as he pleased, and yet at the same time punctiliously religious. Lose sight of the fact that the moral law is the Divine law, and it is evident that such a condition of things may easily ensue. Lose sight of this fact, and it would be impossible to form any idea as to the moral character of the Deity; there would be nothing left to remind man that God is holy and hates iniquity. Epicureanism must inevitably prevail; the voice of conscience will be quelled as troublesome, and vice will reign supreme. Immorality under such conditions would meet with no check ; and yet man might still be religious, that is to say, a consciousness of God might still be found in his soul, the Religious life might make itself felt, and its tendency might still be realized by the observance of the ceremonial code. There is very little doubt, that, unless the moral law be referred to God as the giver and vindicator, it will be suppressed. Whether this can be completely effected, is a question that can be settled only by fact. It is scarcely possible that there is any portion of the human family without a conscience, for in such a condition, there would be no longer any responsibility, and consequently no judgment. Theoretically it is possible that any of the fundamental elements of human nature should be extinguished,

thus, that man should be found without any consciousness of God, without any conscience, without the power of reasoning; but whether this actually is the case is far from probable. The question, we say, can only be satisfactorily answered by facts. Certain it is, however, that, dissociated from God, the moral law being repressed by unrighteousness, becomes rapidly lowered and adulterated. The moral life, as found in human nature, is insufficient to keep up the standard. Nothing that is in and of human nature can resist its own inherent downward moral tendency. That which is born of the flesh is after all but flesh. Revelation connects the moral law with God, it proclaims Him its vindicator, and foretells a future day of judgment. The believer in Revelation receives all these declarations as truths; he recognizes God as the giver of moral law; he fails to conform to this law, and yet he may realize the religious life. This is effected by means of the above-mentioned separation; the moral and the ceremonial are separated, the one is set off against the other, and the loss in one is made up by a gain in the other. The Church assumes to be the vicar of God; as such it becomes the custodian of the moral law. The vindication of this law lies with it, what it binds on earth is bound in heaven; what it looses on earth is loosed in heaven. The Church then, in its head, or through its officers, is recognized by its members as the administrator of the moral law; its judgments being regarded as the judgments of God. A case occurs where the moral law is broken, the Church sits in judgment and pronounces its sentence, the offender must do penance; the penance being performed, the Church pronounces absolution, and the man is then considered to be cleansed of moral guilt; what it looses on earth is loosed in heaven; the process is final and conclusive. Thus for specific cases. To meet the innumerable number of such

cases which must occur, the Church, undertaking to act for God, has established laws — laws known as the sacrament of penance; certain punishments are allotted to certain offences, the priest of the Church can apply these general laws; thus the tribunal of heaven is transferred to earth, and man can by means of penance expiate his guilt before the day of judgment. Moral guilt is thus finally dealt with here on earth before the tribunal of priests; the sinner is punished in penance, and cleared of all guilt by absolution. Penance is a canonical ordinance; a man may be punctiliously obedient to it, and yet licentiously disobedient to moral law; he ceases to fear God in his disobedience, because the Church is his god, and he knows that though he break her commandments, yet he can easily satisfy her, and atone for his sin by undergoing her penances. Thus it happens that gross immorality and strict religiousness may often be found combined, and the reason of it is because the Church has assumed the place of vindicator of the moral law, and is recognized in such a capacity by its members. Thus we find men very religious and very immoral.

Antinomianism is another form of this paradox. Under this state of mind, the connection between the moral law and God is recognized, and also the obligation to obedience; but it is executed in a careless and negligent way. The Solifidian believing that he is justified only by his faith, that his own moral character is of no consequence, becomes careless in his conduct. He is careless in the anticipation of transgression, because he knows that after he sins he has only to continue to believe as he does then, that he is accepted on Christ's account, and not on his own, and he will in reality continue justified and comfortable. He is indifferent to the past on the same grounds, and thus there is the combination of belief that a man is accepted

with God on account of the merits of His Son, and yet that the observance of His own moral law is not to be regarded as essential. Such a belief, if entering fully into the consciousness, works a carelessness in the moral practice, it staves off all feeling of regret for past sin, thus adding indifference to carelessness. If a man, a bad man, be persuaded that Christ has died for sinners, and that, therefore, he need not fear a day of reckoning, he will only become worse, become a more fearless, calculating, hardened sinner. It is fear that keeps villany in check; remove that fear of a day of reckoning, and at once you open the floodgates of vice and crime. The law continues in all ages to keep down transgression. To persuade an unrepentant, bad man into faith in this doctrine is only to make him a hardened villain.

At various times in the history of Christianity we find men, and even sects, who have really adhered to such tenets, Ascetics, displaying, on the one hand, many Christian virtues, while on the other they were guilty of the grossest immoralities. While they aimed at spirituality, they practised immorality, and the same thing has been repeated in modern times. The period of the Reformation was rife with such exhibitions, the excesses of the Anabaptists of Munzer, and his fifth-monarchy men, and much that occurred during the prevalence of the Puritan movement in England, all is attributable to this same cause. The believers of this doctrine felt themselves to be not under law, but under grace; being then freed from the law, they gave themselves up to be the servants, not of righteousness, but of sin. Thus, though they were superstitious and religious just as the Athenians were, they were like them, consciously immoral.

Freedom from law may be premature; no man is at liberty to free himself. "If the Son make us free, then are we free indeed." But how does he effect

this? by making the external, internal; by writing the law in our hearts, and so making us a law unto ourselves; by giving us His spirit, which is the law of God in its essence. Man is never without law. Either he is under law, as in the legal state, or the law is in him, which is the Gospel state. No man can effect this change for himself; it is not an historical, but an internal act, and can be effected only by the power of Christ. To free ourselves is an act of self-will. Yet this is exactly what such spurious believers do. The law, they say, is dead to us through Christ; we are not under the law, but under grace. The law was made for sinners; we are saints, members of the kingdom of Christ; and they go so far as to despise civil dignitaries, they become revolutionists, disturbers of the public peace, licentious, looking upon all order as an infringement upon the freedom of the saint. Thus Munzer and others of his order would set up a new kingdom upon earth, in which there was no civil law or order, where every man could act just as he pleased. Such in its finality is the development of this doctrine; it ends in overturning all that is just and lawful and decent; and yet this is done in the name of religion, and such fanatics would cheerfully suffer as martyrs for their cause. Here, then, under the head of Antinomianism, we have before us a religion of immorality; the Religious life and the immoral life developed side by side. In the preceding case, the moral and the ceremonial were separated, negligence in the one was compensated for by punctiliousness in the other. In this case the same separation occurs, and disregard of the moral is compensated for by a presumptuous confidence; thus the Religious life is realized, and at the same time man fearlessly continues in sin. In this latter case, perhaps, "continuing in sin that grace may abound."

There is yet another form under which religiousness may

be found, as manifesting itself under the conditions of Christianity. The object of the moral law, as we have seen, is to restrain the outbursts of the sinful principle. Christianity, penetrating much deeper, looks to the source from whence these outbursts flow; it aims not at the outward manifestation, but at the inward life. Thus, instead of, "thou shalt not steal," it commands, "thou shalt not covet;" instead of, "thou shalt do no murder," "he that hateth is a murderer;" it strikes at the very root of sin, forbidding desires and feelings, which, if cherished, must necessarily result in acts. It prevents the acts by forbidding desire and feelings. All inordinate and unlawful affections or desires, termed lusts, are strictly forbidden. The standard of Christianity is therefore not merely morality, but purity; it is only to the pure in heart that it holds out the promise of seeing God. The Christian life is, then, to be an approximation to, and, if possible, a conformity with this standard. All around the Christian there are objects and occasions which may give rise to these forbidden desires. These objects and occasions are then to be viewed in the light of temptations. In order to avoid the possibility of having either unlawful or inordinate desires excited, the Christian law forbids its disciple entering into temptation. Thus the Christian life becomes one of self-denial. He is forbidden doing certain things and enjoying certain pleasures, which those not under such a law do and enjoy. He is forbidden them because, in the first place, they tend to excite inordinate desires, which in their turn must become unruly, and hurry one into actual sin. In short, the Christian is to avoid all occasions and things which in any way tend to excite or inflame unlawful feelings and desires. Thus the Scriptures represent the Christian life as one of self-denial, of suffering, of taking up a cross, as "a gate which is strait, and a way

which is narrow, and few there be which find it." Now there is one form of Christianity that enters upon the Christian life without having any idea of conformity to such a spiritual standard. The moral law, perhaps, it will adopt, avoiding any open and flagrant outburst of sin. There are Christians who hold that they are not responsible for the existence of lusts and evil appetites and affections, who do not regard such desires as sin. There are others who regard it as perfectly legitimate and consistent with their profession to tamper with those objects which excite lusts. Thus they will throw themselves continually in the way of temptation; they will enjoy pleasure and pursue objects which can only inflame and strengthen dangerous desires, until the desire becomes a habit, and is pandered to without the slightest compunction. Instead of cutting themselves off from the possibility of sin, they put themselves directly in the way of it. Thus, the man who has been injured, instead of striving to banish the subject from his mind, by continually keeping it before him will naturally excite a feeling of hatred and a desire for revenge. The man who is a sensualist, instead of avoiding all occasions apt to excite his appetites, will greedily rush upon them and inflame his passions until they become inordinate and ungovernable. There are those who undertake the Christian life without any idea of thus meeting and repressing their desires; wilfully they cherish evil feelings, and without any compunction take part in those pleasures which inflame lust, and which those not under the Christian law enjoy; their life, so far from being one of self-denial, is one of self-indulgence; gross immorality is avoided, but impurity and worldliness reign unchecked. Combined with this laxity in Christian practice, there is to be found great punctiliousness in the performance of certain ceremonial observances; carefulness in this respect stands as a set-off

against carelessness in the other, the importance of ordinances becomes unduly exaggerated; the whole stress in the religious life is laid upon the observance of them. Thus a man becomes at the same time a strict Churchman, but a lax Christian. Moral decorum and punctilious ritualism exist on the one hand; carnality, worldly-mindedness, and perhaps sensuality on the other; rigidity and laxity exist in conjunction. The aspirations of the religious life are met, and at the same time self is indulged. Thus the Christian life is reduced to the level of the natural life, and man, satisfactorily to himself, worships both God and Mammon.

There is still another form of the Religious life, the conditions of which are such as to bring it within the possibility of the divine life in the soul. That which distinguishes the Religious life essentially from the Divine, is, that it is a life of self and of works, whereas the Divine is that of God and faith. The Religious life is man's own, arising out of the development of the consciousness of God in the soul. Under these conditions, it is the effort of self to please God, to recommend one's self by one's own works. The Divine life, on the other hand, is not man's own; but the life of God, introduced and kept in the soul by faith. The soul becoming awakened, becomes at once active in the effort to satisfy the demands of this state; necessarily without faith, it is forced to fall back upon its own efforts; and the religion of the soul, under such conditions, will consist in a series of acts, with the view of calming the conscience, and of reconciling the soul consciously to God; no undertaking will be regarded as too arduous to accomplish this object; self-maceration, protracted fasts, ceaseless vigils, and incessant prayers, all will be resorted to in order to obtain a sense of peace with God; but with all, the soul may continue to be dissatisfied and miserable, nothing it can do may bring the desired peace. Without

anything further, it is evident that such must continue to be the condition of the soul; the whole life must continue to be one of depression, suffering, and of hopeless spiritual misery. The great object which the soul proposes, upon being awakened, is to obtain a consciousness of peace with God. It is the nature of the Religious life, under this form, to obtain this peace of itself by its own works. The struggles of the soul, in its vain efforts, are sometimes frightful to witness, and are agony to endure; witness the misery and frantic efforts of Martin Luther, of Ignatius Loyola, and of innumerable other earnest awakened sinners. Some in despair, others wrestling in a life-long agony of prayer. Witness the whole hosts of hermits, and ascetics driven by myriads into the wilderness, and into dens and caves, simply by an awakened conscience, flying the world in order that unimpeded they might attain to a peace unto which every energy of the soul was bent in determination. The usual symptoms attending this condition are not always so decided. Under the conditions of the awakened conscience, religious life will manifest itself, generally, in a continued state of spiritual depression; the hope of the soul, if any, will be faint; of consciousness of peace with God there will be none; fear and trembling will take the place of love and filial confidence, and the soul, uneasy as to its state before God, and yet anxious, will pass its whole life in one protracted struggle by means of its works and acts of devotion, to render itself acceptable unto God. Such, we say, is a form of the Religious, not of the Divine life; it is a life of works, not of faith. There are certain conditions under which the Religious life must evince its insufficiency, and here we have such a condition. The dim, undefined sense of guilt, that in conjunction with the consciousness of God makes itself sensible in uneasiness and fear of God, that feeling having gradually increased, thus

finally manifests itself in an outburst of conscious guilt. It is the object of the Religious life to repress this consciousness, and when realized, this effect is really accomplished; but here the Religious life fails, it is unable to repress the soul's uneasiness, fear of God becomes more and more distressing. The Religious life cannot satisfy these demands; and man feels the necessity for the intervention of a higher form of life, before he can attain to the desired peace.

To conclude; the Religious life is man's effort, of, and by himself, to attain to righteousness; it has faith in it, but it is faith in self. While the moral standard is low, and the sense of guilt repressed, it is a success. Let either of these facts be reversed and it becomes at once a failure. In direct contrast with it stands the Divine life; like it, a life of faith, not, however, in self but in God;—a life which meets all the demands of human nature, proving successful in the presence of the loftiest moral standard, coupled with the profoundest consciousness of guilt.

CHAPTER III.

THE DIVINE LIFE.

THE fundamental difference between the Religious and the Divine life is this. The Religious life is a man's own; it is an activity, a potentiality, residing originally in human nature. It is man relying upon himself, striving to realize righteousness. On the other hand, the Divine life is not man's own; it is the life of God, a potency residing originally not in human nature, but in Christ, the God-man, the Mediator; by Him, by faith in Him, it is introduced into human nature, and even there it is not man's own; but is retained only under the same condition of faith. It is, in contradistinction to the egotism of the Religious life, man in humility surrendering himself to be formed of God. In relation to activity, it is man working in reliance upon God; man working in fear and trembling, since it is God that worketh in us both to will and to do.

In order to reduce human nature to the condition adapted to the development of the life of faith, a preparatory work is necessary. The state of egotism has to be entirely broken up, and man's alienation must be converted into a state of love and filial dependence. In order to effect this, the first thing necessary is that man should be brought to recognize the truth as to his present condition; what he is, what is his real internal spiritual condition, and how, such as he is, he stands related to God. Human nature, as it stands, is self-deceived; man remains unconscious of his true condition—he imagines himself whole, when in reality he is foully diseased. To bring out this disease and make it evident to him who is its subject, is the first thing to be

done. The disease under which man labors is evil in its incarnate form; it is sin. Man is a sinful, guilty creature; and it is of this fact, in the first place, that he must be made conscious. Sin, then, and guilt, in order to be brought as facts before the consciousness, must become actual facts; a law must be given; man must find himself under law, and then in the act of transgression, the fact of his sinfulness and of his guilt will become manifest to him. Without law, sin cannot be recognized as such. Man must, therefore, under such conditions, remain unconscious of his sinfulness.

The method pursued by the Religious life in order to its realization, is to conceal from man his sinfulness, and to repress in him all feeling of guilt. The object at which it aims is to banish all uneasiness, all fear as to God and the hereafter; and so to keep the soul quiescent in a dream of self-satisfaction. The object aimed at in order to the introduction of the Divine life within the soul, stands in direct opposition to that of the preceding. Primarily, the soul is blind; it is ignorant and unconscious as to its true condition; egotism holds it fast bound in the fetters of self-deception. The condition which the Divine life requires in order to its introduction within the soul, is that this delusion be at once dispelled; the scales must fall from the eyes, the soul must be awakened to the true state of the case, must realize and become conscious of its true condition. The method which is pursued is not then that which is employed under the Religious life; there the standard of morality was lowered, and the first movements of the soul in the instinctive feeling of its guilt, were repressed. Here, on the contrary, the standard is elevated, the absolute perfection required by the true Divine law given in Revelation, and exhibited in the person of the God-man, is erected before the soul. The absolute requirements of the moral law

are brought in contact, by an external spiritual influence, with the self-willed movements of an unregenerated nature. The revolt of the soul, under such a standard and under such a law, brings clearly out before the consciousness the fact of man's sinfulness, and the continual transgression of the positive commandments reiterates and deepens the fact of guilt within the soul.

The great object to be effected is to make man conscious of his sinfulness and of his guilt; to make him dissatisfied with himself, frightened at the appalling revelation of what is the state of things within; to humble him, and so to bring him to a sense of his need of succor from without. In fine, completely to break up the state of egotism, and to bring man, in an humble penitential frame, to rely, not upon himself, but upon his God for salvation. Observe, then, the leading points by which this change is effected. First, a consciousness of sinfulness and guilt; out of this condition there arises, in the second place, a fear of God, and a sense of man's own impotency. So far self-revelation works only a further separation; without something further, the soul must succumb under the horrors of despair. Here, then, in the third place, we are to consider the objects of faith presented in the work of redemption by Jesus Christ. Upon these, the soul in the spirit of faith lays hold. Faith, in this work of redemption, restores the soul to the conscious condition of peace with God. Peace being restored, the soul, in view of God and his work of redemption, assumes now for the first time the position of filial relationship towards Him. Love and a filial confidence take the place of fear and distrust; and the soul, in the confidence of an Almighty Father's and an all-sufficient Saviour's proffered help, enters upon the career of obedience.

The characteristic condition of the soul, preparatory to the introduction of the Divine life into it, consists in a pro-

found consciousness of its sinfulness and guilt. Is such, we ask, the state of the soul in its primary natural condition? Is the soul self-conscious of its sinfulness and guilt? Evidently, no. The Moral state gives us no such facts; it gave us self-complacency and self-sufficiency; it gave us a course of conduct corresponding with the judgments of the moral faculty, and therefore a state of self-satisfaction. Nor does the Religious life present to us any such facts; the whole object of this form is to keep these facts out of view. The standard of the moral law being adapted to the infirmities of the creature, he is able, satisfactorily to himself, to conform to it. The movements of a disturbed moral sense are carefully suppressed, or satisfied by the observance of an irksome ceremonial. Thus, the moral sense being repressed, the fact of guilt is kept under, never being allowed to present itself before the consciousness. Nor will we find these facts existing under the lawless state. Where there is no law, there can be no actual transgression; where there is no knowledge of law, of course there can be no consciousness of sin. To know the law will not prove sufficient, the external must become internal; the law must become assimilated by the conscience, before sin can become a fact of the consciousness, before it can be felt to be guilt, and the actor can feel himself to be sinful. The lawless condition is without law; either it is originally unknown, or has been so frequently ignored as to have ceased to be recognized. The soul is indifferent, and perfectly regardless of the requirements of law; the law of its lusts is the only one which, in its self-will, it recognizes. It is evidently impossible for sin to be recognized as such without law. Sin cannot be imputed where there is no law. Man could not recognize in himself affections and desires as evil, unless there was some law made known to him, prohibiting them. Thus, St. Paul tells us, he had not

known lust except the law had said "Thou shalt not covet;" that is, he could not have recognized in himself desire as being evil, without such a positive prohibition. Of the desires which are found in human nature, some in their very beginning can be recognized under the law as evil, others can be recognized as good; but the law coming in, prohibits their exercise in certain directions; desire thus becomes lust. Even the malignant feelings could not be recognized by man as evil unless there was some moral light in him. Doubtless, there is but a small portion of the human race, if any, which is without any moral light. Such feelings can only, however, be recognized as evil under the illumination of such inner light. The moral law of revelation, in precept, in commandment and example, brings clearly to light the good and the evil. Its prohibitions at once designate the evil, its requirements exhibit the good. The knowledge of this law enables man at once to recognize the evil; and when the moral faculty is developed within him, he feels the obligation of abstaining from it and of cultivating the good. Having this knowledge, in the act of transgressing one of these positive commandments, man cannot but know that he has been guilty, and cannot but conclude, by inference, that there is a lawless principle within him. But such an intellectual assent or conviction is not equivalent to a consciousness of these facts. Man may know that he is a transgressor — that he is guilty and a sinful being — and yet be far from conscious of what these things mean. Such knowledge lies merely in the intellect — in the perceiving, reasoning faculty; it has not entered into the heart and become a fact of the consciousness.

There are, besides the Divine life, but three conditions in which human nature can find itself: first, the condition of the moral life; second, that of the religious life; and

third, that of the lawless condition. Under none of these will we find the facts of the consciousness of sin and guilt developed. These three conditions give us all that human nature is and is capable of in its natural condition. All of them are contained under the category of egotism, all are consistent with a complete separation and alienation from the true God.

It is essential to the nature of law that it should be enforced by a sanction. Law is either imperative, or it is prohibitive. As imperative, it seeks its enforcement by offering a reward. As prohibitive, it is enforced by means of punishment. On the one hand, it says, "Do this and live;" on the other, "Cursed is he that doeth not all the things that are commanded." Doing good is commended and rewarded; doing evil is cursed and punished. It is not that good and evil are made so by law. To steal, to lie, to commit adultery, is not evil because prohibited under a positive statute. Apart from all such prohibition they are evil. But without holiness or moral purity this would not be perceived. Evil cannot be recognized as such by an evil creature. It requires the presence of the moral good, which in relation to evil becomes holiness, before evil can be appreciated as such. The holier the being, the more will it be able to appreciate evil, the greater will be his horror of and disgust with it. Moral evil, and its opposite, moral purity, or holiness, can exist only in association with a sentient, intellectual, and moral Being. The holy Being is one whose moral nature is absolutely pure and perfect. The evil Being is one whose moral nature is impure and bad. Holiness and moral evil are not entities, existing apart and of themselves; they come into existence in association with being,— the latter in association with creature being. Holiness, in its absoluteness, is the moral condition of the Deity. He is "of purer eyes than to behold

iniquity; he cannot look upon evil." By nature, He is necessarily holy. The creature, by nature, in his primary condition, is holy also; but not necessarily so. Its natural tendency is towards holiness; its disposition is pure. Self-will destroys this primal condition; it precipitates the angelic creation, we are led to believe, into the category of the evil. From holy beings, they instantly become transformed into evil ones. Their whole nature has undergone a transformation; they are unclean and evil spirits. Evil is now their natural element. When the devil speaketh a lie, he speaketh it in accordance with his nature, for he is by nature "a liar, and the father of it." All that is naturally unclean and malignant pours forth from these evil sources. A nature which is completely depraved, thinks, feels, and acts evil, naturally. In what relation does such a being stand with respect to law? Evidently, so far as law is imperative, and commanding that which is good, he is beyond its reach. The only way in which law can be applied to the creature in such a situation is as a restraining force. The law, as prohibitive, threatens punishment to evil acts; fear of such punishment is the only motive which can be applied to an evil nature. By this means, evil can be kept under restraint in an absolutely evil being. Torment inevitably following upon the evil act, in a sentient, intellectual being, must necessarily restrain him; but it would not make him feel and recognize his guilty and depraved nature. To fear the consequences of an action is not to be conscious of guilt. Before the act, the soul is disturbed by fear of punishment; after the act, without something more, the transgressor will only become more terrified at the now certain doom. Law, then, to evil natures, will, in the first place, by means of threatened punishment, restrain evil acts more or less. After the act is committed, it will but increase fear, making the

creature, in the end, reckless, despairing, and perhaps even defiant.

Human nature, though fallen and depraved, is not absolutely unclean and evil; there is a duality in it; the good exists alongside of the evil; there are good feelings and bad feelings, good desires and bad desires in human nature. The good is capable of appreciating the holy, and as such is more or less capable of appreciating and abhorring the evil. Law, in both of its aspects, is applicable to human nature: that which is good is appealed to and is encouraged by the rewards offered under a holy law; that which is evil is condemned and is held in check by the law, in its threatenings of punishment. The law, St. Paul tells us, was revealed to man outwardly because of transgression; that is, to hold sin in its principle in check,—to prevent its outburst in sinful actions. Hence it is that the moral law, in its first revelations, levels its fulminations principally at acts. Let sin, which is evil incarnate, but be permitted to burst forth in open acts, and society would be disruptured. As it is, society with difficulty manages to exist. But let the barriers which have been erected by God in man's conscience, and by this moral law which enlightens the conscience, be but once entirely removed, and this world would at once become a very hell. In fact, under such circumstances, human nature would not continue to exist. The law, then, by its threatenings of punishment to evil acts, through fear restrains sin. But with human nature it is capable of doing more: it can bring out in man the consciousness of his guilt with respect to the many transgressions he has committed, and can thus, moreover, make him conscious of his inherent depravity and sinfulness. The mere infraction of a positive statute is not enough to make man conscious of his guilt. The law says, "Thou shalt not steal;" a man knows this statute, he

breaks it; unless this law be the law of his conscience, nothing follows but fear. The man knows that he has transgressed, that he is now liable to punishment, and he suffers fear, he is apprehensive of punishment; but still he may not feel at all guilty, he may even excuse or justify himself. If he be thoroughly depraved, he would feel no compunction at all; and while he would dread the day of reckoning, he would hate the being who is to call him to account. His knowledge of his crime, so far from humbling him, would only make him more reckless, and altogether worse. The more depraved a man is, the less capable is he of appreciating his depravity, the less he will care about committing crimes; he may finally glory in them. It requires some degree of goodness to feel compunction for crime: the worst men are those who feel no compunction for the evil they have perpetrated. Because the day of reckoning is for the present delayed, because they as yet go unpunished for their crimes, their hearts are fully set in them to do evil; they recklessly sin on, and "knowing the judgments of God, that they which commit such things are worthy of death," not only do the same, but have "pleasure in them that do them." It requires some amount of goodness to suffer from the evil; thus, Judas was a better man by nature than many who follow after him, in that he repented himself in that he had betrayed the innocent blood, as he himself confessed. And so deeply did he feel his crime, that he went and hanged himself;—a much better man, we say, than those who commit crimes almost as deeply dyed, and yet feel no compunction for them.

Besides being afraid of the consequences of an act, the moral law can effect more in the soul. Entering into the conscience, it can, instead of an outward letter, become an inward living spirit. As such, it produces a living effect; instead of fear, the soul experiences the feeling of

guilt, it would feel, under the same circumstances, as Judas did, that it has betrayed innocent blood; and herein is the pain that it suffers. It feels the turpitude of its action. The man who has transgressed the law of public opinion becomes uneasy; he is afraid of the consequences of his action; he knows that when his crime becomes known he will be branded as a villain, — that he will be utterly discarded from the society of his fellow-men. The man who has transgressed the law of the land becomes uneasy; he knows that, should his sin be made known, he would at once be arrested, haled to judgment, and from thence probably to the gallows. In the view of these frightful consequences which he has entailed upon himself by his crime, he is afraid; every man who looks at him becomes a detective; every leaf that falls to the ground makes him startle with fright. Fear is the principle which moves the soul under these conditions; it is the consequences of the act which are dreaded; all the while the culprit may be indifferent to the guilt of it. Before the culpable act, threat of punishment deters; after, it serves to make fear only more intense; there is a fearful looking-for of vengeance and fiery indignation. Now, what the criminal fears from public opinion, or from the hands of civil justice, as a religious being, he must fear, and far more, from a holy God. As a man, he dreads the brand of his fellow-men; as a citizen, he dreads disgrace, and punishment at the hands of civil justice; as a religious man, a man who has in him a consciousness of the God who is holy, and the vindicator of right and wrong, he dreads the vengeance of His tribunal. But in all this, still there is no consciousness of guilt; as yet it has not fastened itself upon the soul. The man fears, but is not conscious of his guilt. To feel guilt, a man must to some extent be holy; the law of God, the moral law, must enter into him, and become a

part of his nature; he must feel, when he has done an evil deed, that he has done wrong,—must feel the moral turpitude of his act; and this he cannot do unless he has a conscience — one into which the moral law has entered as a factor. The law condemns in the letter; the conscience is a living form of this law, its condemnation is spirit — a living, conscious, sensible act. In it, the soul becomes at once conscious, and sensible of its guilt. The man who feels his guilt, in the contemplation of his crime, is racked not only by fear of consequences, but also by remorse. He recognizes and feels the evil of his sin, his soul shudders with horror in the presence of its sin, is agonized with remorse; and in addition to this, as a religious being conscious of a holy God, the avenger of injustice and wrong, he fears to meet Him, he recoils with terror from the future, fears death, and is terrified at the thought of judgment.

To restate the subject: transgression implies law, conscious transgression implies a knowledge of the law. Since law implies punishment, consciousness of transgression implies apprehension of punishment. The transgressor being completely depraved and hardened, transgression of moral law carries with it nothing more. The transgressor not being completely depraved and hardened, but still having some conscience, transgression of moral law implies the consciousness of guilt which carries with it remorse, and the recognition of the evil of sin. Consciousness of guilt in conjunction with consciousness of God, which exists in man as a religious creature, implies fear of God, of death, and of a future judgment. Such is the connection of psychical facts which holds good of man in his relation to moral law. Thus man stands in relation to the prohibitive aspect of law, in so far as it forbids evil with the threat of punishment. In so far as the law is

positively imperative, demanding good dispositions, the feeling that arises upon a failure to meet these demands is not that of guilt, but rather of helplessness. The soul recognizes the fact that it has not what the law requires, recognizes its deficiency, perhaps perceives in itself the very opposite disposition to that which the law requires; it is humbled by the disclosure, and recognizes its helplessness. The law under this aspect serves to make the soul conscious of its sinfulness, but not of guilt. Guilt pertains to acts, it springs from transgression, sometimes from acts of omission, but generally from acts of commission. It arises in the soul when in the contemplation of such acts; it is of greater or less intensity according as the act was more or less wilful and inexcusable. Sinfulness is a state, a psychical and pneumatic condition, it is the condition of the human being so far as he is evil. Sin is evil incarnate. The condition of sinfulness began in and with the guilty act; by one man, by his one act of disobedience, "sin entered into the world, and death by sin;" again, "by one man's disobedience many were made sinners." Sin as a first act of transgression is inexplicable; it is an act of self-will, and therefore inexplicable; it is a mystery, that is, has no explanation; every wilful act of sin is inexplicable, it is unreasonable; the very soul that sins will admit this, it will accuse itself of folly, will find it impossible to understand how it ever could have perpetrated such an act of folly. Actual sin is folly, therefore it can offer no explanation for its existence. Sinfulness began in such an act of folly; it continues to propagate itself, and is ever repeating itself in like acts. If acts of sin could be accounted for, guilt would be more easy to bear; it is just because a man sells his soul for nought, that guilt is so oppressive in its weight. "What shall it profit a man if he gain the whole world and lose his own soul?" is only a reasonable

question. But it is the folly of sin that in it the soul sells itself verily for nought; herein especially lies the misery of guilt. Every act of sin is an inexplicable fact; out of it guilt arises, which in its turn indicates or points to a previously sinful condition. Sin as an act had in its origin no such previous connection. It was an absolutely self-willed act of folly. Now however, inasmuch as sinfulness or human depravity exists, the sinful act has a root. The act springs out of a precedent condition. The corrupt tree bears fruit, which however is worse than the condition of the tree would warrant; as an effect it is only partially accounted for, to a certain extent is without a cause, or, more strictly speaking, without an adequate cause; it is therefore to a certain extent inexplicable. The will, or self-will alone, can be offered to account for it; in so far however as it is connected with the previous condition, so far it is an index of it. The sinful act pointed to a sinful state, and it is this fact that the feeling of guilt brings especially before the consciousness. Consciousness of guilt and of sinfulness or depravity are thus intimately, even essentially connected. Man cannot be conscious of his guilt without at the same time becoming conscious that he is a sinner. Sinfulness as a state and sin as an act are so intimately related that they cannot possibly be considered as separate. They are as essentially connected as the tree is with the fruit, yet, as we have said, the fruit is worse than might have been expected; there is more in the cause than an antecedent state of corruption; self-will, an unaccountable, inexplicable factor, must be introduced. These two things taken make up the antecedent and the cause of the act of sin; guilt as a fact of consciousness is a witness to both, and makes them to appear as facts of consciousness.

The two factors to the one product of the sinful act are, as we have seen, self-will—wilfulness we may with propriety

term it where the will acts without any apparent reasonable grounds—and sinfulness. Again, the two factors to the common product of sinfulness are this same wilfulness and desire. Desire seems to stand at the beginning of the sinful development in the present condition of human nature. Desire gives opportunity for or makes the possibility of actual sin, sinfulness creates it. Desire, no matter how inordinate, can never account for the fact, it is not an adequate cause; wilfulness utters the fiat, and makes sin a fact. Desire implies love, such a form of it as is contained under the category of liking; we love that which we like, and *vice versa;* we love that which we desire, and desire that which we love. Desire implies more than liking, it implies a felt pressing need. It is a conscious want pressing for gratification. To desire excessively is to love and to want excessively; when directed, then, to things below, it becomes inordinate desire. Love directed to the creature rather than the Creator is idolatry. Covetousness, an inordinate desire or affection, says St. Paul, is idolatry; so with all other desires or affections when inordinate and directed to the creatures or created things. Desire directed towards the creature, when excessive, falls then into the category of the inordinate; other desires in their very beginnings are evil. Each individual character has its own peculiar tendency to some particular form of sin. Dispositions vary; in one character ambition is the leading characteristic, in another spiritual pride, in another worldliness, in another sensuality, in another avarice. The meaning of this is, that each one of these characters has some particular creature object on which its affections are set. A disposition is a state or habit of desire. It will be found that the disposition indicates the leading desires in each character, and therefore what the man loves and wants most. Thus, the avaricious man loves gain above all things; the

sensualist, the indulgence of his appetites and passions; the worldling, the life of pleasure; the ambitious man, power or popularity; and the spiritually proud, the sense of his independence. These are the loves of these various forms of character; their affections centre upon these things, their desires constantly go out after them. A disposition is, we say, a chronic state of desire; each individual, from the very beginning, has his own peculiar set of desires; it is the gradual growth resulting from the indulgence of such desires that finally results in a disposition, and designates the character as belonging to one or the other of those forms of sinfulness. Desire, by itself, does not in all cases create sinfulness; it requires the additional factor of wilfulness. Desire prepares the way, the soul wants something, an opportunity of meeting this want presents itself; the law interfers, and says, Thou shalt not; self-will comes in, and the act is committed. The desire is unlawfully indulged, guilt is incurred, and desire now becomes a sinful habit; the more it is indulged, the stronger the habit, the more chronic it becomes; now it is a lust, inordinate and lawless in its nature. Desires which did not in the first place exist in the soul are sometimes brought into being by sinful acts. Intemperance, which in its finality is a chronic desire, is thus by indulgence often engendered; no such desire exists in the soul; no sense of want is felt; the unlawful act is committed; the man intoxicates himself; thenceforth he feels a desire for intoxicating drinks; he has planted a lust within his soul with which thenceforth he must ever wage war if he would save himself. Other desires exist in the soul originally; gratified legitimately, they produce no evil; but pampered and cherished, they grow in intensity, and become inordinate and wanton; they fix themselves in the mind, presenting themselves before the consciousness in the vilest manner through the imagination; thus they be-

come lusts which "war against the soul," and the soul is converted into an evil, or a foul and loathsome object; thus God sees it, and thus the consciousness perceives it, when once it is awakened to it, through its guilt.

For all such self-formed habits man must feel that he himself is responsible, and whenever they come before his consciousness, must feel awakened to a consciousness of his guilt. The guilty act points to the self-formed habit, and this again points to a series of acts whereby that habit was formed. No condition is thus without some amount of guilt, for all are what they are through guilty acts of self-indulgence. The power which a man feels within himself, working through desire, he knows to a great extent has been wilfully engendered. Thus it is that man in view of his sinfulness feels guilty. It is not that the state or habit is guilty, but that he who has it is guilty in having wilfully engendered it; wilfully he has pampered his appetites until they have become inordinate habits; he has cherished ill feelings until they have engendered hatred, and envy, and jealousy, and malice, and such like affections. These have become habitual states of the soul. In childhood, such states (if at all) are scarcely perceptible; in manhood, they exhibit themselves decidedly; in old age they become matured. Out of such states issue all the evil desires, such as revenge, and all those wicked, malicious desires that seek the misery and destruction of all those who oppose themselves to self. Every man is responsible for and guilty of what he is; for he is not what he was, and he has wilfully made himself what he is. What he is, becomes manifest to himself for the first time, often after some desperately guilty act. Thus his eyes are opened, and he becomes conscious that he is a miserably sinful and guilty creature. The act points to the condition of the soul from whence it issued, and that to a series of guilty acts; guilt increasing, becomes deeper in

each succeeding act. No guilty act stands isolated; it is a link in the chain which stretches far back to the first guilty act of the first man, Adam. By the one act of disobedience of one man, many were made sinners. All the links that we have added to this chain we are and feel responsible for. We feel, then, guilty of our sinfulness, because we are guilty of the acts whereby it was brought about. Sinfulness and guilt cannot therefore be considered as separable. The point at which guilt comes in is, when man wilfully yields to the solicitations of desire. And herein lies the inexplicable nature, the mystery of sin. In its final analysis, it resolves itself into folly.

The predominant feeling, when the soul is awakened to a consciousness of its internal condition, is that of guilt. Roused by the rude shock of some glaringly guilty act, all at once the soul becomes conscious of its condition; casting its glance backward, it is appalled at the vision that presents itself. Stretching backward, connecting it with a state of almost innocence, it sees a long chain, each link of it consisting of some flagrantly guilty act. Larger and larger, heavier and heavier become the links as the chain grows longer, until at last the soul, staggering under the load, awakens to find itself almost crushed under the weight of its guilt. It is not the power of sin, its deadly, constantly increasing gravity that the soul first regards; that comes afterwards, when the soul begins to make the effort to resist it,—guilt is the first aspect under which sin presents itself before the consciousness when the soul is aroused. There are various ways by which this is brought about; one of them we have mentioned. A glaring act of guilt will often be the means of arousing the soul to moral self-consciousness; in a religious soul (where the consciousness of God as the Holy One and the Judge of all the earth is present) it will evolve all the other facts connected with that of guilt. Thus, the

soul will become terrified at the thought of God; "when it considers Him it will be afraid." Death, too, will be an object of dread, and the soul will in consequence, "all its lifetime, through fear of death, be subject to bondage." "The sting of death is sin;" guilt more or less felt is what makes man afraid to meet death. As a fact in the soul, guilt is never absent. There have been men, perhaps, and there still may be, who are absolutely indifferent to death, who think no more of it than do the beasts which perish; but if there are any such, they are scarcely human; they have not what the human race as a general rule has. Such men, if there be any, have not guilt in them. Fear of death proves guilt, not that it is invariably before the consciousness; man is often ignorant of what it is that makes him afraid. Guilt is not always before the consciousness; it may be repressed through pride; it may make itself felt only as a ground-swell within the soul; there is no movement; all may be quiet; apparently the storm seems far off. Fear of death *proves* guilt; thus, oftentimes, imminence of death will bring this connection out; so that this is another way by which man may be awakened to guilt. Brought into immediate contact with death, the soul for the first time awakes and becomes alive; now for the first time it looks the truth fairly in the face, and in it reads its doom. Guilt flashes its lurid light upon it, and reveals to it the blackness of its guilt; deed after deed arises and presents itself before the consciousness for judgment, and receives its sentence; wildly and convulsively the soul clings to life, and grapples with death; death has brought guilt to light, and guilt the fear of death. Thus, the presence of death is another way of bringing guilt, with all its attendent facts, before the consciousness. In the soul where there is no consciousness of God, that is, where the fact is so suppressed as not to appear before the con-

sciousness, where, consequently, there is no consciousness of immortality, no belief in a future judgment, — in such a case, guilt, when it becomes a conscious fact, must exist only as remorse. And under such circumstances, no doubt suicide will follow. Thus Judas repented, in that he had betrayed innocent blood, threw down the pieces of silver for which he had bartered his soul, and went and hanged himself. Alas, poor guilty man! remorse had fixed its fangs within upon his soul; faith, hope, everything had disappeared, nought but the black deed, and that stands out; hopeless, reckless, unbelieving, he rushes upon his doom; dangling from a limb, burst asunder in the white moonlight, ghastly spectacle — he hangs a sign, the victim of remorse.

A general summary of the subject gives us the following result: — guilt implies knowledge of the law; the moral law as we find it in revelation, or in the enlightened conscience, forbids both the inward and outward acts of sin; it prohibits the cherishing of a certain class of feelings and desires; it pronounces all such conscious voluntary acts as sinful, and threatens punishment; the soul being in possession of such knowledge, when conscious of the inward forbidden act, becomes at once conscious of guilt, and so again a forbidden outward act being committed, the soul becomes conscious of its guilt; the guilt of the outward act is felt to be deeper than that of the inward; because it is more wilful, it is more inexcusable, and just as it was more or less wilful, will the soul feel more or less guilty. Guilt points to the condition of the sinning soul, and that lays open a whole chain of sinful acts, so that, overwhelmed at the sight, and staggering under the weight of its load, the soul cries out in anguish, "What must I do to be saved?" "Oh wretched man that I am; who shall deliver me from the body of this death?"

How it is that this self-revelation takes place at one time rather than at another, and in one person and not in another, lies simply in this, that at such a time man is true to himself, and honestly reads off the record of his consciousness. At other times he wilfully shuts his eyes and will not look at the truth; he suppresses within himself the facts of his consciousness, and offers himself up a willing servant to sin. He manages to suppress, perhaps for the time to extinguish, two elements of the human consciousness, namely, God, and the moral self-consciousness. Such is man's part in this matter. On the other hand, in order to bring out these facts in the consciousness, Divine inspiration intervenes. Like letters which, when written with invisible ink, are made evident by being held before the fire, so the spirit breathing upon the soul brings out in living characters the facts of man's consciousness. Truly, "by the law is the knowledge of sin;" but what makes this knowledge vital, what makes sin and guilt conscious facts, is that the soul is breathed upon by the Spirit, and man, dead in trespasses and sins, becomes at once a living soul; consciousness is life, without it the soul is dead. With this consciousness a new form of life is introduced, which, gradually expanding and being fed by the gospel of Christ, will finally penetrate the whole soul, infuse into every portion of it light, and be consummated only when it has penetrated and glorified the body. All those deep, yet inarticulate movements which are found under the Religious life, belong to this source. They were the motions of the Spirit, striving to bring out before the consciousness the fact of sin and guilt. That ground-swell which sluggishly surged under the Religious life was but the movement of the Divine Spirit within; as a force, its tendency was towards consciousness, but it was repressed and chained down under the formalism and cold morality of the Religious life. But

here the Spirit will no longer be held in check; He has burst loose, the Religious life proved insufficient. Man is forced to recognize his sin and guilt; they are facts before him, and as such must be met and satisfied; the conscious life has begun, the Spirit has quickened the soul, and already it is in travail; nor will this be ended until the new creature is formed within, until Christ dwells in the heart by faith. The Divine life is now, then, in process of generation, the new creature is being formed.

"In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth, and the earth was without form and void, and darkness was upon the face of the deep." And just as it was in the physical, so it is in the spiritual creation — all the old conditions of human nature being broken up, the soul being dissolved in the waters of repentance; out of this spiritual chaos a cosmos will arise; — "and the spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters." The same is true of the spiritual. "Except a man be born of water and of the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter the kingdom of Heaven." The condition of water is the state of penitence; the other necessary condition in order to the creation is the Holy Ghost. These were elements under the physical creation which it was the work of the Spirit to bring out of chaotic into cosmical order. There are elements under the spiritual creation which in the primary state of penitence may be considered as in chaotic arrangement. The work of the Spirit is to reduce them into a spiritual cosmos; and this brings us to the consideration of the spiritual creation and development of the kingdom of God among men.

The kingdom of God is a spiritual creation; it exists in the world, but is not of the world; it is made up of men, not, however, in their natural and carnal condition, but in a supernatural spiritual condition, — men who have been regenerated by the Spirit of God. The fundamental

and primary spiritual condition, in order to the entering into and becoming a member of this kingdom, is that which we have been describing. It may technically be called the state of penitence; those who are in this condition are poor in spirit; they are, as we have seen, awakened to a consciousness of their guilt and sin, and being so, they are of a broken and contrite heart, humble-minded, heavy-laden, longing for deliverance from their guilt and sin. Such alone are the conditions under which the powers of the other world, as emanating from Christ, can and do actually operate; and in due time such characters are upon the exercise of faith introduced within the kingdom of Christ, they are relieved from the load of their sin and guilt, redeemed from the bondage of sinfulness, and finally their bodies being glorified, enter upon the life of glory, which as yet is future in the history of the kingdom. This kingdom has a real historical development; it has always existed in the world. To give us an account of this development is the prime object of revelation. The members which constitute this kingdom have always been of the same character; they were those who were awakened to the consciousness of their miserably sinful condition, those who mourned for sin, men of broken and contrite hearts. Such souls eagerly clutched at the promise of a spiritual deliverance held out to man from the very first, and with anxiety they looked forward to the time when the Redeemer should come, who would deliver them from this bondage, and restore them to a better and happier life. Such were Abel, Enoch, Abraham, and all the patriarchs. Such was the Arabian patriarch Job, who, though separated far from the chosen people, could yet say, "I know that my Redeemer liveth, and that he shall stand at the latter day upon the earth; and though after my skin worms destroy this body, yet in my flesh shall I see God." Such,

too, was David, the man after God's own heart, who suffered more under the consciousness of sin and guilt than, perhaps, any man ever has or ever will do; he too, in the anguish of his soul, looked confidently forth to the coming of his Redeemer. And just such was the whole host of worthies who followed him in historical succession; all were men of "broken and contrite heart;" "all died in faith, not having received the promises, but having seen them afar off, and were persuaded of them, embraced them and confessed that they were strangers and pilgrims on earth."

According to the historic development of the kingdom, in those preceding the coming of the Redeemer, the good things provided in the kingdom were not yet realized. Sacrifice, as we have seen, is in its nature a promise, and is symbolic of what God intended to do, so far as concerned the taking away of guilt. "It is not possible that the blood of bulls and goats can take away sins." The conscience could not by these be purged of guilt; they pointed to the day when this would be done, and so encouraged and strengthened hope; but the saints of old must continue to labor under a sense of guilt, though they might know that God would not impute it to them, through the promise; still they must feel, more or less, its tormenting influence, and struggle under the burden of it, waiting patiently for the fulfilment of the promises. The position which such saints occupied with respect to the kingdom of Christ was this: as being poor in spirit they were adapted for an entrance into the kingdom; they were fit subjects for the powers of that kingdom to operate upon and within. Had there been nothing more, though adapted for the kingdom by their spiritual condition, they could not, properly and strictly speaking, be said to be members of that kingdom. One other important element is neces-

sary in order to create membership—that element is faith. The soul in a contrite condition awakened to consciousness of sinfulness and guilt, is not yet, strictly speaking, in the kingdom. "Blessed," says Christ, "are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of Heaven." Such is the fundamental character of all those who belong to that kingdom; such is the condition to which all must be reduced before they can make an entrance into it; such still may be the condition of the soul, and yet the actual entrance not yet effected.

To all who stood at different epochs in the long line of the historic development of the kingdom, there was an object of faith presented, that object was God's promise of sending a Redeemer who was to deliver man from all the evil that sin had entailed upon him; this promise was ratified and confirmed in the institution of sacrifice; which at the same time symbolically represented the way in which that promise was to be fulfilled; it having an especial relation to that most prominent point in redemption, the guilt of sin. It was to this promise and to this representative institution that the faith of the ancient Church attached itself. The life of the Church then, throughout those long ages, was one entirely of hope. During the gradual historic development of the kingdom, the meaning contained in this central promise and institution was gradually evolved; it gradually became clearer how God proposed to effect Redemption, and the experience of the believer in the presence of such increasing light must have become more satisfactory; and as the time grew shorter and the light grew clearer, anticipation must have become more and more eager. The deliverance, observe, which was held out to be expected, was not, as the Jewish Church, drawn down by carnality, conceived, to be a deliverance from temporal enemies, and an exalted political status. The kingdom

from the very beginning was a spiritual one. Only the spiritual man could understand it, or would care for its exhibition. The poor in spirit, mourning for sin, tormented more or less by the fear created by guilt, hungering and thirsting after righteousness, they could understand the meaning of spiritual promises, and would eagerly await the coming of a Redeemer who was to deliver them from these harassing conditions and from the burden of sin and guilt under which they groaned and were in bondage. Thus Zacharias understood the promises, and in the presence of the fulfilment of them could exclaim, "Blessed be the Lord God of Israel, for he hath visited and redeemed his people, and hath raised up an Horn of salvation for us in the house of his servant David;" his idea of the fulfilment of the promise in relation to present salvation lay in this, that, being delivered out of the hand of his enemies (that is spiritual), he might serve God without fear, in holiness and righteousness all the days of his life. The Redeemer was to give knowledge of salvation unto his people, he says, by the remission of their sins.

The fundamental characteristic of the member of the kingdom after the coming of Christ was exactly the same as that of the saint before His coming; he was "poor in spirit." The soul laboring under a sense of its guilt is subject to two leading influences: first, it is humbled; next, it is harassed by a distressing sense of fear; it is uneasy about its relation to God, fluctuating between the fear of His wrath and the hope of His love. It is the first of these elements that the term "poor in spirit" expressly designates. It is to the second of these elements, however, that the promises of Redemption especially relate. Harassed more or less by such feelings, the saint under the Old Testament could well understand the meaning of the spiritual promises, and could only eagerly and anxiously

await their fulfilment in his own case. Struggling under the bondage of sin, he is wearied and heavy-laden, and above all things he is anxious for reconciliation and a sense of peace with God, for the burden of his sins is intolerable. As a member of the kingdom under its present historical state of development, all these wants can be supplied. The development of the kingdom has reached its turning-point, both objectively in history, and subjectively; it can, in the soul of the believer, create an entirely new form of experience; all that is necessary in order to do this is the exercise of a proper faith. The Redeemer has come, has by the sacrifice of Himself in relation to God made an end of guilt, has ascended up on high, and received gifts for men, has been put in possession of the supreme moral power, the Holy Spirit, by whose agency, by the additional medium of His Word and example, he is ready and able to deliver the believer from the bondage of his sin. All that is necessary in order to make these objective facts subjective, and a real experience in the soul of the "poor in spirit," is, that he should exercise an adequate faith; he must appropriate the objective to himself; make the fact of Christ's atonement the satisfaction for his own guilt; make the power of Christ, by confidently relying on it, his own in the struggle with sin. Let him but claim Christ's act of atonement for himself, and at once it will give him peace of conscience and peace with God. Speaking the language of such a faith, he can say boldly and joyfully, "Christ hath redeemed me from the curse of the law, being made a curse for me;" confidently relying upon the strength of his Redeemer, he can say, "I can do all things through Christ who strengtheneth me." "The life which I now live in the flesh, I live by the faith of the Son of God, who loved me, and gave Himself for me." Thus, the Redemption which the New Testament saint experiences by faith is

not one exclusively of hope; it is a present one: "being justified by faith, we have peace with God through our Lord Jesus Christ;" a present conscious possession. "By whom also we have access by faith into this grace wherein we stand, and rejoice in hope of the glory of God; and not only so, but we rejoice in tribulation also; knowing that tribulation worketh patience, and patience experience, and experience hope; and hope maketh not ashamed, because the love of God is shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, which is given unto us." Thus the experience of a Christian believer, necessarily, from the historic nature of the development of the kingdom of God, is in advance of that of the Old Testament saints. David and St. Paul represented different epochs in this development. The element in which they were agreed was poverty of spirit; both were broken-hearted, contrite sinners, deeply conscious of their sinfulness and guilt. David looked joyfully forward to a time of deliverance, and rejoiced in hope of the salvation which the Redeemer was to bring to light; his consciousness of peace with God must necessarily, from want of light, be fluctuating; he lived rather in hope of it. St. Paul rejoiced not in this hope, for with him it was fruition; but he too rejoiced in hope of the glory of God, the Glory which was to be revealed at the second coming, not the first; "he looked forward to the resurrection of the dead, and the life in the world to come," and even previous to that event, in the strength of a faith in a present salvation, he was "willing rather to be absent from the body, and to be present with the Lord."

The consciousness of guilt is, as we have said, followed by two effects. The man who has been awakened to a consciousness of his guilt and sinfulness is humbled; here we are at the disintegration and dissolution of egotism; no longer can the soul in this condition buoy itself up with a

belief in its own goodness. No! the truth is now revealed, and the soul is, per force, brought face to face with it. It sees itself under the light of a perfect law, and as it appears to a Holy God. Its own blackness and foulness stand clearly out; up to this time the man has succeeded in deceiving himself. All the while he has been imagining, perhaps really believing that he was without reproach, or perhaps he may have acknowledged to himself, and to others even, that he had infirmities and weaknesses; but he has never fairly looked the subject in the face; he has carefully repressed the truth in unrighteousness; has never honestly judged himself by the perfect law; he has never been true to himself. Christ tells us that "men love darkness rather than light, because their deeds are evil; that every one that doeth evil hateth light, neither cometh to it, lest his deeds should be reproved." On the other hand, "every one that doeth truth cometh to the light, that his deeds may be manifest that they are wrought in God." It all depends on a man's honesty. The man who is really and honestly anxious to know the truth, to know exactly what is his condition, whether or not he is in the right path, such a man with unprejudiced mind comes anxiously to the light that he may compare his character and conduct with it, and see whether he is in the right, whether he is in God. Honesty of purpose makes difference of character in this respect. The true man is willing and anxious to be reproved if he is in the wrong, his only anxiety is to be in the right course. The man who loves the wrong and its deeds, loves darkness; necessarily he is dishonest and untrue to himself; he avoids the light lest his deeds should be reproved. The penitent is necessarily an honest, true man; now at last he is in the truth, and the truth will finally make him free. Comparing himself with the true life, in his penitence he enters upon it. There is

a disclosure; he sees it, recognizes it to himself and is humbled by it; becoming conscious of his guilt and sin, he becomes a broken-hearted, contrite sinner; egotism is entirely broken up; no longer does he pride himself upon his righteousness; but, smiting upon his breast, like the poor publican, he cries out in his anguish, "God be merciful to me a sinner;" self-sufficiency has gone down, penitential humility has taken its place; self-complacency has disappeared, inward sorrow and mourning, total dissatisfaction are in its stead. The other effect following upon consciousness of guilt is inward wretchedness, and this wretchedness has as its chief factor, fear. The guilty soul becomes sorely distressed as to its state with respect to God, guilt creates fear and distrust, the soul feels that justly it deserves God's wrath and indignation, and this creates great uneasiness; above all things the soul longs for God's forgiveness of its sins, and for a sense of peace with Him; there will never be any rest until, being justified, the soul attains to a peace with God. Consciousness of guilt, in conjunction with that of God as the Holy One, necessarily engenders fear; it makes the soul dread Him whom above all things it would love, and would like to feel assured was its Father, rather than its enemy; hence the uneasiness, the wretchedness under which the awakened man labors; he wants peace with God, wants to be assured that God has taken away his sins and received him into his favor. The first of these effects, under the dispensation of the kingdom, is permanent; the second is removed.

The act which, on God's part, relates to guilt is designated by several names: it is termed forgiveness or remission of sin, pardon, justification; all which terms relate to the same act, the act by which God puts aside or covers man's guilt, and receives him into his favor. It is in its nature an active transitive act, passing over from God to

man. God forgives sin, man as the subject of the forgiveness becomes conscious of the act. It is an act not only of and in God, but also in man; previous to it the soul is perplexed and harassed under the consciousness of guilt, it fears God's wrath, and can attain no peace. But upon the taking place of this act all is changed, forgiveness of sins at once quiets the conscience; not that man ceases to feel and be humbled under the sense of his guilt, this will ever continue; but he is relieved from all further apprehension as to God's wrath; he is no longer afraid of death and the hereafter; he sees his guilt has been atoned for on the Cross, and in view of this he can feel confident of the love of God, and can ever rejoice in the hope of the glory of God.

The curse which the law levels against sin has in the experience of the awakened sinner become an actual fact. In his consciousness of guilt he is actually experiencing the curse of the law, it has already taken hold of him. He is judged and self-condemned, now, in mercy, that he may be delivered from the final judgment of the last day. He is judged by God in this life, and so the curse has fastened itself upon him. Now, remission of sins delivers a man from this condition; so that he who has been forgiven, can truthfully say, with the Apostle, "Christ hath delivered me from the curse of the law." With such an one this is not a doctrine, it is an experimental fact; he speaks from the depths of his own personal experience; he has felt the wretchedness entailed by the curse, and has actually through faith been delivered from it; he speaks then from experience when he declares Christ's power. St. Paul tells us the Gospel is the power of God unto every one that believeth, because every such an one experiences that power, and feels that it has done for him what nothing else in the world could do. It has restored him to peace, satisfied all

the demands of his guilt, given him the assurance of God's love to him, and enabled him sincerely, "in the spirit of adoption, to cry out Abba, Father." The Apostles, in extolling the excellency of the Gospel of Christ, speak from experience. It has really been a power in them, and they speak as men who appreciated this. It is not a mere doctrine which is to be looked at from the outside, and intellectually grasped; but one that is to be personally applied to each awakened believer, so that from his own personal experience he shall be able to say, "Christ has delivered me; God forbid that I should glory save in the Cross of Christ." He ought to be able to say to every man, from the depths of his own experience, "I am not ashamed of the Gospel of Christ, for it is the power of God unto salvation, unto every one that believeth." I say so because I have tried it myself; I speak from experience; I know its efficacy, and from the bottom of my heart would commend it to all the weary and heavy-laden.

As to the manner in which this power is administered in the kingdom, there have ever been differences of opinion in the Church. Some have held, and still hold, that remission of sins is administered in baptism; that where there is baptism, there is remission of sin. Others have attached it to the Holy Communion, and others again to certain ordinances of the Church, the officers of the Church being regarded as the organs of its administration. Thus in the rite of priestly absolution, remission of sin is conjectured to be administered. There is, too, a conditional absolution involved in the rite of penance. Under all these schemes it is held that there is such a thing as forgiveness of sins. Each one of these views attaches to itself the power of the administration of this gift. The Roman Church, relying upon the ground that what, by its officers, it binds on earth is bound in heaven, and that what it looses on earth

is loosed in heaven, grounding its administrative claims upon this passage of Scripture, proceeds to exercise it. Thus her priests in the rite of absolution, as the agents of God, forgive sin, and in the rite of excommunication bind sin upon the soul. The Roman Church in its wisdom has firmly grasped this grand truth, which the Protestants have too generally lost, namely, that forgiveness of sins is a reality of consciousness. Objectively, it is a doctrine; but administered, it is a human reality. It is an event which takes place, or ought to take place, in a man's consciousness. Forgiveness of sins is confessedly, of all, an element in the kingdom. The Roman Church administers it; the Protestant Church does not. The penitent comes to the priest, confesses his sin; knows that there is forgiveness with God administered in the kingdom of Christ; he firmly believes that his priest is authorized to administer it; the priest grants him absolution, and the penitent goes away satisfied, relieved in mind, consciously absolved. Perhaps, precedent to absolution, some act of penance is required; the act is performed, and the penitent, as before, feels himself absolved. A firm belief in the power of any Church to administer absolution through its ordinances, or by its officers, makes a man practically a Romanist, and unless, as in the case of Luther, the sense of guilt prove too deep to be thus relieved, or faith in the Church be too weak, when absolution is administered, the man will feel perfectly satisfied as to his relation with God. This is the case with many, as we have seen, under the religious form of life, their true spiritual status is determined by what they rely upon as conferring the pardon. To look to and rely upon Christ and His work, is one thing; to look to and rely upon man is another: the same principle is at work here as in the case of idolatry. In the one case, an image, first a symbol, next becomes the reality, and so the prime ob-

ject of man's worship. In the other case, the priest first, simply an administrator under a power, soon becomes the actual dispenser of the gift. It is a critical situation, man has assumed the place of God. If the man alone is regarded by the penitent, the soul is deceived; but if Christ is principally relied upon, and man is looked upon merely as his officer, though the situation is precarious, still it is not hopeless. The great truth, however, which the Roman Church has laid hold upon, is that forgiveness is actually administered to the consciousness in the Church. Its members can, therefore, through absolution obtain peace with God; they can know and feel that their sins are forgiven. This is a point for which human nature, when once awakened, will perseveringly struggle, and any Church which can supply this want, must inevitably wield a gigantic power in this world.

That Christ has the power to forgive sins, and to make it a fact in the consciousness, he demonstrates in his cure of the man sick of the palsy. "Whether is easier to say, Thy sins be forgiven thee, or to say, Arise and walk," He demands of those who question his power. But that ye may know that the Son of Man hath power on earth to forgive sins, (then saith he to the sick of the palsy,) "Arise, take up thy bed and go into thine house, and he arose and departed to his house." The forgiveness of sins being an internal as well as an external operation, Christ, to demonstrate to those around him that, although unseen, the effect was real, by his fiat produces an outward visible effect, which stands out as a sign of the unseen, inward; and in this, as in all Christ's miracles, there is a real connection between the sign and the thing signified; the body becomes whole, *visibly*, the soul *consciously*, none knowing the internal miracle but the man himself. And this same miracle is repeated in the consciousness of every one that believes.

The Roman Church administers Christ's prerogative of forgiveness through her officers. This is an error, and a disastrous one, for it glorifies the church, while it obscures and shuts out the head. Christ alone can forgive sins. While on earth he administered that prerogative by his Word, he says to the sick of the palsy, "Son, thy sins be forgiven thee," and immediately this believer was relieved of the bondage of his guilt, and consciously was at peace with God; at once he loved his Saviour, and became his faithful disciple. Forgiveness of sins is not now, however, administered in this way; it cannot be, for Christ is not present with us, but is gone "to prepare a place for us." The administration of this power is, however, still exercised by Christ himself; the agent which he uses is the Holy Spirit; the means which the Holy Spirit uses is the written word, the gospel. According to the promise of Christ, the Spirit takes the things of him and showeth them unto us. In opposition to the Roman doctrine, Christ is the only priest. He alone has the power of administering the forgiveness of sins. In agreement with the Roman doctrines, forgiveness of sins is an actual conscious fact in man's experience. The Holy Spirit effects this result, and He uses the gospel of Christ. To the soul laboring under the consciousness of guilt he comes taking the things of Christ; his work of atonement he applies to the troubled conscience. He kindles faith within the soul, and that, laying hold upon this work of Christ, applies it to itself. The demands of guilt are thus amply met and satisfied, and thus the guilty soul becomes consciously reconciled and at peace with God. Christ calls himself the "bread of life," because he supplies the wants of man's awakened spiritual nature. "The bread that I will give is my flesh, which I will give for the life of the world." The soul laboring under the consciousness of guilt is in want. The flesh

which Christ gives for the life of the world is exactly adapted to this want; the soul partaking of it feels at once that it has drawn in a new and vital principle: His flesh is felt to be food indeed, and His blood to be drink indeed. The food, then, which is administered by Christ to the hungering soul, through the Holy Spirit, is His flesh and blood, as exhibited in His atonement. In the Holy Communion this food is, in symbol, significantly administered to the soul; so that the believer by faith feels that he is actually feeding upon His body and drinking His blood, and he finds it food indeed, and is thankful. Under no conditions is the consciousness of redemption so entirely brought out as in the Holy Communion. On that occasion, through His ministers, He says distinctly to each of His disciples present (and to be such they must be poor in spirit), "Take, eat; this is my Body, which is given for you; do this in remembrance of me." And again, "Drink ye all of this; for this is my Blood of the New Testament, which is shed for you, and for many, for the remission of sins. Do this, as oft as ye shall drink it, in remembrance of Me." Thus it is that Christ administers the forgiveness of sins; and the penitent must be truly without faith who fails to receive it, and who does not go from that table thankful, joyful, his heart bursting with love towards Him who so loved him and gave Himself for him. Christ administers forgiveness of sins through the Spirit, in His word, and ordinances. The condition, in order to receive the same, is in the penitent — simply faith. The more faith he has, the more decidedly he will receive it. Baptism and the Holy Communion are both means through which Christ confers, and we consciously receive the benefits from Him, provided there be the faith to receive it. The reason why so little benefit is received is because we have so little faith. The Word is the original

and primary means of grace. The application of the truth of Christ to the soul by the Spirit through faith, imparts new life. An uninterrupted state of consciousness as to the forgiveness of our sins, and of God's favor and love towards us, is the thing which the soul chiefly desires, and this is verily administered by Christ in His kingdom.

Forgiveness of sins, as we have said, is the act of God, immanent to him. As such, of course, we cannot be said to become conscious of it; God only is conscious of his own acts. But it is also an active transitive act; it passes over in its effects to us. God forgives; and in the consciousness of peace which thereupon ensues within us, we thus immediately become conscious that we are forgiven. Thus, in a mediate sense, we may be said to be conscious of forgiveness of sins. Man commits a trespass against his fellow-man; he becomes sorry for his act, goes to his fellow-man, and asks his forgiveness. It is granted. The trespasser feels relieved; and though he may continue to regret his fault, and be humbled whenever he thinks of it, still his mind is now relieved, for he has obtained forgiveness for the injury he inflicted — the two parties are consciously reconciled. And so with relation to God. "If we confess our sins, God is faithful and just to forgive us our sins, and to cleanse us from all unrighteousness." And in this case no less than in the human, the forgiveness is made a fact of consciousness. So long as forgiveness is not granted, it will be impossible for the soul to be at rest. Its peace will be disturbed; it will feel uneasy as to God's attitude towards it. Provided the man does not view his sin, he may continue to feel comfortable; but let him but fairly eye his offence, and then, unless he be forgiven, he will be disquieted. The only point that remains is as to how this forgiveness is to be obtained. In the first place, then, confession of sin to God is necessary, and in general

the whole state of penitence. Approaching God in such a frame, and confessing the sin, God immediately dispenses an absolute pardon. Observe the way in which this pardon is administered; it comes through the kingdom of Christ. The soul obtains its pardon, as it did in the first place, by acting faith upon Christ crucified. God, by the Spirit, presents before the penitent soul the atoning work of Christ; this the soul, by an act of faith, lays hold upon, and thenceforth peace is restored within. The soul now, instead of its former uneasiness, finds itself filled with peace. It feels conscious, and knows that God has granted forgiveness. This process is gone through with at the very first, when the soul is first justified, and also throughout the whole Christian life. Wherever a conscious act of sin has been committed, the penitent soul obtains conscious peace by appropriating, by faith, the atoning work of Christ. God administers forgiveness of sins in general and in particular, by leading the soul to regard and appropriate the blood of His Son. The great point which we would make is, that forgiveness of sins, in the general and in the particular, is a fact in the human consciousness. The legacy which Christ left to His disciples was peace—peace of conscience, peace with God. He is styled the Peacemaker, who has made peace by the blood of His cross. The sinner, as a penitent, eyes his guilt, and is troubled; as a believer, he eyes the Cross, and is reassured. He sees in it reconciliation, and argues that if while we were enemies, we were reconciled by His death, much more, being reconciled, we shall be saved by His life. Consciousness of peace streams out like light from the Cross; upon it, in clear and legible letters, we read, "Your sins and iniquities will I remember no more." In the Cross, then, there is a general grant of forgiveness of sins to all who desire it. The blood of Christ is to the realm of spirit what water is

to the world of animal existence: every one that thirsts can drink. The penitent is one of the thirsty; all that he requires is the faith to take this water of life, which is offered without money and without price. The unawakened know not any such want; therefore, they will not drink. If they come at the invitation, they will, like the Jews of old, expect some temporal or some carnal blessing. But the poor in spirit are thirsty; they need and crave this water of life. Nothing but faith is wanting that they should satisfy their thirst and make redemption as much a fact of consciousness as the need of it.

There are three phases of the Religious consciousness: there is the dormant consciousness, the awakened consciousness, and again there is the full Christian consciousness. The facts of this last are righteousness, peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost.

The Protestantism of this age has very generally failed to recognize this important truth. In its teaching it fails to supply what the awakened soul most urgently demands, namely, peace with God. In its anxiety to define the doctrine of justification by faith, to inform its disciples how God acts in this matter, in the letter it loses the spirit. Protestantism, as it is now very generally administered, teaches that consciousness of peace with God and of forgiveness of sins is possible only under an advanced experience; that it is a peculiar favor vouchsafed by God to some only, those who are eminent saints. The poor contrite, timorous sinner must therefore expect to remain as he is; or perhaps some day or other, when he is duly sanctified, he may hope to attain to the assurance of hope, or faith as it is called; and then, and not until then, can he expect to feel at peace with God, and rejoice in the hope of the glory of God. Protestantism disconnects justification and man's consciousness of peace and reconciliation. It

teaches that a man may be justified, be a true penitent believer who has confessed his sins to God and believes in Christ, and yet without peace; necessarily therefore he is still afraid of God and unable to trust Him as a Father. It teaches that faith in Christ's atoning blood need not necessarily bring peace to the troubled conscience. Thus, according to this system, though forgiveness of sins is granted in Heaven, it is seldom administered on earth, only in the cases of a few particular saints. Practically, then, forgiveness of sins is not administered, according to this scheme, in Christ's kingdom. Sinners must wait until they get to heaven before they can feel any certainty of salvation. In experience they cannot rise above that of the saints under the Old Testament, and like them must die not having received the promises. Redemption with them extends no farther than it did with those ancient saints. The Redeemer has come to us; but as yet He does not administer any of his purchased powers. Evidently such a system is out of date. Its position in the historic development of the kingdom is a false one. It does not profess to administer what Christ is ready and willing to confer: the legacy which, in fact, in a covenant sealed with His blood, He has left to His disciples, "My peace I give unto you;" and surely He means peace with God. Without this peace, without being able to glory in Christ, it is impossible to love God; without this the soul will necessarily be afraid of God, and will most inevitably be seeking to please Him with its own righteousness. Evidently, it is an error to separate God from the soul. God's acts are transitive; what He binds in heaven is bound on earth, in the human consciousness; and what He looses in heaven is loosed. Since He gave His Apostles this power, He must have it Himself. When God binds His curse upon the soul, it becomes a conscious fact; man feels the

load and groans under it. When man becomes conscious of his guilt, he begins to feel the curse of the law. In his case, the throne of judgment has been set, the books have been opened; God has entered into judgment with him. He is judging him now that thus he may not be condemned hereafter. The curse falls, and the soul enters at once into a conscious misery. What was bound in heaven is now bound on earth. And so again when God looses. When leading the heavy-laden soul, He draws it to Christ, and points it to Him as the Lamb of God that taketh away the sin of the world; when looking at Him, the soul appropriates Him as the bread of life to supply its wants; then God looses. The curse is removed, and the soul being justified by faith feels at peace with God. When God justifies, the curse is removed; and when the curse is removed, man becomes consciously reconciled with God, and can say from the bottom of his heart, "Abba, Father."

The position very generally occupied by the Protestantism of the day is really a departure from the doctrine of justification by faith. It is a form without the spirit. It admits that justification depends on faith; but as to our peace with God, that (we can see no other way of escape) depends upon our good conduct — whether we lead such lives as to deserve it. Justification under this scheme resembles the case of a contingent remainder suspended *in nubibus* — dependent upon some condition which in all probability will never be fulfilled, and so most probably the remainder will never arrive at the maturity even of a vested interest. To try and make me believe that I am delivered from the curse of the law, when I feel that I am not, is folly. No: I can in this life be delivered from it, and will have Christ to thank for it, and am authorized to say with Paul, "Christ has delivered me from the curse of the law." Protestantism is in error in denying conscious-

ness of Redemption to be an essential element of the Kingdom. In its historic development, the Kingdom has a time when Redemption from the guilt, and also from the power of sin, is actually and consciously administered. It is administered by Christ through the Spirit, by the Word, and through the sacraments; it is received by faith. There is such a thing now as the *Christian consciousness*, an advance upon any state that has ever preceded it. It did not exist in its present form before the coming of Christ. The elements of that consciousness are in general, as stated by the Apostle Paul, righteousness, peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost. Thus the *awakened* consciousness has advanced and become the *Christian* consciousness. And while guilt as an humbling element is retained, all that under the sense of it frightened the sinner has disappeared. In sight of the Cross, guilt humbles, but does not dismay. We clearly see peace in the blood of the Cross; and He who hangs there is our peace: thus guilt will only inflame love. "For God commendeth His love towards us in that while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us." The Christian consciousness, instead of fear, has as an element, the love of God, which is the only ground of true Gospel obedience. The only condition required in order that the power of Redemption may operate, is that the consciousness of guilt and sin should be awakened. This brings the soul into a conscious state of want. It wants forgiveness and peace; it wants a strength above its own to struggle with sin; it feels its need of Redemption. The supply for these wants is ever ready at hand, as much so as water is; nothing further is required but that we should, by faith, drink. The atoning work of Christ satisfies the demands of guilt; the law and spirit of Christ, the demands of our ignorance and weakness.

The *pneumatic* consciousness passes through three stages.

Emerging out of the dormant state, it rises to that of want. The soul, in its consciousness of guilt and sin, feels desperately the need of redemption. In the kingdom of Christ this want is met and supplied. Here, then, follows the third stage, namely, the consciousness of redemption, which is a leading element in the Christian consciousness. In it, guilt and redemption stand side by side. Looking within, the soul cries out, like St. Paul, "Oh wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" Looking without, in the same breath it exclaims, "I thank God through our Lord Jesus Christ; thanks be to God, who giveth us the victory through our Lord Jesus Christ." The Christian who cannot enter into this experience is out of place; he is not up with his position in the historic development of the kingdom; for, as we have said, forgiveness of sins is now actually administered in the kingdom, in the consciousness of every one who will receive it. The standpoint of the Apostles is that, or should be that, of every Christian who is living under the present dispensation. That it is not, is not, we think, entirely from want of faith, but from confusion of ideas and ignorance. The separation of the objective and subjective, of justification and consciousness of peace, so prevalent under the Protestantism of this age, is mainly answerable for it.

The Christian consciousness in its integrity has, then, as essential elements, "peace and joy in the Holy Ghost;" that is to say, the presence of the Holy Ghost in the soul makes itself manifest in peace and joy. Egotism is completely broken up, and alienation from God is supplanted by love and filial trust. Self-complacency and pride are uprooted; humility is the prevailing disposition. Such is the conscious condition of the soul — a condition which, beginning with knowledge of the law, opens with

the consciousness of guilt; and being finished under the Gospel, through faith in it, there is added to the soul the experience of redemption from guilt, and it is restored again to the love of God.

Redemption from the bondage of its guilt is obtained through faith in the Son of God, especially his atoning work. It is maintained by the same means. When the soul falls into sin, first it confesses it; then, exercising faith in the cross of Christ, it regains its peace of mind. Whenever guilt would disquiet, the believer immediately turns his eyes to the Cross; and that which first gave peace has the power to maintain it. Thus peace of conscience is kept up, and the sinner continues to love and to trust in God as his Father. Here, then, we are properly at the beginning of a new life; a new creature is now formed; the Divine life is being developed in the soul; there will be a new form of life. "For if any man be in Christ Jesus, he is a new creature." This new Divine life begins then, properly, with the consciousness of redemption from guilt. The soul is now restored to a filial relation with respect to God, and enters upon a new career.

The Divine life is then a life of consciousness; and the soul that has entered into the experience of Christ's redemptive power has taken up its proper position in the historic development of the kingdom. This condition, as we have seen, is attained and retained by means of faith. So long as faith in Christ's work lasts, will the consciousness of redemption from guilt continue. Whenever guilt rises threateningly in the consciousness, the attention has only to be directed to the proper object of faith, that is, Christ's sacrifice — his flesh and blood, as given for the life of the world — and at once fear will disappear, and the soul will return to its state of rest and peace. The more familiarized the mind becomes with this process, the more steadily

will such a consciousness continue. By constant use, the object of faith passes over, and will finally enter into, the very constitution of the soul, will become a part of its nature; like blood, it will enter into the pneumatic circulation, becoming the life-blood of the soul — a fact in the consciousness. Thus the soul will, in its conscience movements, naturally pass from the one fact to the other — from guilt to that of the atonement. The one will become a fact in the consciousness as thoroughly as the other. And the consciousness of redemption, so far as guilt is concerned, will become a steady fact in the soul. It is to this that Christ refers when he says, "Whoso eateth my flesh and drinketh my blood, hath eternal life; for my flesh is meat indeed, and my blood is drink indeed." In this process the objective becomes the subjective. By faith Christ's flesh and blood passes into the soul, is transplanted into the consciousness, becomes a fact in the experience, is the life of the soul. The stronger the faith, the more vivid will be this consciousness. In the act of the Holy Communion it becomes most intensely vivid. Sometimes the consciousness of guilt comes heavily down; so much so as to repress for a time that of redemption; but just as soon as the attention can be re-directed to the Cross, let but faith continue, and at once the soul is revived, is relieved, and restored to its former equilibrium of peace and joy.

The Divine life springing out of the consciousness of redemption is entirely dependent upon faith. "The life which I now live," says St. Paul, "I live by the faith of the Son of God." It is attained and retained entirely by faith; in its exercise it is a state of consciousness; and it is sustained and fed by faith in Christ. His flesh, which he gave for the life of the world, is the bread which the soul by faith feeds upon; thus this state of consciousness is sustained.

Beginning life with this encouraging experience, the new creature finds itself unexpectedly encountered by another obstacle. Hitherto, sin had been almost exclusively felt and viewed under its aspect of guilt. The soul, in viewing it in the consciousness, had taken cognizance of it, not as a power, but rather as an act and a series of acts; and in this connection it was the guilt of sin which had fixed itself as a fact in the consciousness. But now, that the soul has been delivered from guilt as a condemning power, sin begins to appear under its other aspect, namely, as a law. And now, when the soul has fondly imagined that all was over, that it was free all at once, it finds itself sadly mistaken, and becomes conscious that, so far from being free, it is under a bondage. "It finds within a law that when it would do good, evil is present with it." It finds itself in the presence of, and in conflict with, sin as a principle and a power. Thus a new view of the Christian life begins to dawn upon the soul, and another fact becomes established in the Christian consciousness. The guilt of sin and the power of sin become now clearly separated; the demands of the former have been met and satisfied; those of the latter, which now make themselves felt, will, in due time, be satisfied also. The Christian life then opens with a conflict. Sin is a power tending downwards to death. The Divine life which now occupies the consciousness, is a tendency towards righteousness — communion with God and life. Two forces have then met in the soul. The Christian consciousness furnishes the arena in which the struggle is to take place. Let us see, then, how the powers residing in the Kingdom of Christ are administered in such a situation. The process which now is in course of development, is what is generally known as sanctification.

In order that the soul should be sustained and advanced

in the struggle with sin, it is, in the first place, necessary that it should be maintained in the consciousness of its justification. This is a necessary fundamental condition in order to the maintenance of the Divine life; without such an experience, the soul must continue depressed under the bondage of guilt, and therefore servilely afraid of God. Such a condition is inconsistent with the presence of the love of God in the heart, and of a filial trust and confidence in Him as a Father, which are essential elements of the Divine life. First, the soul must be delivered from this bondage of guilt and fear, and consciously reconciled to God. This experience is, as we have seen, obtained by receiving and feeding upon the flesh and blood of Christ; and thus it is retained; thus the love of God is maintained in the soul. Christ as the administrator of the powers of his kingdom, by his spirit applying the word, continues to feed the soul from day to day; he gives it its daily bread; and thus the consciousness of redemption is maintained as a fact in the soul. In the love of God and of Christ, the Divine, the Christian life begins; and during its whole progress this fundamental condition is more or less maintained; sometimes vivid, and again more faintly. Man has really no direct power over this condition, all that he can do is to put himself in contact with the object which excites it. Consciousness as a state is peculiarly the work of the Spirit. He breathes upon the soul, and at once, like letters written in invisible ink, when held before the fire, the facts of consciousness stand out clearly and legibly. Prayer is the only power which is available in the premises; it alone mediately can bring about the desired effect. Consciousness of guilt and of redemption are, therefore, peculiarly the work of a supernatural power — the Holy Spirit. Sometimes either of them, or both together, arise suddenly in the soul; but there are occasions — such as

that of meditation, and reading the Word, preaching, and times of affliction — which the Spirit uses particularly as peculiarly adapted to produce such effects. The law, as adapted to bring out the consciousness of guilt and sin, is the means generally used by the Spirit to bring about that effect. And while the soul meditates upon it and considers God and the end of the ungodly, the fire kindles, and a new state begins to arise in the soul. The Gospel, as adapted to bring out the consciousness of redemption, is the means which the Spirit uses to produce that effect. We in ourselves really have no power over such frames; they are the work of the Spirit. Thus, all life-long we are made to feel that of ourselves we are insufficient to help ourselves; that we are entirely dependent; that all our sufficiency is of God. Therefore we are essentially creatures of prayer: "men ought always to pray, and not to faint." Prayer is man's most precious prerogative, his most effectual weapon in the fight of faith. At times man will be left listless, lifeless, with nothing but that dogged faith which says, "Though He slay me, yet will I trust in Him." Then there is nothing left one but to pray and to wait; and even when we cannot pray, we can wait.

The fundamental element in the Christian consciousness is then the work of the Spirit, and is maintained by faith; maintained by feeding upon the flesh and blood of Christ by faith.

Consciousness of sin as a power is, too, the work of the Spirit. It is begun and maintained by infusing into the soul the law and spirit of Christ. The law of Christ, upon justification, becomes naturally the rule of the disciple's obedience; "If ye love me," He says, "keep my commandments." The example of Christ becomes the ideal of the disciple. His strongest desire is to be like Him. He imitates his master, obeys His laws, strives to attain

His spirit. All this is at first objective; gradually, however, in the effort, the objective passes over into the subjective. Gradually, in this life of obedience and imitation, the external becomes the internal; law becomes spirit; Christ is reproduced in the heart by faith. In this effort to conform to the will of Christ, man at once finds himself resolved into a duality; "to will is present with him, but how to perform that which is good, he finds not. For the good that I would, I do not; but the evil that I would not, that I do. Now if I do that I would not, it is no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me." Here, then, the soul becomes conscious of sin as a power acting in antagonism with its ruling desire. "I find then a law that when I would do good, evil is present with me. For I delight in the law of God, after the inward man; but I see another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin and death." Such is the state of things which the effort after conformity with the will of Christ develops in the consciousness. The true self, in its aspirations and desires, is impeded and held in check by the sinful principle, until at length galled under this bondage, wretched in the experience of its impotence, it cries out, "Oh wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" Such is the language and the feeling of the soul when once it has entered upon the struggle with sin. The same cry was forced from the soul when it experienced its burden of guilt; a pressing want was felt, and it was supplied. "The flesh and blood" of Christ, received by faith, supplied it. Here, too, there is a want; the soul feels its need of some one to give it power over sin; it feels its own impotence, and it cries out for assistance. Christ, in the Gospel, offers Himself, and the soul in faith depending on Him and on His strength, can say with St. Paul, "I can do all

things through Christ who strengtheneth me." Here then, as in the former case, Christ supplies a conscious want of the soul, and faith is the means through which the assistance comes. His atonement was received in the first case; here it is His Spirit. The soul leans directly upon Him, depends upon His strength, and thus overcomes.

In the struggle with sin, a duality, we have said, is developed in the consciousness, which becomes more and more evident the longer and the closer the struggle is waged. This duality, as will be seen, resides not in the personality, but in its conditions; in an antagonism which has been excited between the conscious life and that of self as instinctive and spontaneous; between the law of the pneumatic and of the psychical life; an antagonism beginning with the act of regeneration. And here, therefore, we are to find what is essentially the Divine life; and will see its gradual development. The soul being led through the experience of guilt to that of redemption, in the spirit of love to God and Christ and of filial trust, enters upon a new life. That life is one of obedience and conformity to Christ; this path is one of difficulty; it opens with conflict; a duality is developed: on the one hand, we find the new man; on the other, the old. The new man is the regenerate, the old man the body of sin. It is important that these two forces should be distinctly separated, so that we may clearly recognize them.

The *pneumatic* life exists as *consciousness;* uninterrupted consciousness is spiritual life in its highest form. The life of spontaneity is that of childhood. Self-consciousness is the development of a duality in the soul. First, there is the primary self, which feels, thinks, and acts immediately and instinctively; then there is the secondary self, parallel with the primary and conscious of it, as feeling, thinking, and acting. If this separation be complete; if the con-

sciousness of the secondary over the primary self be uninterrupted; in such case there is a complete duality developed within the soul, the object and the subject being both found in the unity of the personality. This duality does not, however, reside in the personality; the *self* that thinks, feels, and acts, that same self is conscious of itself as so doing. The duality is rather in the condition of the *self*. *Self*, in its primary condition, feels, thinks, and acts instinctively; such it is by nature. Just as a plant naturally puts forth leaves, buds, and bears fruit, so man naturally reasons, feels, and acts. Such, then, is the primary condition of human nature; these are its essential characteristics, which characterize and distinguish it from other forms of life. The secondary condition of human nature is, that it is conscious of itself, as feeling, thinking, and acting. Here, then, there is an advance; here we find one of the essential characteristics of pure spirit; here we rise to the *pneumatic* life. This self-consciousness is more or less interrupted in human nature. In the state of childhood, it scarcely can be said to exist; where it does, it is generally exceedingly inconstant; sometimes present, then for long periods absent; during its absence man falls back into the primary state of childhood. All the powers of human nature—sensitive, intellectual, and moral—may be in active operation, and yet man may be in the unconscious state. Such is the state of childhood; but as man gradually emerges from this state into that of manhood, self-consciousness becomes developed; first it is remittent, inconstant; gradually, through exercise, it becomes more constant and clearer.

Residing in this highest region of life, we can detect the movements of what was once man's actual condition, now in its feeble movements, just serving to remind us of what we might have been. At times, and even during periods

of every man's life — especially when the soul is quiet, and in a contemplative mood — there arise sad reflections within; dim forebodings darkly shroud the future. The soul is dissatisfied with itself, and the sad wails of hopeless aspirations swell like funeral dirges through the depths within. Desires for a better life become articulate, and sometimes grow so strong as to arrive at the maturity of a resolution. The soul is resolved to do better; it longs for a higher life; but then it feels its helplessness, remembers resolutions made before, and made only to be broken. Thus sadness and dissatisfaction settle down upon the soul, and it plunges into pleasure or excitement of some kind to stifle these cravings for a better, higher life; here, then, is a standing witness in the soul that man is born for something better than what he is. These last embers of the heavenly fire, bursting out now and then into a sudden gleam, illumine the gloomy depths of the soul, and then all becomes dark again; the fire is out, and all is cold and gloomy as before. There are many ways of stifling these aspirations; the life of worldliness or of absorbing business are among the most effectual. In the Moral life, too, this want is effectually stifled; the self-satisfaction which is thus engendered, wars against these higher aspirations, and extinguishes them. The moral and the religious are both forms of the pneumatic life, but both fall far short of actually realizing it. The religious goes farther than the moral; but both only betray, and in the end extinguish the aspirations of the higher life; both are forms of self-deception.

The fundamental characteristic of the Divine life is that it begins in the truth. Man is not in and of the truth until he becomes conscious of his guilt and of the bondage which he is under. So long as we think "we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us." We must, in the first place, open ourselves to the light of

God's truth. "Every one that doeth the truth, cometh to the light, that his deeds may be made manifest that they are wrought in God." Self-knowledge cannot be obtained until the soul honestly opens itself to the light of the truth, and then judges itself just as that truth does; until candidly it calls evil, evil, though it be attached to one's self. Unless we judge ourselves now, we must be judged hereafter. Self-condemnation is the beginning of truth in the soul. Naturally, we would justify ourselves, and deceive ourselves; but truth requires that all this be done away with; that we be true to ourselves, even though it cost us the mortification of the damned. Egotism itself, and in all its forms, is a lie. Man is not self-sufficient, is not independent, is not sinless and guiltless; it is all a lie. Egotism is this in its very essence. And the moral life and the religious, failing to recognize the truth, they too are lies, the whole thing is a falsehood. Man must go back to the very beginning, and begin with recognizing the truth, by beating upon his breast, and crying out, "God be merciful to me a sinner;" and again, "Who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" Behold the two cases, the Publican and the Pharisee; behold the truth and a lie. The Pharisee was a moral man; more, a religious one; but also he was an incarnate falsehood; the Publican is the truth, both in and of it. The Divine life has its foundation, then, in truth. The soul ceases to deceive itself by a moral or a religious life, but recognizes what in truth it really is, and what it deserves. Here faith comes in, and upon Christ, as presented in the gospel, lays hold, and appropriates Him; appropriates His flesh and blood for the healing of a wounded conscience; His strength or spirit it rests upon as a means of escape from the bondage of sin. This recognition of the truth of one's condition makes the Divine life, a life of faith, possible. Until this takes place, man will inevitably depend upon himself for salvation.

The life of faith, which is the subjective condition of the Divine life, is, dependence upon another; upon Christ as presented in the gospel for justification and for sanctification. With this life of faith or implicit reliance upon Christ, there begins a new epoch in the human life. Thus, desires and aspirations which formerly could scarcely attain to the maturity of a fluctuating resolution, which was never kept, now become ruling principles. The *pneumatic* life becomes invigorated, and the determination to do the will of Christ, and to contend against sin, becomes the permanent attitude of the soul. It is in this region of the soul, the renewed pneumatic life, that Christ or the Spirit takes up His abode. He resides not in the lower forms of life, but in this highest, the pneumatic, the conscious life. Redemption takes hold of this principle: this is the only point of contact which it can find in fallen human nature. In fallen angels it is not present; it is what makes human redemption possible. Laying hold of these faint expiring aspirations, the Spirit of life revives and strengthens them; he makes them to become influences, the standing resolution of the soul. Here, then, we find the *germ* of the new creation, the new man; and in this region of life he is complete, perfect: here sanctification begins; from hence the law of a new life is to issue, and gradually to extend its influence until it has brought the whole soul and body under subjection, in obedience to Christ. Man, however, in the consciousness of his weakness, relies not upon anything within him, but upon the objective Christ, His work and His spirit. Thus man lives upon what is without, and is sanctified by the effectual working of the Spirit within.

Consciousness is, essentially, duality. The condition in which man finds himself primarily, is one of discord. Every one must sometimes feel "the good that I would,

I do not, and the evil that I would not, that I do." There is, then, an antagonism existing between the forces within. In the primal state this duality is not very distinct; and, moreover, the natural inclinations, as a general rule, override the dictates of the higher life. Sin has dominion; and though sometimes restrained, yet eventually it reigns supreme, beating down all opposition. But in regeneration this state of affairs is reversed; sin has not the dominion. A deadly struggle has begun, and the sinful habits and desires are now squarely met by the power residing in the higher life; and, therefore, there is war within, a conflict that will continue as long as life lasts. Now the law of the Spirit of life has made the soul free from the law of sin and death; and, therefore, though there is a struggle, yet in general the Spirit is victorious; and thus a tone is given to the life. Habit after habit is assailed, fiercely grappled with, and quivering in the death gripe of the Spirit, is hurled to the ground and fiercely trampled under foot. "I hold under my body," says St. Paul, "and bring it into subjection." It is a deadly struggle, no quarter given on either side.

So complete is the constitution in which the sinful tendencies reside, that it can be regarded as an organism. They resolve themselves into two distinct classes: the affections and lusts of the body, and of the mind; all the forms of sensuality, the appetites and passions, fall under the first; all the spiritual affections and desires, such as ambition, pride, desire of revenge, covetousness, all these fall under the second class. Mankind, as a class, is, if anything, more under the dominion of his bodily lusts than of his spiritual. Lust in all its forms, especially the sexual, has always proved the leading element in human degradation. Intemperance, unchastity, and lasciviousness rapidly drag human nature down into the abyss. Such is the process

of human degradation, according to St. Paul in the first chapter of Romans. Seeing, then, that these lusts are especially predominant, it is natural that human depravity should be designated with an especial reference to them. Thus the whole organism of sin is generally designated as the flesh, because it is the "fleshly lusts" that generally predominate, and that war most effectually against the soul; not that the other class of lusts do not exist: the lusts of the mind work, too, powerfully in human nature, manifesting themselves disastrously in the individual life and in the history of the race. But it is all the forms of fornication, intemperance, and uncleanness, that exist most generally in human nature, and drag it down most rapidly into the abyss. It is with all these tendencies that the higher consciousness established in regeneration comes into immediate conflict. In that region of life the law of God reigns, in it dwells the Holy Spirit. The law of the Spirit of life directs its tendencies. The Holy Spirit, be it noted, dwells not in the flesh, but in man's πνευμα or spirit. The human consciousness has become the organ of the Holy Spirit. All that is holy in man is found here. Here is to be found the delighting in the law of God, the desire and inclination towards holiness; here is to be found that gravitation towards God and His will, that whenever the consciousness is alive, makes itself felt in opposition to the desires of the flesh. Here, then, we find another complete organism — a new man which is created in his outlines after the image of Christ. A faint, indistinct, fitful one, perhaps, at first; but still an image and reproduction of Christ. Here is the place we are to look in order to find the fulfilment of the promises of Christ as to His dwelling in the heart, His communion with the soul, His coming in and supping with us. Christ dwells not in the flesh, but in the human *spirit*, and as it is regenerate. The promises

of Christ are as really fulfilled in the matter of sanctification as in that of justification. "For this is the covenant that I will make with the house of Israel after those days, saith the Lord: I will put my laws into their minds, and write them in their hearts." This has actually been done; in the new man we have the fulfilment of the promise evidently before us. Its tendency is towards holiness; it cannot sin, just as the old man cannot be holy: it is essentially sinless; in it the Spirit has become the law of man's life, and he cannot sin but by quenching this life. To increase in this life, man must cultivate self-consciousness, and must yield himself to the spirit, must walk in the spirit; that is, must walk in the direction of the tendency of his self-consciousness; and he will not fulfil the lusts of the flesh. On the other hand, in order to weaken the power of the flesh, he must mortify it; and to this end must deprive the sinful affections and lusts of their food; by starving them they become weak, hence the meaning of fasting. By this means the sinful desires are deprived of their food; they are never indulged, and thus they become weakened, and gradually deadened. But they do not become dead; for let temptation, which is an opportunity for their indulgence, but arise, and at once at any period of life they will make themselves felt again. Thus it will become evident that they are not dead, but only kept under. And man, knowing his weakness, must be vigilant, and avoid all occasions of temptation as much as possible. "Let him that thinketh he standeth, take heed lest he fall." Thus the sinful body is kept under; it is a painful operation, especially at first, when the lusts are strong, and therefore it is called crucifixion: it is a lingering death, too, and so doubly hard to be endured. In the Christian life, then, we have, on the one hand, mortification of the members of the body of sin; and on the other,

a walking in the Spirit, and an increase in its fruits. The body of sin is not sanctified, it is crucified; and this painful death will not end until, as Luther vividly remarks, "shovel strokes be fetched upon it." But though the body of sin, the flesh, is not sanctified, the body is. There is a struggle between the flesh and the spirit for the body; and by body, we mean not only the human form, but all the human faculties: there is a struggle for this prize, an effort to rescue the body, with all its members, from the service of unrighteousness, and "to bring them into captivity with every thought to the obedience of Christ." Gradually all the human faculties become the servants of the Spirit; the mental faculties, yielded to the service of God, become *charismata;* the physical members are used to glorify God, and to advance his kingdom; thus the mouth, from blaspheming, becomes the organ by which is preached the unspeakable riches of Christ; the knees are now bent in heartfelt prayer; the hands are busy in advancing the interests of Christ's kingdom; the whole body and soul becomes sanctified, and is daily offered as a living sacrifice to God, holy and acceptable. So sanctification extends from spirit through soul and body, until the whole man is brought to the obedience of Christ. Thus we have finally an image and reproduction of Christ; a man of faith, whose whole soul and body is dedicated to God, whose meat and drink is to do his Father's and his Saviour's will. And yet all this while, the flesh still exists; all its organism is complete, it is but kept under; hence, the necessity for caution and unceasing vigilance in the Christian life. And the Christian, knowing this state of things, is a man of prayer; and of faith; he stands in the strength of Christ, being clothed with the panoply supplied by God. The life of sanctification, or the Divine life in this relation, just like that of justification, is maintained by faith. In the

one the soul lives upon the dead Christ, upon his flesh and blood, as offered for the life of the world; in the other, upon the living Christ. "Being reconciled by His death, we are saved through His life." "The life which I now live, I live by the faith of the Son of God, who loved me, and gave himself for me," says St. Paul.

In the Kingdom of Christ, then, we find that the grace of sanctification is as effectually administered as is that of the forgiveness of sins. Christ Himself, through His Spirit and word, administers both; and they both make themselves to be felt and recognized in the human consciousness. Forgiveness of sins as administered by Christ becomes, in the human consciousness, peace with God, and forms the basis of a filial love and trust. Regeneration and sanctification as administered by Christ become, in the human consciousness, the conscious experience of an upward tendency toward God. The soul becomes conscious that it has been transformed; that another power, the Divine Spirit, has taken possession of it; that the law of its being has been changed; that the will of God is now its greatest delight, the object of its strongest love and desire. The soul becomes conscious that God is its all in all; that His will is its will: thus the power of Christ is as sensibly felt in sanctification as in justification. The one is as much a subject of consciousness as the other: thus "the Spirit beareth witness with our spirits that we are the sons of God." This soul is conscious of Christ's presence within it, and "works out its own salvation with fear and trembling," conscious that "it is God that worketh in it both to will and to do." Conscious of the inward presence of Omnipotence, pledged to its sanctification, it feels that it can do all things through Christ who strengthens it. Omnipotence can accomplish anything; faith in Him who is omnipotent can do wonders; by it miracles were wrought;

and by it sanctification too, the greatest of moral miracles, is wrought in the soul. Abraham believed in God, as in Him who was able to raise the dead; and by faith hoped against hope. Human sanctification requires the exercise of the same faith — it is the resurrection of the soul. Christ tells us "the hour is coming, now is, when the dead shall hear the voice of the Son of Man, and they that hear shall live." This resurrection is now proceeding, and in him who believes in Christ as the quickener of dead souls it takes place. "I am the resurrection and the life, saith the Lord; he that believeth on me, though he were dead, yet shall he live." All depends on faith. The Divine life is thus engendered and sustained, like forgiveness of sins, by faith in the Son of God. In the one case the flesh and blood of Christ is the food taken; in the other, it is that Spirit which He Himself promised to send, and which was to be in the soul as a well of water springing up unto everlasting life.

Finally, the Divine life is not like the moral and the religious realized in this world. Its expectation is far ahead of its present actuality. At present it is hidden with Christ in God. It is true that "now are we the sons of God: but this doth not yet appear as it shall at the manifestation of the sons of God." The life is as yet confined to the individual consciousness; and here in this world, what with the struggle with the body of sin in the effort to wrest the members and faculties of soul and body from the service of sin, and to make them the servants of righteousness unto holiness; and what with the struggle with the powers of the world and Satan, — there arises nothing but conflict and disappointment. The leading of the Divine Spirit is by no means satisfactorily realized in the general life. The spirit, man's pneumatic personality, is holy; but not as yet is the body and soul, nor ever will be as long as the

body of sin remains. The body must die because of sin, though the spirit be alive through its inherent new created state of righteousness. Thus it happens that there is a want of correspondence between the spiritual or the Divine life in regenerate man, and the actual life as realized. His whole soul and body is not as yet sanctified, brought completely to the obedience of Christ. Thus the Spirit is in travail; it fills the soul with "groanings that cannot be uttered, and of this we are conscious." Ourselves, which "have the first-fruits of the Spirit, groan within ourselves, waiting for the adoption, to wit, the redemption of the body." Then, and not until then, will the Divine life be realized, and therefore it is that we live "in hope." We through the Spirit wait for the hope of righteousness by faith, and as yet are saved only in hope. The Christian consciousness contains in it conspicuously these three elements: righteousness, peace, and joy in the conscious indwelling of the Holy Ghost. All these are His work, and maintained by faith in the Son of God. Such, in brief, is an outline of the Divine life. It begins, strictly speaking, with the experience of Redemption from guilt. It retains this experience all along. It ends and is realized in glory in the other world, where sin and sorrow are known no more. "Beloved, now," consciously, "are we the sons of God, and it doth not yet appear what we shall be; but we know that when He shall appear we shall be like Him, for we shall see Him as He is."

PART III.

THE INSTRUMENTALITY.

CHAPTER I.

THE HOLY SCRIPTURES.

THE Scriptures are the Word of God; Nature is His work. "All Scripture is given by inspiration of God, and is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness." The Scriptures can be considered under two relations: first, in relation to the individual, and then with relation to the race. Man can be viewed individually or collectively. As a collective mass, the whole race may be viewed and considered as one individual; and it is to man viewed as such that we will at present direct our attention. The Scriptures, as a whole, stand in a certain relation to man as a collective individual. They propose to enlighten, convert, instruct, and discipline him, so as to raise him to a higher and better order of existence than the one he now occupies. Considered under this aspect, the Scriptures fall at once into two divisions, or into dispensations: the preparatory and the final — the law and the Gospel. This division holds good in the individual as well as in the race. The two are not historically separable; they are developed side by side. The distinction between them in their historic development, is, that under the preparatory dispensation, law was the most prominent feature, the whole system being one of restraint and prohibition, a strictly disciplinary system. Under the final dispensation, all this is reversed, and spirit is substituted for letter. The grand object of the preparatory dispensation was to create a conscious spiritual want in human nature; to bring man in some way to a consciousness of his sinfulness and guilt, of his weakness, and inabil-

ity of himself to deliver himself; and to prepare him for the great Deliverer. The final dispensation satisfies all these wants, and ends in glorifying man, in body as well as soul, and elevating him, after this life, to a full communion with God.

The preparatory dispensation falls again into two divisions or systems. The grand object being to create a conscious spiritual want, this is effected first through the discipline of misery, or, secondly, through the discipline of a pious education; and this brings us to the religious division of the human race into Jew and Gentile. The Scriptures confine themselves, historically and doctrinally, after the calling of Abraham, exclusively to the Jews. This nation being taken by God into a peculiar relation with respect to himself, thenceforth they are exclusively his pupils, they are made the subjects of a careful religious education conducted by God himself; to them are committed the oracles of God, a gradually accumulating deposit of Divine truth, which in due time is to be opened to the Gentiles.

The religious history of the world divides the race into two sections, Heathenism and Judaism. Heathenism was cut loose with but one revealed fact; the promise of a Redeemer, ratified and symbolized by sacrifice. It forgot the promise, retained the institution, but lost its meaning. Heathenism, then, in its religious history, is not a development or progress, but a retrogradation, a lapse from the worship of the true God; in its finality a worship of devils; in this process human nature enters upon a degradation.

Judaism is a progress; first, promise and sacrifice is retained with a knowledge of the true God; meaning of promise is gradually unfolded; sacrifice is gradually interpreted; all along the faith of the believer attaches itself to God and this promise; he feeds upon the promise; thus

hope is maintained, and love to God kept up. Without such a promise man could not know of God's merciful disposition, and under a sense of guilt would be afraid of Him. All along, therefore, Revelation was to man the means of maintaining the Divine life in the soul.

Truth coming through inspiration is revelation. The prophet through whom the revelation is originally made, speaking out of the depths of his consciousness, and under the conscious inspiration of the spirit, knows that what he declares is from God, and is the truth. Those who originally received the revealed truth, do so for two reasons: because they are confident, through the proper credentials, of the inspiration of the prophet; and, moreover, because, in the case of a large body of spiritual truth, they themselves being spiritual, recognize the truth of what is declared. The truth that Paul declared under inspiration, the consciousness of Peter and James responded to; they knew in themselves that he spoke the truth; that he spoke in the spirit, and uttered God's truth. The inspired one is thus but the interpreter of the consciousness of the spiritual. Hence, all that are spiritual, says St. Paul, are capable, more or less, of passing judgment upon the revelation.

Doctrinal truth comes to us as a historic deposit, and must always be thus delivered to the succeeding generations. We have the same criteria by which to judge of the truth as in former days. We, in the first place, decide whether he who professes to utter inspired truth is properly accredited. This evidence goes to strengthen personal authority; and such, in the main, was the object of miracles. But this argument must ever be more convincing to those who are immediate witnesses of such wonders. To us, who are so far off from them, they do not appear so convincing, and especially is this the case when one lives, as we happen to, in a skeptical age. The strength of miracles, as an accrediting in-

strumentality, is, therefore, not the most to be relied upon ; nor did Christ, when he was upon earth, ever rely most upon them. His Apostles appeal to His resurrection ; but even in this case we must remember that they were, as it were, within sight of that great event. Christ's miracles were rather of the nature of signs; they pointed to man's spiritual condition, and to Himself as the physician who could heal man of his blindness, and lameness, and deafness, and deadness. He appealed to a carnal generation by His works ; but to a spiritual, He appeals and manifests His truth in His words and His self-manifestation. "If I do not the works of my Father, believe me not. But if I do, though ye believe not me, believe the works." In judging then of spiritual doctrines and truth, as we now have it, the stress is not to be laid so much on personal authority, but rather on the truth itself; it of itself commends itself to man's conscience as a manifestation of the truth. The argument which is most convincing as to the Divine nature of Christianity, is Christianity itself. Christ, by the spiritual, must be recognized as God. His flesh and blood, as offered for the life of the world, is to the broken and contrite heart food and drink indeed, "as rivers of water in dry places," "as the shadow of a great rock in a weary land." It is useless to try and prove to a carnal mind the necessity for an atonement; without the consciousness of guilt in the soul, it will all be in vain, and the doctrine will only be a subject for cavil. But let guilt once take possession of the soul, and then all will be changed. Give the soul in such a condition but faith, and with avidity it will take and eat that body, and drink that blood, and will be refreshed and thankful; it will feed on Him in its heart by faith with thanksgiving. Thus will this doctrine be recognized as Divine, and every line uttered by St. Paul will strike home

to the heart. The strongest argument for the truth of these doctrines is to be found in the experience. The consciousness of the spiritual is one's best evidence of things unseen, and having the experience of some of the truths of revelation, one is ready to receive them all, even though they may not be experienced nor comprehended in their depths. And here the weight of personal authority comes in. Having experienced the power of some of the doctrines of revelation, we naturally conclude that there is a power in all which emanate from the same source. The Jews require a sign, and the Greeks seek after wisdom; but "we preach," says the Apostle, "Christ crucified; to the Jews a stumbling-block, and to the Greeks foolishness; but to them which are *called*, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God." The Jews represent one class of men — the carnal, who are impressed only by visible signs, who require a miracle before they will believe. Such men must rely exclusively upon personal authority in the reception of a doctrine. Such were the Jews; such is the Roman Catholic theory, which is able to take an infallible man-pope, as its source of truth. The Greeks, however, must needs have wisdom, a philosophy, a connected philosophic system. Spiritual truth must, to such, be a science. And such there are at this day — those, for instance, who would have us to account for the atonement on philosophic principles, before they will receive it as of God's truth; such is the whole school of Rationalists. But to them who are called, who are in the proper spiritual condition, broken and contrite in heart, heavy-laden with guilt, waiting for redemption; to such humble ones Christ crucified is consciously the power of God, and to them the evident wisdom of God. Christianity, for its reception, depends on the state of the heart; only those who are *called* can really ever be convinced of

its truth. "No man can say that Christ is the Lord except by the Holy Spirit."

The providence of God, as exhibited in Biblical history, in its broadest aspect, is but a gigantic scheme for the religious education of humanity. The race, as we have said, falls into two divisions, Jew and Gentile. There was an educational system being worked out in both of these divisions. Cut loose from the sources of light, and soon losing the little that it had at first; the Gentile world was cast adrift, apparently by God, to work out its own destiny. And yet this was only apparently so, for all the while God was guiding the ship, and conducting it to the final haven. There were plans of mercy in store for the Gentiles, and we who now write, and you who now read, are a fulfilment of them. The system adopted in the case of the Gentile world was to let them alone, to let them try the experiment of working out their own salvation. As might have been expected, they failed; and so God's plan succeeded. God allowed the Gentiles to try what they could do to improve themselves. He let them try their own strength and wisdom, in order that experience might make them wiser and humbler. Striking out wildly, in the effort to know God, relying upon their own wisdom, the result was idolatry. Downward was the tendency of the age. Speculative error fostered moral depravity; and finally, steeped in misery, sunk in hopeless darkness and degradation, the Gentile world awakes to the misery of its situation. It has proved the vanity of its wisdom, the weakness of its strength; it comes to itself, is humbled, and ready and willing to lay hold upon the hope offered in the gospel. Here, then, is the "fulness of times" for the Gentile world. It is ready (made so by a stern course of discipline, by a self-made misery) for the Redeemer, and, therefore, it was that the preaching of Christ and of Him cruci-

fied proved so powerful, and was so successful. The Gentiles had practically proved the vanity of all human wisdom, and could appreciate the "foolishness of preaching." They had learned the misery of sin, and were only too anxious to be delivered from it. Thus it was that the preaching of a crucified Redeemer was hailed with such ecstasy throughout the Gentile world.

The religious education of the Gentile world consisted, then, in this: Through the actual experience of the misery of sin, they were humbled and brought into a state of penitence; being thus humbled, miserable, and confessedly helpless, they were prepared to welcome the preaching of a Divine Redeemer. Philosophy! How long did those poor ancients fondly imagine that by it they could emancipate human nature. One after another system was tried and found a failure. Socrates, noblest of the ancients, he too fondly imagined that his philosophy would redeem mankind; but it, too, failed; until men finally fell back upon the infidelity of Epicureanism, thus confessing that there was no possible means of escape. Stoicism was indeed a noble protest against vice, and a gallant attempt to meet and foil the powers of darkness. But it was too strong for man, few wills could carry out its doctrines. It could never be generally applied. It was, in fact, a *petitio principii*, taking it for granted that man was stronger than sin and Satan; requiring the weak to be strong, whereas this is exactly the difficulty. And this is the bottom fallacy of all human philosophies, considered as means of salvation. They require, but do not give; require morality, but give no strength wherewith to perform it. It is easy enough to know the good; but how to perform, here lies the difficulty which the poet Ovid sees, when he says, "*video melioria, proboque deteriora sequor.*" And again, Epictetus, "He who errs, does not what he would, but

does what he would not." Any form of philosophy which fails to give this power of performing is useless, and cannot deliver man from sin. Such, too, is the nature of all the forms of religion now prevalent, outside of Christendom. They differ from the ancient philosophies in that in them there is added a theology; but to know of God without something further is not enough, and does nothing for man. Confucius, for instance, the great Chinese teacher of morals and of etiquette, teaches a great deal of truth; but does he make the morals of his countrymen any better? He teaches the moral law, but he adds nothing to human nature; he takes away none of its innate depravity and love of sin. So with Brahminism, Buddhism, Mohammedanism, and all other forms of heathenism. Though they may have increased the human stock of theology, and enlarged the moral code, yet none of them can deliver man from going down into the pit. All of them can but subserve the same end that ancient polytheism did, namely, prove the vanity of all human efforts towards salvation; they are in the end in themselves impotent; must bring man into such a state of misery and degradation that he will "come to himself," realize his desperate condition, and, like the Western world at the time of the coming of Christ, be eagerly anxious for the advent of a Redeemer. To every people there is an appointed "fulness of times" which will most inevitably come. The education of the Western world has to be repeated in each of these cases. The Hindoo, the Chinese, the Persian, the Mohammedan, the African, the whole heathen world has yet to be brought to a sense of its degradation, and of the vanity of its wisdom, before it will be ready for the Gospel of Christ. For many of these nations the "fulness of times" has not yet come. Still they hold on tenaciously to their ancient forms, trusting in them to deliver them; their eyes are evidently not

yet opened to the insufficiency of such means for salvation. The process of humbling through experience of the misery of sin, of making man teachable through experience of the vanity of his own wisdom — this process, as a system of religious education, has in turn to be applied to every portion of the Gentile world. And not alone to them; but also, as St. Paul tells us, to the Jewish section. They, too, now in these last times have, like the Gentiles, been concluded in unbelief that He might have mercy upon all.

According to the Scriptures, positive religious instruction, up to the time of the calling of the Gentiles, was exclusively confined to the Jews. The ultimate end of this religious instruction and discipline was the same as in the case of the Gentiles, only that end was approached from an opposite direction: the end in both cases being to demonstrate to man that he cannot deliver himself, to humble him, and to make him look out of himself to God for salvation. The Gentiles, as we have seen, were brought historically to this condition by being allowed to plunge themselves into the abyss of ignorance and sin. It was actual misery that brought them to the knowledge of sin. The method in the case of the Jewish section of mankind is different. They are more and more enlightened as to the nature and character of the true God. The moral law is revealed to them so that they are amply informed as to their duty towards God and towards man. By these means, and by various other providential arrangements, the Jews were kept, with difficulty it must be confessed, from plunging into that abyss of darkness and vice in which all the heathen nations around them were swallowed up. The chief subject of instruction under the Jewish dispensation was the nature and character of God, and the feature in the Divine character most dwelt upon was his holiness. That "He was of purer eyes than to behold iniquity, that he

could not look upon evil." That in this respect, in relation to evil, He is "a consuming fire." This point was most expressly taught and developed under the Mosaic ceremonial ritual; at the same time the tender aspects of the Divine character were expressly inculcated. Jehovah was a God, "long-suffering and of great mercy," "who repenteth Him of the evil." And these seemingly opposite aspects of the Divine character were brought into contact with each other, and yet reconciled, in the forgiveness of sins through sacrifice. The Mosaic ritual expressly taught that, "without shedding of blood there is no remission of sin." Thus, while God forgave, He at the same time in the sacrificial death of the substituted victim, clearly intimated that justice must be vindicated. Thus the Jew was taught that God was at the same time holy, just, and good, and that although he forgave, yet it was only through the shedding of blood. On the one side, then, under this system, we have the holiness, justice, and mercy of God, and a lofty moral standard as to the rule of duty; on the other, poor, weak, sinful man. The holiness and strictness of God's law meant to bring out this contrast, and to make the Jew conscious of his true condition as a sinful man. He was to be humbled, made conscious of his insufficiency and of his guilt by contrast with those sublime objects of faith which were presented before him. He was to be humbled by the very inaccessibility of the height of holiness required of him. The law and the character of God, as revealed under the Jewish dispensation, has, as its spiritual object, the bringing man to the knowledge and consciousness of sin, both in its guilt and power; to bring what is hidden to light, that is before the consciousness, and thus to make the sinner of a broken and contrite heart, and one longing for Redemption.

And here another feature in the Jewish economy is to be

noticed, namely, "the promise." This promise, the Scriptures inform us, was given to our first parents; it belongs, therefore, to the whole family of man. In it, in brief, God promises to send a deliverer, who is to deliver man from that state of misery into which sin has plunged him. This promise is the very core of revelation. It lies in the centre of the Jewish dispensation; and it was the office of prophecy to unfold and develop its meaning.

In order that the blessings of this promise should be administered, a certain previous spiritual condition is required. The promise relates exclusively to spiritual subjects, to sin, the fundamental cause of man's miserable condition. The state of sin is felt chiefly in guilt, and in sin as a power; the consequences which it entails are death, subjection to the power of Satan, and, in general, all the misery that man is heir to. The Redeemer is then to deliver man from sin in its guilt and power; to ransom him from the power of Satan; to check the entailed consequence of death and endless misery. To appreciate such a deliverance, man must in the first place become conscious of his situation, must feel his guilt, must be galled by his bondage to sin. Until the soul is brought into this condition, the promise will not be appreciated. How this was effected in the Gentile world we have seen. The Jewish dispensation aimed at producing the same result. By the law, St. Paul says, is the knowledge of sin. The honest mind in the presence of the Holy Jehovah and under the strict moral law, was necessarily reduced to an humble spiritual condition. The soul could not but feel that in many things it offended, and that the immaculate spotlessness required by the law in order to righteousness before God was an impossibility. Therefore it must conclude that "by the deeds of the law, no man living can be justified." Thus attention was directed to the promise, faith

fastened upon it; hope found its anchor in the promised Redeemer. And thus justification by faith was a fact under the Old Testament, as thoroughly as under the New, and thus St. Paul argues in "Galatians" and "Romans."

The blessings offered in the promise being possible only to those who were in this humbled and consciously spiritually needy condition, any use of the then present system which prevented the presence of such a condition was out of harmony with the spirit of the dispensation. To adopt the law and the ritual as a means of obtaining justification before God, is to misunderstand the whole dispensation. The Jewish government was a theocracy; transgression of the civil law was an offence against God. God extended pardon to many classes of such offences through the rite of sacrifice. The day of atonement purged the whole nation from such offences, and withheld punishment which had been deserved. The guilt, then, which was purged under the ritual, was not moral — that which rests in the conscience — but civil. Thus it was indicated "that without shedding of blood there is no remission," and inasmuch as by such sacrifices something was really effected, civil guilt being in reality purged; it was thus declared that the ultimate sacrifice, of which these were only shadows and types, would, too, really effect something, only it would be a higher thing, namely, the purging of the conscience from dead works, or the taking away of moral guilt. Now, to take the moral law in its letter as the rule of duty, and the ritual as a means of attaining justification before God, would exactly defeat what the law, as a dispensation, intended to effect, namely, to bring man to a consciousness of his sinfulness and guilt. This is, however, exactly what the Jews did. Like the young ruler, the pious Jew could say of the commandments, "all these have I kept from my youth up, even until now; what lack

I yet?" But if there had been a law given which could have given life, "verily righteousness should have been by the law." But it never was intended to be thus attained. The law was ever but "a schoolmaster," to lead the individual to the promise, and historically as a dispensation, to lead the nation up to Christ manifest in the flesh. It was the preparatory dispensation intended to educate the whole people, as a mass, up to the consciousness of sin, and so having created a want in the human consciousness to prepare it for the dispensation of a supply. Here, then, the educational process has arrived at the same point in the Jewish as in the Gentile world. A sense of want has been developed in the soul. The process, though differently conducted in the two cases, has in the end brought the soul to practically the same condition. Such is the theory and the meaning of the Jewish dispensation. Although apparently in the end, it seems to have failed in realizing it. The time came when, historically, the system had reached its full development; but the subjects to whom it properly applied, as a nation, failed to profit by it.

Alongside of this system for the development of the individual moral consciousness, we find a parallel development of the meaning of the promise. Gradually the nature of that which was promised is brought to light, and under clearer figures, the nature and work of the coming Redeemer is indicated; so that while on the one hand the subjective consciousness is developed, on the other hand the objective to which faith attaches itself, is also more clearly defined. There were those at the coming of Christ actually waiting for the blessing promised Abraham. There were those whose condition was in exact harmony with their position in the historic development of this divine system of education; whose subjective state was that of those who longed for deliverance; whose faith, well in-

formed, knew that the Redeemer was already at hand; whose hearts, therefore, beat wildly when that cry of the Baptist was heard in the wilderness, saying, "Repent ye, for the Kingdom of Heaven is at hand." Such men were in harmony with the dispensation under which they were living, and naturally passed out of Judaism into Christianity. In fact, they were always Christians, inasmuch as their faith had always fastened itself, not upon the righteousness of the law, but upon the Gospel promise. With such Jews the preparatory education had proved a success; they were prepared for the ensuing dispensation. But with the mass of the Jewish people the case was otherwise. The Scribes and Pharisees had so long taught that righteousness came by the law; that punctilious performance of moral and ceremonial duties justified; that thus, finally, Judaism was generally understood. They had so long interpreted the promise as referring to temporalities, regarding the Redeemer as a conquering hero; so long had religion been considered as consisting in formalism and moderate morality; so long had religion been thus taught and received, that they were utterly incapable of taking any other view of the subject — were sealed up in unbelief; therefore they cast out the true spiritual teacher and Redeemer when He came, and slew Him. Thus the time had arrived when they themselves must be cast out; to be treated as the Gentiles had hitherto been; cut loose from the covenant, and cast out to depend on their own resources, in working out their own salvation. God cut them loose from Himself, and has for a time cast them adrift upon the wild sea of unbelief. "He has concluded them all in unbelief that in the end He might have mercy upon all."

The educational system as applied to this favored people has now changed. They are not utterly cast off, as St. Paul tells us; but having failed to profit by their own, and

to enter into the present system, they have, as a punishment, been thrown back upon themselves, that finally, like the Gentiles, they may learn that salvation is not of man, but of God. They have been broken off because of unbelief, and they, "if they abide not still in unbelief," says the same apostle, "shall be graffed in again." "For I would not, brethren, that ye be ignorant of this mystery, lest ye be wise in your own conceits, that blindness in part is happened to Israel until the fulness of the Gentiles be come in."

God's system of religious education, as applied, works thus: He leaves men to themselves until, plunged in darkness and misery, they cry out for deliverance. Then the time has come, the Gospel is published, and "as many as are ordained to eternal life believe," and are saved. As applied to the Jews, they were instructed in theology, and were supplied with instruction and a discipline adapted to bring them into that experience peculiar to the members of the kingdom. Some all along profited by this discipline, and partook of the blessings of the promise; others all along mistook the object of this discipline, and sought justification by the works of the law. Finally, when this preparatory dispensation had come to an end, the nation, misunderstanding it, in unbelief, held to it as the way of obtaining righteousness before God. "They had a zeal of God, but not according to knowledge; for they, being ignorant of God's righteousness, and going about to establish their own righteousness, have not submitted themselves to the righteousness which is of God. For Christ is the end of the law for righteousness to every one that believeth." Thus the Jew has fallen back upon the Gentile system, that through it they may finally, as a people, be brought up to accept the righteousness of faith. What may be in store for this race before they are brought to this, who can tell?

Absolute infidelity most probably is the destiny in store for them. This probably is the form which sin will assume in a people placed in such circumstances. At any rate, they are not cut off finally, but, like all the Gentiles without the covenant, must for the present depend upon themselves. God is determined that they shall learn a lesson and be humbled; to do them good in the latter end, and so, finally, all Israel shall be saved.

The Christian Church now occupies the position which the Jewish Church once did, and, like that body, is liable to misunderstanding its position, and the meaning of the dispensation under which it is placed. The Jewish Church, misunderstanding the end of the law, used it in its moral and ceremonial aspects, for the purpose of obtaining righteousness before God. They thought that, by a punctilious observance of all its statutes and ordinances, they attained a complete righteousness, and were then accepted of God. Thus the young ruler, thus St. Paul before his conversion, and the Scribes and Pharisees generally, believed and acted. The Christian Church can make the same mistake. It can take the moral law as propounded by Christ, and the ceremonial, as established by Him and His disciples, and make them its righteousness; can so misunderstand the Christian dispensation, that it may conceive that morality and formalism is true righteousness, and renders man acceptable before God. And this is exactly what a great portion of the Christian Church actually does; one vast section of it, the Roman Catholic, has already actually done this. Another, regarding Christ as a mere teacher of morals, lays it down as truth that morality is Christianity; here we have Unitarianism and Socinianism. Another section adds to morality a ritual, — Baptism and the Lord's Supper taking the place of sacrifice under the old Covenant; this gives us ritualism and its milder form, formalism, which correspond on the

one hand with Romanism, and the other with Phariseeism, its Jewish ancestor. The ritualistic moralist, just as the Pharisees of old, imagines that he is clothed with righteousness, and that he is justified by these works of his; both totally misunderstand the economy under which they are placed; they forget that it is written, an eternal truth for man, that "the just shall live by faith." Thus it is clearly possible that the Christian Church that now is, like the Jewish that was, may through unbelief fall from its covenant position, and back upon its old Gentile, or perhaps upon the present Jewish position; hence the warning of St. Paul. "They," he says, the Jews, "were broken off because of unbelief," "and thou that standest by faith be not high-minded, but fear. For if God spared not the natural branches, take heed lest He spare not thee."

In the Christian Church, upon the individual, both forms of education are employed. Some approach Christ from the ancient Jewish standpoint, others from the Gentile. Those who are brought up and grow up from their youth in piety, approach Christ from the Jewish or legal standpoint; and if they make an entrance into the kingdom, must do so by first proving to themselves, through a course of earnest obedience, the inadequacy of all human efforts; of all forms and ordinances to justify and to give peace to the conscience. They must learn that man is powerless in himself to resist sin, and must thus be brought to Christ for both justification and sanctification. If they stop short of Christ as the only ground of hope and of strength, they are without the kingdom, and relying upon the righteousness of works.

Others approach Christ from the Gentile standpoint; having plunged themselves into the abyss of sin, they have experienced its folly and its misery. From this dreadful condition they are rescued by faith in the Gospel of Jesus

Christ, and now He is all their strength and hope; they know what they had brought themselves to; they know who has brought them to where they now stand, and from the depths of the soul can say, "By the grace of God I am what I am."

Such, in brief, is the outline of that scheme of religious education which God has planned for man's salvation, both in its historic development and in its personal application to the individual. Such is the scheme opened to us in the Scriptures, and known as Redemption. The Scriptures give us the elements of instruction, the discipline employed, and an historic account of the practical working of the system. They present us with a method whereby man is brought to know God and to know himself; hereby his own subjective condition is made to stand out before the consciousness; he is thus brought practically to know himself, the sense of his necessitous condition is made to press upon him; and then, in the Revelation of Christ in the Gospel, his wants are, through faith, met and fully supplied. Thus the Scriptures have been, and must always be, the means, whereby man is to be saved. They have always been the instrumentality by means of which God has wrought the salvation of men. Man in his natural state is without true self-knowledge. Even when deeply sunk in the misery of sin, still he cannot understand it, he knows not what it is that has brought him to so desperate a condition; afloat on a stream whose banks are too distant to be seen, he knows not from whence or whither he is drifting. All are involved in this current of sin; there are no landmarks to point out how we are drifting. The Scriptures give us such landmarks; they give us, in the first place, the historical account of sin, and then, by means of the Revelation of the character of God and of His law, we are enabled to come to a practical consciousness of our

present internal condition. By comparing ourselves with God's character we learn our own; finding that it is very far departed from that of Him in whose image we were originally created. By comparing our conduct with the requirements of His law, we soon find that we are far distant from the righteousness of that law — that we are guilty, sinful creatures. We find that even when we would do good, evil is present with us; we find that the good that we would we do not, but the evil which we would not that we do; we find, therefore, that we are in bondage, sold under sin. Such is the state of things which the law, when regarded and honestly used as a rule of conduct, reveals to us as existing within. The law, then, when used, is the instrument for exciting a self-revelation. By it is the conscious knowledge of sin, both as to its guilt and power. Historically, the Scriptures tell us the same thing. "By one man," we read, "sin entered into the world, and death by sin;" and in the Book of Genesis we have presented to us the account of this sad transaction. Thus, both historically and experimentally, the Scriptures become the means of opening to us the condition in which we are, and the relation in which we stand as sinners with respect to a Holy God. By this instrumentality man arrives at a true self-knowledge, and at a true knowledge of God in His relation to us. The soul sees everything in a new light, its eyes are open now for the first time to the truth; "whereas it was blind (self-deceived), now it sees." Consciousness of guilt and of the miserable bondage under which the soul is to sin, makes it cry out for help, and in its extremity it turns to God. Here, then, we are met by the revelation of the Gospel. In it Christ is offered to the heavy-laden soul as a Saviour from both guilt and the power of sin and the devil. Faith at once accepts the offer; Christ as the bread of life is eaten; His flesh and

blood, as offered for the life of the world, become the life of the guilty; His flesh is bread indeed, and the words which He speaks are felt to be spirit and life. His spirit by faith becomes the sinner's strength, and thus by faith, man, a sinner, is saved; he has eternal life abiding in him.

Christianity, from the very beginning, has had to sustain itself against a very heavy pressure. Essentially, in the individual and in the race, it is a conflict, a struggle against the powers of the world, the flesh, and the devil. In one sense it means peace, in another it means war. "I came not to send peace," says its great Captain, "but a sword." This was only to be expected. "I will put enmity between thee and the woman, and between thy seed and her seed; it shall bruise thy head, and thou shalt bruise his heel." Here is Christianity at its very birth; a new power is ushered into the world, under God's own hand and seal, ratified in the rite of sacrifice. Evil is to have an antagonist in this world; two hosts are to contend against each other, under the banners of good and evil, under two distinct leaders. Christianity, then, from the very outset, proclaims itself a combatant; and to the end, in the individual experience, and in that of the race in its historic development, we must expect to meet the same spectacle.

The positions, around which and for which the struggle is waged, are continually shifting. Every age has its position to maintain. The position which we, of this age, are called upon to maintain, is the divine authority of the Holy Scriptures, especially that of the Old Testament. Every thinking man, in his own private experience, has now to fight a battle. No one, who is informed as to the scientific discoveries of the age, can fail to be affected more or less by them; he cannot but feel that the foundations which hitherto existed within him are being shaken, perhaps broken up, and in the uncertainty which under

such circumstances ensues, he finds himself casting about to find some method by which to reconcile the conflicting facts of science and revelation, and thus get a new basis to rest upon. Science for example has, it is claimed, clearly made it out that man has existed upon this earth for more than six thousand years. Such a statement is in conflict with what we have hitherto believed; that belief being grounded on the Biblical account. The Bible gives us an account of the creation, and then it gives us, as we thought, an uninterrupted genealogical line, down to well-known historic times. It gives us the exact number of years that elapsed between the Creation and the Deluge; giving us the length of each generation from Adam, through Seth, to Noah; from Noah it gives us a genealogical line through Shem down to Abraham; and through Abraham to known historic times. We had, up to this time, always supposed that here we had the real account of the creation of the world, and of the development of the human race, of the age of the world and of the race. But science shows satisfactorily, it is said, that this is all a mistake; that man has existed on the earth myriads of years, that in all probability the human race is not one family, not from one parent; but that it is diverse in its constitution and origin, springing from various centres. How, then, stands the case? To minds that are satisfied as to the truth of the facts of science, it is evident, either they must misinterpret the Scriptures, or they are untrue. To the minds which are not satisfied as to these facts of science, they are simply in a state of doubt; their faith has been unsettled; they are waiting for something further to develop itself, and they eagerly grasp at all the theories which are foisted upon them, holding to one after another, as they are successively exploded; uncertain as to everything, certain as to nothing; altogether they are in a painful state of doubt.

Those who are satisfied as to the facts of science, feeling that, with the present interpretation of Scripture, its account of the creation, and the account which science gives of it, are inevitably at variance, betake themselves to a re-examination of the Scripture, and begin to distort plain language, and to theorize.

The Mosaic account of the creation of the world and of man, is as clear and explicit as anything can well be, so much so that a child can understand it. God made the world, including man, in six days, and rested the seventh day. This is the plain statement made in the Scriptures. Now, as to the theory of periods, instead of days, is it tenable? Clearly, Moses, or whoever wrote this account, evidently meant to convey to his reader the impression that in six natural days the world was created; or why say, "the evening and the morning was the first day." And if this is written by inspiration, clearly God intended that such should be the impression conveyed. This account, be it remembered, was first given for the information of the Hebrews, and certainly they have always understood it according to the plain letter. "The evening and the morning was the first day," it is written. No matter about there being no sun, as some would argue, and that, therefore, there could be no evening and morning. After all, this is nothing but hypothesis; no one knows how it was then. Light appears to have been the first thing distinctly created; and then it is written, the evening and the morning was the first day. That God intended this plain meaning to be attached to this account, is proved by its repetition in the Fourth Commandment. The Jews are to keep the seventh day, because God did. This, be it remembered, was delivered by God himself from Sinai, in the hearing of the people; this, then, is not Moses, but God himself speaking, and He says of himself, "For in

six days the Lord made heaven and earth, the sea and all that in them is, and rested the seventh day and hallowed it;" here, then, is a plain statement made by God himself. If He had intended periods, surely this language would have been a mere play upon words. Nor did the Jews understand it so; they evidently understood God to say that, inasmuch as He had rested on the seventh day and hallowed it, they must do likewise. This, then, we say is the plain Scriptural statement; the Scriptures are committed to it, namely, that in six days, each of an evening and morning, "the Lord made heaven and earth, and the sea, and all that in them is, and rested the seventh day."

This same rule is to be applied to all the other points of the Scriptural account of this primal epoch; to the creation of Adam and Eve; to the disobedience and fall of man; to the antiquity of man, &c.

And then, as to the Deluge; there can be no doubt about it, that the writer of that account means to say that the Deluge was universal; he is at the greatest pains to impress this fact upon us. Every honest candid mind cannot but feel that this is so, and all twisting and distorting of the plain Scriptural statement, to accommodate it with the facts of science, is folly, it only does harm. No; let the Scriptures take care of themselves; what they say, they say clearly; if science and they are at issue, well, let them be, thus only will we ever meet the difficulty fairly and squarely, and settle it. The Scriptures need no scientific glosses, they can afford to stand by themselves. The Bible is then committed to the six days cosmogony, to the unity of the human race, and its non-antiquity, to the fall of man, and the universality of the Deluge. Directly in the teeth of the "development hypothesis," it asserts that man was originally formed in the image of God; that, instead of progress, we have before us degradation and retrogression. The

Bible and science, any candid mind must see, are now almost at every point directly in conflict.

In contradistinction to all those theories, which would by a series of glosses distort and contort the plain statements of Scripture, in the vain effort to make them conform to the alleged facts of science, which would construct out of this simple account a geological and ethnological scientific system; — in contradistinction to all such theories, we hold that this simple account is to be honestly dealt with; that we are to interpret it according to the plain signification which it bears on its face; that in it will be found, in the end, all the essential elements of truth. Thus, should we ever attain to a thorough knowledge of creation, it will be found that the statement here made in Genesis, is as adequate a one as any that could be framed; that in fact it is a formula for the creation. As to the unity of the race, there is no possible ambiguity in that statement, and in the end this will be found the true account of man's origin. As to the fall, this too is clearly stated, and in the end will be found a formula for the entrance of evil into the world. And as to the Deluge, there can be no doubt but that the writer believed, and that he intended to say that it was universal. Here too in the end we will find a formula for a catastrophe which overtook the world and swept from it all life, except that specially preserved in the Ark. The Deluge is evidently an epoch in the history of the world, and according to Scripture it was universal. The peopling of the world, as we find it now, is subsequent to the Deluge. "These are the three sons of Noah, and of them was the whole earth overspread." Shem, Ham, and Japhet are the sources of the diversity of the race as we now find it. And the problem of barbarous Africa will finally, too, find its solution, in the curse of Ham, or Canaan.

And now, lastly, as to time. Is the human race but six thousand years old? Here, as in other cases, the Scriptural account is so clear and explicit that there is no possibility of mistaking the meaning of it. The line of descent from Adam to Noah, through Seth, is expressly given; the length of each generation is expressly stated; so that the number of years elapsing between Adam and the Deluge can be ascertained by the simplest calculation. The only mistake possible, is, as to the numbers, and this only because of the liability to error in transcribing and in translating. But this, seeing we have the individuals, and inasmuch as they are so few, would after all be but a trifling error. Again, with the exception of the length of the generations, we have the same accuracy in a genealogical line extending from Noah, through Shem, to Abraham and the patriarchs. Moreover, this genealogical line is found again in Chronicles, and adopted and ratified by St. Luke in his Gospel; so that it must be considered an essential part of Revelation. Revelation, therefore, stands committed to only two thousand years, or thereabout, between the Creation and the Deluge, making the world and man, from its recorded creation, only about six thousand years old. This is man's antiquity, then, according to the Scriptures.

This, then, is the position in which every candid mind and honest believer in revelation now finds himself placed. The Holy Scriptures inform us that the world was created in six natural days; that the human race has its origin in one pair of ancestors; that they sinned and fell; that the Deluge was universal, destroying every living being except Noah, his family, and what was contained in the Ark. Moreover, from the genealogies given, man is but six thousand years old. Such are clearly the facts according to the Scriptures. Opposite to these statements, what do we find? — the facts according to science. Geology proves

irrefragably, it is claimed, that the world was myriads of years in being brought into its present condition. Geology, biology, and their cognate sciences, prove, it is said satisfactorily, the indefinite antiquity of man. Moreover, it appears, according to science, that the human race is not a unit, but has divers origins, having various centres. And again, under the light of science, the universality of the Deluge is regarded as unreasonable, and as highly improbable. How, then, is the candid mind to bear itself in the midst of such conflicting statements? We find ourselves, then, between two conflicting sets of statements. They are contradictory the one to the other; both, therefore, cannot be true. Which are we to stand by? Take, for instance, the Deluge, one of the clearest cases. Revelation declares, over and over again, that it was universal. Clearly this is stated, Gen. vi. 17: "And behold, I, even I do bring a flood of waters upon the earth to destroy *all* flesh wherein is the breath of life from under heaven; and everything that is in the earth shall die;" and again, "All flesh died that moved upon the earth, both of fowl and cattle, and of beast and of every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth, and every man." Note that *every* man, "all in whose nostrils was the breath of life, of all that was in the dry land died." No assertion can be clearer and more explicit than this — nothing more sweeping in its diction. Evidently the author of this account meant to state that the Deluge was universal, and that it put an end to all animal life that moved upon the face of the earth, except of that in the Ark. Scientists deny this fact, and tell us that science will not admit of it. Now, either the Deluge was universal, or it was not. If it was not, then the Scientist is right, and Revelation wrong. The account, therefore, is false. Can we admit this? It is vain to try to contort this language so as to accommodate it to the alleged neces-

sities of science. And, after all, it is perfectly useless; for no doubt any partial deluge would be regarded just as improbable. No; there is no escaping the dilemma: either the Deluge was universal, destroying man and all terrestrial animal life, or the Scriptural account is false.

This same process can be applied to each of the other points under dispute: the creation, the unity of the race, its antiquity, and fall. The day has come when these issues must be met and tried by each man, in his own mind; and accordingly as he decides, he must range himself on the one side or on the other. The question of the six days can be postponed for the present by means of the doctrine of the periods. Geology will have to progress further before the issue will be again formally made. The question of the unity of the race is now in court; that of the fall — though, as one would think, sadly verified in every one's own experience, and by the history of the race — yet even that is questioned, and the theory of the development hypothesis is in direct antagonism with it. The question of the Deluge seems to have been very generally decided against Revelation; and that of the antiquity of man is now in process of trial; the evidence collected so far, tending, in the judgment of many, strongly to uproot our former opinions on this subject. All the theories for the reconciliation of the Scriptural account with that of science have so far proved failures. No one can be satisfied with them. The language of Scripture is so simple and clear that all efforts to distort and to accommodate it, by means of unwarrantable glosses, with the alleged facts of science, only serve to disgust the candid mind, and to bring down the ridicule and contempt of the scientist. The question cannot be settled thus. It must be fairly stated and encountered. We must boldly take our stand, and insist upon it that the Scriptural account is essentially true, or we must aban-

don it altogether and declare it openly to be untrue and false.

"The question of the antiquity of the human race, like that of all animal life, is a question of biology; and biology derives all its data, as to time, from geology." Thus Professor Huxley writes. "But it may be said that it is biology, and not geology, which asks for so much time — that the succession of life demands vast intervals; but this appears to me to be reasoning in a circle. Biology takes her time from geology. The only reason we have for believing in the slow rate of the change in living forms, is the fact that they persist, through a series of deposits, which geology informs us have taken a long while to make. If the geological clock is wrong, all the naturalist will have to do, is to modify his notions of the rapidity of change accordingly."

Geology, then, is responsible for all the discredit that has been thrown by science upon the Bible account of the origin of things. It is with this science that the Theologian is at issue. To begin, then, we impugn the fundamental dictum of this science. The principle which underlies all geological speculation with respect to the past, or the future, is, if we take revelation as our guide, false. The principle to which we refer is this, namely, that the present processes which we observe in nature are those which have always been; that we are authorized, nay, compelled to conclude that the processes of nature have always gone on just as we observe them now, and that therefore the experience of the present is a revelation of the past, and, according to some theories, a prophecy of the future. Thus Professor Huxley: "I presume that 100,000 feet may be taken as a full allowance for the total thickness of stratified rocks, containing traces of life; 100,000 divided by 100,000,000 = 0.001. Consequently, the deposit of 100,000,000 years

means, that the deposit has taken place at the rate of $\frac{1}{1000}$ of a foot, or say $\frac{1}{83}$ of an inch per annum. Well, I do not know that any one is prepared to maintain that, even making all needful allowances, the stratified rocks may not have been formed, on the average, at the rate of $\frac{1}{83}$ of an inch per annum. I suppose that if such could be shown to be the limit of the world growth, we could put up with the allowance without feeling that our speculations had undergone any revolution. And perhaps, after all, the qualifying phrase, 'some such period,' may not necessitate the assumption of more than $\frac{1}{1666}$, or $\frac{1}{2409}$, or $\frac{1}{3332}$ of an inch of deposit per year, which, of course, would give us still more ease and comfort." Because, from present observation, it is quite plausible to suppose that $\frac{1}{83}$ or $\frac{1}{1666}$ of an inch of rock might be annually deposited, it is argued that the whole deposit took such a number of years, a mere sum in division: this gives us, according to this assumption, the antiquity of the stratified rocks, and so the age of this globe as habitable. But have we a right to take for granted such an uniformity in the processes of nature? Why may not the whole, one hundred thousand feet of stratified rock, have come into existence at once? To suppose such an uniformity is a mere begging the question, and assuming a position exactly in opposition to the teaching of Revelation.

There are three schools of geological speculation, we are told — catastrophism, uniformitarianism, and evolutionism. "Catastrophism," says Professor Huxley, "is the doctrine of a past era in geological inquiry; uniformitarianism, that of the present; while evolutionism has the honor of being that of the future." He himself is an advocate of the last. The first, the catastrophic, is the only theory that will at all admit the credibility of the cosmogony of Revelation. "The doctrine of violent upheavals of mountains, of sud-

den depressions of continents, of universal cataclysms, and the like, is catastrophic, insomuch that it assumes that the forces by which they were brought about were more intense than, or different from, any of those which we now experience." And then we are informed that the Hindoo, the Egyptian, and the Mosaic cosmogonies may be quoted as examples, as well as that of the Stoics.

The Bible cosmogony, it will be seen, is classified under this theory, and it is the only theory that will admit of any possibility of its being true. But this school, we are told, belongs to the past; it has been exploded and abandoned, and uniformitarianism has taken its place. "Catastrophism," says Professor Huxley, "has insisted upon the existence of a practically unlimited bank of force, on which the theorist might draw. Uniformitarianism, on the other hand, has with equal justice insisted upon a practically unlimited bank of time, ready to discount any quantity of hypothetical paper."

This theory grounds itself upon the principle we have assailed as being false; it begs the whole question, and assumes that exactly what we see occurring now, has always thus occurred; that the processes of nature are the same yesterday, to-day, and forever. According to this theory, "all the phenomena in the past history of the earth are ascribed to forces identical in nature with, and not more energetic than those now active on the face of the earth. From this point of view, the forces that are now bringing about changes are so gradual that they almost escape observation, are adequate to produce the most stupendous geological results, in unlimited time. Things have remained in the remote past, very much as we have known them during the last two or three thousand years, and the equilibrium of nature has not been destroyed, although local changes have taken place. According to Hutton,

there is no physical evidence of a beginning, no prospect of an end; and in this he is followed by the great apostle of the uniformitarian school, Sir Charles Lyell." "For this they willingly are ignorant of, that by the word of God the heavens were of old, and the earth standing out of the water, and in the water: whereby the world that then was, being overflowed with water, perished. But the heavens and the earth which are now, by the same word are kept in store, reserved unto fire against the day of judgment and perdition of ungodly men." 2 Peter iii. 5–7. Evidently, uniformitarianism is not the doctrine of the Scriptures; nor do we see what right it has to assume that "the forces productive of the phenomena of the past are identical, and not more energetic than those now active on the face of the earth." Evidently, the advocates of such a theory must disallow the existence of miraculous phenomena; the fundamental principle being that the present is the exponent of the past; since present observation and experience fail to give us miracles as phenomena of nature, necessarily we must conclude that they never were. This is but a return upon us of the skepticism of Hume, only coming under another form. Hume argued that miracles were incredible, because they contradicted our experience. Evidently he adopts the dictum of uniformitarianism, that the present order of things is also that of the past, and that therefore no testimony can convince the mind of the reality of miracles. Supposing that this is the truth; supposing that we are to judge of the past, nay, must judge of it by the present, of course, then, miracles are incredible, and as facts, non-existent; and the Bible, with its long list of miraculous events, is untrue and but a fable.

If we draw our conclusions from the Scriptures, our fundamental formula will be directly in conflict with that of uniformitarianism. According to the Scriptures, the

processes of ancient times were very different from those of the present. Beginning with the creation, we have a series of events such as the experience of the present never would teach us to expect. The state of things described in the Scriptures is entirely different from what we now find them. The economy of the world, it would appear, has undergone a change. God no longer does wonders and signs in the sight of mortals. We have no Sodom and Gomorrah scenes now; no Mount Sinai terrors; no angelic appearances; no plagues of Egypt; no dividing of seas for nations to pass over; no voice from heaven now speaks to men in tones of thunder; no deluge has since that great one, swept over the earth. The sun and moon, never now, as in the days of Joshua, stand still; nor does the sun now go backward, as on the dial of Ahaz. Nor are even lesser wonders now witnessed; no blind are now made miraculously to see; no lame to walk, deaf to hear, and dead to be raised. All those signs and wonders which sometimes astonished, sometimes alarmed men, have long ago ceased, and we have nothing now to remind us that there is a God, save the "still small voice" of the spirit, and the internal miracle of regeneration. The economy has changed, and there has consequently come upon us the sign spoken of by the Apostle Peter: "There shall come in the last days scoffers, walking after their own lusts, and saying, Where is the promise of His coming? for since the fathers fell asleep, all things continue as they were from the beginning of the creation." And this change of Divine operation applies to the physical as thoroughly as to the moral.

We cannot but conclude then, that, according to the Scriptures, so far from the present being an exponent of the past, it is on the contrary entirely different from it; we cannot then argue from the one to the other. We cannot

argue that because now $\frac{1}{8}\frac{1}{3}$ of an inch of rock may be deposited annually, therefore the inhabitable world is so many years old. We cannot thus reduce the antiquity of the world to a mere sum in long division. For all that we know from observation, and such appears to have been actually the case, the world may have been created all at once, in six days; man was created at once in his maturity, by the creative fiat of an Almighty Word; and the Scriptures seem to teach the same doctrine as to the creation of the physical world. God said, "Let there be light," and at once there was light; and the same of all other things. Because we now see man growing from infancy into manhood, because such is our present experience of the origin and development of human nature, is this any reason why we should be compelled to conclude that man was not, in the first place, created in maturity? And just so there is no reason why we may not conclude that this world was not ushered into existence, by the creative fiat, complete in structure. Experience of the present, in opposition to the dictum of uniformitarianism, is no guide as to the past.

Evolutionism, the third scheme of geological speculation, is not much more satisfactory than uniformitarianism; like the latter, it reasons from the present to the past. "In common with Lyell and Hutter," Kant, who is regarded by Professor Huxley as the founder of this school, "argues from the present order of things to the past, using, so far as the knowledge of his day would allow, uniformitarian doctrine." "With as much truth as Hutton, Kant could say," writes Professor Huxley, "I take things just as I find them at present, and from these reason with regard to that which must have been." "Like Hutton, he is never tired of pointing out that in nature there is wisdom, system, and constancy." The same principle then underlies evolutionism as uniformitarianism. The difference between them

lies in this, that uniformitarianism knows no beginning nor end, whereas evolutionism pretends to give us both. "Kant (writes Professor Huxley) expounds a complete cosmogony in the shape of a theory of the causes which have led to the development of the universe from diffused atoms of matter endowed with simple attractive and repulsive forces." "Give me matter," says Kant, "and I will build the world." "And he proceeds to deduce from the simple data from which he starts, a doctrine in all essential respects similar to the well-known 'Nebular Hypothesis' of Laplace. He accounts for the relation of the masses and densities of the planets to their distances from the sun, for the eccentricities of their orbits, for their rotations, for their satellites, for the general agreement in the direction of rotation among the celestial bodies, for Saturn's ring, and for the zodiacal light. He finds in each system of worlds indications that the attractive force of the central mass will eventually destroy its organization by concentrating upon itself the matter of the whole system; but, as the result of this concentration, he argues for the development of an amount of heat which will dissipate the mass once more into a molecular chaos such as that in which it began. Kant pictures to himself the universe as once an infinite expansion of formless and diffused matter. At one point of this he supposes a single centre of attraction, set up, and, by strict deductions from admitted dynamical principles, shows how this must result in the development of a prodigious central body, surrounded by systems of solar and planetary worlds in all stages of development. In vivid language he depicts the great world maelstrom widening the margins of its prodigious eddy, in the slow progress of millions of ages gradually reclaiming more and more of the molecular waste, and converting chaos into cosmos. But what is gained at the margin is lost in the centre; the

attractions of the central systems bring their constituents together, which then, by the heat evolved, are converted once more into molecular chaos. Thus the worlds that are, lie between the ruins of the worlds that have been and the chaotic materials of the worlds that shall be, and in spite of all waste and destruction, cosmos is extending his borders at the expense of chaos."

Evolutionism applied to biology gives us Darwin's theory of the origin of the species, or the development hypothesis. This, taken in conjunction with the "nebular hypothesis," as expounded by Kant, gives us what professes to be a philosophical account of all the complex phenomena of the world. This, then, is the philosophical account of the origin of things, and a theory of the universe, and competes with the Scriptures for the faith of mankind. The lines are drawn: we must range ourselves on the one side or the other. Evolutionism is as far from the Scriptural account of the origin of things as is uniformitarianism. It adopts the fundamental principle of the latter, that the present order of things is the same as that of the past; it adds a theory for the beginning and the end, and so the circle is completed. It requires no God; a speculation which begins in Pantheism, and which must inevitably end in Atheism.

We have seen that biology is entirely dependent upon geology for its data with respect to dates; and geology, in its turn, so far as it undertakes to speculate with respect to the past, is for its dates dependent upon the principle that the present is the interpreter or exponent of the past. Catastrophism, as a theory of speculative geology, in its account of the past, is the only geological theory which is not necessarily in conflict with the Biblical account of the past; but this theory, as we have seen, is now abandoned.

Putting aside the question of dates, the scientific version

of the origin and development of the human race amounts to this. The Development Hypothesis of Darwin (though some would appear to deny that man is a descendant of the ape) has been practically adopted. Man is supposed to be in his origin little better than a wild animal, living like a beast of prey in dens and caves, his only weapon of defence a rude club or a piece of rock; his whole life consisting in a struggle with the wild beasts of the forest for food. This is called the "Stone Age;" from this, according to some development hypothesis, he is supposed to emerge, and gradually to rise until he arrives at the "Bronze Age;" then again he progresses, and finally arrives at the "Iron Age," where he is supposed to become somewhat civilized, and in reality a man; for before this he was nothing more than a wild beast. And here it is, we suppose, that the Scriptural account of the race is allowed to begin.

According, then, to this account, man's origin is buried in the dark obscurity of the infinitely remote geological ages of the past. How low down in the scale of being man was, at his creation, it is impossible precisely to gather from this account. Darwin, and his school, logically place it in the ape; or, going back further (with Professor Huxley), place man's origin "in the shapeless mass of protoplasm." Man, then, beginning with "protoplasm," after myriads of ages of progress through the ape, &c., emerges into the wild beastism of the Stone Age; passing through this, he emerges into the Bronze Age; and, in time, passing through this, he emerges into the Iron Age. M. Figuier, in his work entitled "Primitive Man," gives a most perspicuous account of this truly mythical progress of the human race, presenting us with pictures of man's appearance and general condition during each of these periods.

Now this scientific account of man is in conflict with that of Revelation. According to Revelation, man does not begin "in the shapeless mass of protoplasm;" nor in the ape; nor in wild beastism. "And God said, Let us make man in our image after our likeness, and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth. So God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him, male and female created he them." Man was made, then, originally in God's own image, and given dominion over all the earth. Evidently, Adam was not a wild beast; and if men have been found in such a condition, it is because they have retrogressed, and not that they have progressed. The development hypothesis is in conflict with the facts of Scripture. No doubt, man, in many parts of the world, in times past and at present, as in Africa, is but little removed from the wild beast; but he has brought himself to this condition. In such cases we have before us not progress, but degradation; we have in it, the evidence of sin and the curse. Man began with being in the image of God, according to the Scriptures, — a sinless, noble, commanding creature.

Again, so far from there being any such gradual progress, as from the "stone" to the "bronze" and "iron ages;" so far from this being a fact in the historic development of the race; the Scripture tells us, in speaking of the very first set of men, of Tubal Cain the son of Lamech, the son of Methusael, the son of Mehujael, the great-grandson of Cain, that he was "an instructor of every artificer in brass and iron." As to caves: "Jabal was the father of such as dwell in tents and have cattle." As to culture: "Jubal was the father of all such as handle the organ and the harp." This certainly gives us a very different impression of man's

condition, in his first stage of development, from that given us in the pages of M. Figuier. The two accounts are in conflict; the one takes it for granted that man begins in "protoplasm," or in the ape, or in wild beastism; the other, the Scriptural account, makes man at his origin a noble, intelligent, sinless being, made in the image of God. His origin is the highest point of the natural development of the race; subsequent history gives us a lapse, retrogression, human degradation, more or less retarded and restrained by an overruling Providence. The degradation of Canaan, he being under a special curse, was to be the greatest.

These are vital questions to our race, questions on which it is all-important we should have some settled views; otherwise we shall be plunged in a sea of idle speculation and doubt. Moreover, Christianity is vitally connected with them; St. Paul, St. Peter, Christ himself, the whole New Testament, indorses the Old. Christianity rests upon the Old Testament as its foundation. Christ and Adam are, according to the Scriptures, the turning-points in man's history. Christianity must therefore share the fate of the Old Testament. The time has come, then, when we must take our stand. Every thoughtful mind is necessitated, by the present state of things, to look into these questions, and to settle them personally for himself. One thing is certain — either this whole account of creation and of antediluvian man is God's truth, or it is an unsound myth. If untrue, let it go into the abyss where all such things belong; let us cease to teach our children what is untrue; let us do away with the solemn farce of reading it in our churches. Are we ready for this?

The general impression made upon every candid mind in reading this History, is that it is inspired and the truth. "Never man wrote like this man." It bears the stamp of God upon it. And this internal evidence is to us the most

convincing. It appeals at once to our consciousness, and at once we feel its power, that it is God's word. The author of this History is evidently in a peculiar position ; he speaks with the utmost assurance of God's thoughts, and feelings, and counsels, which could not but have been within the very circle of the Godhead itself. "And God said, Let us make man after our own image, and in our own likeness." Now, how could any mortal know of God's counsels within himself? Again, "It repented the Lord that He had made man on the earth, and it grieved Him at His heart." How could any mortal historian make such a statement? Whoever wrote these things seems to have been admitted into the innermost confidence, the very bosom of the Godhead. He speaks like an amanuensis writing at the dictation of God himself, who speaks of Himself in the third person. It seems, therefore, to be God's own account of the matter. Certainly, no man could of himself have been acquainted with the facts of creation ; they are necessarily, humanly speaking, pre-historic. The creation, necessarily, from the nature of the case, must be a revelation. If it is not, then it must be the mere figment of some poetic imagination, the dream of some poet author, who profanely dares to propound it as God's truth.

The issue has now, in this age, been formally made. Each one of us, in the quiet forum of our own minds, must examine into the question and decide for ourselves. Rapidly it is being decided by the Church and world at large, and perhaps by the next century will be settled, and appear in the form of a current belief. Let one even now attempt to feel certain as to any of these facts, and he will find how far, already, the current has borne him. Few dare now to assert the universality of the Deluge, and fewer believe it. Already confidence in the Scriptures has been sadly shaken, and our prophets know it not. They know not that they

themselves are fast falling into the ranks of infidelity, and are being borne along by its current.

Now the Scriptures are the instrumentality by means of which God gives man a religious education and regenerates him. When He takes a portion of the human race, and brings it into a near relationship with respect to himself, He puts this book into their hands, and bids them read, learn, and inwardly digest it. Now if these Scriptures are to be man's God-appointed teacher, is it not but reasonable to suppose that they will contain the truth? Certainly, on all important points. If the Scriptures are false, then indeed are we in a sad plight. We are all in the dark as to God, the world, and ourselves. Like the heathen nations, we must betake ourselves to speculation and conjure up a cosmogony and some scheme which will account for the origin and condition of man. If the Scriptures are false, we are without a guide, and the whole apparatus for the religious education and regeneration of man is a failure. If we must distrust our teacher in the very beginning, evidently there is no telling where we can trust Him. Our faith in the whole system is shaken; we know not what to believe; we know not when the Scriptures speak the truth, and when they are false. The end is inevitable; we will discard them utterly, and must teach ourselves, must depend upon our own resources, upon the wild confusion of half-constructed sciences, upon the oracular deliverances of a host of half-informed scientists. We are to leave, in fine, living waters, and betake ourselves to broken cisterns. We must lie down involved in Stygian darkness, without hope, without God in the world. Such, men of the nineteenth century, is the inevitable doom awaiting us, the fate attendant upon tampering with and distrusting the utterances of the infallible Word of God. We have yielded too long to these insidious assaults and underminings of a science man-

aged by ungodly men. It is time for us to man our guns, to get ready for action — the enemy is now upon us in earnest.

The dark shadow of infidelity which has so long rested upon Germany, creeping on slowly, has finally settled down upon us. The eclipse of faith has begun, and perhaps it may be a total one. This alone supports us, that an eclipse is never of long duration. "The night cometh, but also the morning." Already the shadows of an ominous penumbra have settled down upon us. Germany is beginning to emerge; but the shadow, ominously creeping on, is now enveloping us. Germany is metaphysical and critical. The tempter therefore approached her, clad in transcendentalism. The New Testament was the point of attack, and Christ and Christianity finally disappeared in a myth. We, true to our English relationship, are scientific and practical. The tempter approaches us wrapped in the mantle of a pretentious science. The Old Testament is the point of attack, and that, under his insidious assaults, is fast, like the New Testament in Germany, vanishing in a myth. The object aimed at in both cases is the same, namely, infidelity; to engender a disbelief in and distrust of the Word of God.

Now, without the Scriptures, salvation is impossible. Man and God are two realities, but man cannot know the one or the other, but through the instrumentality of these Scriptures. Self-consciousness, in its relation to sin, must remain dormant until aroused by the power of the Word. The true God cannot be known savingly by man of himself. The future too must remain an enigma, without such light as is shed upon the subject through the Scriptures. To distrust them is then fatal, it is the greatest misfortune that can befall the race. Science, then, managed as it is by ungodly men, is the greatest danger that besets this age. It aims at overturning our faith in Revelation. What, for in-

stance, is the sentence of science upon this utterance of Scripture: "Then spake Joshua to the Lord in the day when the Lord delivered up the Amorites before the children of Israel; and he said in the sight of Israel, Sun, stand thou still upon Gideon; and thou, Moon, in the valley of Ajalon. And the sun stood still, and the moon stayed, until the people had avenged themselves upon their enemies. Is not this written in the book of Jasher? So the sun stood still in the midst of heaven, and hasted not to go down about a whole day. And there was no day like that before it, or after it, that the Lord had hearkened unto the voice of a man; for the Lord fought for Israel." Nothing can be more solemnly affirmed than this. Revelation is committed to it. It is referred to again in Isaiah xxviii. 21.

What says science to the standing-still of the sun and moon for a whole day? And again to the same point is Isaiah xxxviii. 8: "Behold, I will bring again the shadow of the degrees, which is gone down in the sun-dial of Ahaz, ten degrees backwards. So the sun returned ten degrees, by which degrees it was gone down." What says science to this? And is not the creation of the world in six days just as possible as either of these events? The truth is, the Bible is a book of miracles; if you doubt one, you must doubt all, and discard the whole Bible. Science tells us it is utterly impossible that the sun and moon should stand still, or that the sun should go backwards; but Revelation tells us that both these things have happened. We must choose between the two, and be either scientific infidels or unscientific believers. St. Paul saw this state of things ahead of him, and he warns us, 1 Timothy vi. 20: "Avoid profane and vain babblings, and oppositions of science, falsely so called;" and again, "Neither give heed to fables and endless genealogies, which minister questions, rather than godly edifying which is in faith." Of course,

this advice will only apply to believers, and it is very evident that they are now in need of this warning. All of us, after all, are but borne along in the current of the spirit of the age. Like mariners far out on the ocean, drifting along upon some oceanic current, we are borne onward by the spirit of the age, not knowing where we are or whither we are going. There is a providence of evil as well as of good — a vast undercurrent of spiritual forces, bearing man unconsciously along upon its surface. The spirit of the age is this providence of evil. No doubt God overrules it for good; but it is grand and awful in its movement, and carries man floating upon it, like a feather upon the surface of a torrent. We, as Christians, find ourselves floating along with this current; few are conscious of their situation. The watchmen are mute, and fail to cry out the hour of the night. The current is rapidly nearing the vortex of infidelity. It becomes us to recover ourselves before it is too late.

The signs of the times demand of Christians that they should stand to their colors. Christian men must hold themselves aloof from all these unprofitable questions of science; they must withdraw from this field, and confine themselves to the Scriptures. They must, in the face of science, hold to the text of the Scriptures.

We must take these statements as they stand, and if there be some mystery about them, we must in faith leave it so, knowing that God has purposely so stated it, and we must wait for another sphere of existence to have all difficulties cleared up. Alas! it is mournful to see already how far we have drifted. Already we can hear in communions which regard themselves as orthodox, ministers of the gospel flatly declaring that the Deluge was not universal, that the world was myriads of years in being created. This, in the very teeth of the volume which they have sworn to respect

and defend, as the very infallible Word of God. Behold this sign of the times! Whither are we drifting, O men, O Christian men of the period? Into the abyss — the vortex of infidelity! And O whither, then? Distrust, disbelieve the Word of God, and where are we? Adrift! afloat upon the wild sea of perdition, without hope, without God in the world! Christian men, awake, arouse yourselves to the peril of your situation, and gird yourselves for the conflict! Stand to your Bibles, or you are lost. "For all flesh is as grass, and all the glory of man as the flower of grass. The grass withereth, and the flower thereof falleth away. But the Word of the Lord endureth for ever."

CONCLUSION.

IN opposition to the spirit of the age, we protest that there are realities besides those which the senses reveal to us. We do not impugn the reality of the one; but we do insist upon that of the other. Just as certainly as nature exists, does God. We know of the one through consciousness, and exactly through the same means do we know of the other. Theology is just as much a science as is geology, for there is a God, and there is a knowledge of Him. There is something, we say, besides this world; besides the whole universe, the human consciousness demands it. Religion is a reality. The fact of its existence in any of its forms is a standing proof that there is something in human nature which demands it. Christianity, too, is a reality. As revealed in the Word of God, it is a Divine power, a spiritual force introduced by Christ, and now operating in the historic development of the race.

The strongest argument for the Divine nature of the Christian religion is to be found in the personal experience of the believer. The Gospel of Christ is the power of God "unto every one that believeth." The Apostles knew this. Christianity was to them not a mere intellectual dogma; it was a spiritual power. They were convinced of the deity of Christ, not only by His external, but also by His internal miracles. Regeneration or conversion is the greatest of all miracles, and this miracle takes place in the consciousness of every one that believes. Every believer, therefore, has an experience of the power of Christ and of His Gospel, and knows that Christ is God and that Christianity is Divine. Faith in Christ, as offered for the life of the world, has restored the believer, heavy-laden with guilt, to a state of conscious peace with God, and to a state of filial trust and love. Christ's flesh and blood have proved both food indeed and drink indeed. Consciously, too, Christ dwells in the heart of the believer by His Spirit. He feels that, in his consciousness, he is a new creature; that "the law of the spirit of life has made him free from the law of sin and death." The Spirit of God witnesses with his spirit that he is a son of God, and hereby he knows that he dwells in God and that God dwells in him by the Spirit which Christ has given him. The indwelling of the Spirit is a conscious fact in the soul of the regenerated believer.

Therefore, inasmuch as through faith in the Gospel the soul has attained peace with God and the gift of the Spirit, it knows through its own experience that Christianity is what it professes to be — "the power of God unto salvation." Such proof is, of course, possible only to the believer. None can feel the weight of it but those who personally believe. But, then, when a man once has it, none can take it away from him. It gives him no argument

wherewith to meet the cavils of the unbeliever; but for himself he *knows* — the evidence is himself. Like the blind man restored to sight, one thing he knows: "whereas he was blind, now he sees;" whereas he was weary and heavy-laden with the burden of his guilt, now he has found rest, and enjoys peace and joy in the Holy Ghost; whereas sin had the dominion over him, now, through the grace of God, though sorely pressed, he can stand. Thus he has the witness in himself that Christ is the Saviour, and that His Gospel is verily the power of God unto salvation.

There are realities besides what the senses reveal to us; there are inward facts as well as outward. There is such a thing in human nature as sin, as remorse, as guilt. There is in the soul, in its very consciousness, the tremendous reality of a God, and there is such a thing as the fear of God in the soul — the fear of death and of a future judgment. There is such a fact in human nature as prayer and as sacrifice. All these are facts just as certainly as that there are rocks and metals and gases, and other things that are seen. It is time that we should become aware of the existence of this class of facts. The attention of this nineteenth century has been too long engrossed with the things that are seen. It is time for us to turn our attention to the eternal. Let us "look, not at the things which are seen, but at the things which are not seen; for the things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal."

THE END.

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